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rP R E F A C E
Since th is  th e a is  d ea ls  w ith  the m ethodology of the 
s o c ia l sc ie n ce s in gener* ' and w ith  econom ics in  p a r t ic u la r  
and s ince o b je c t iv i ty  is  one o f the re q u ire m e n ts  o f sc ie n ce , 
i t  seem s a p p ro p ria te  th a t the au th o r d e c la re  b is in te re s ts  
in  the chosen to p ic  b e fo re  going any fu r th e r .
T iie  w r i t in g  of th is  th e s is  was prom pted  by t-wc 
fa c to rs :
(a) The attem p t to le a rn  m ore about the chosen f ie ld  and
(b) a concern  th at re s u lte d  fro m  the r e a liz a t io n  th at much 
of m odern  econom ics is  not the study of homo but of robo t 
(as  Shackle has put i t ) .  I f  i t  is  a c ce p te d , on the o ther 
han d , th a t m a n , f a r  fro m  boing a ro b o t, is  in  some sense 
f r e e  to make d e c is io n s , what are  some of the c on sec: .e nces 
of such an assum ption  fo r  econom ic th e o ry ?  I t  is  the  
endeavour to  an s w e r th is  question  th at has re s u lte d  tn
the body of th is  th e s is .
I f  man ie  an a c tin g , choosing a n im a l then what can 
be sa id  about concepts such as s o c ia l la w s , e q u il ib r iu m  
and p re d ic t io n  in the s o c ia l sc ie n ce s?  I t  is  in attem p tin g  to 
aa sw er q u es tions l ik e  these th a t an au thor is  le d  f a r  fro m  
the land  w here he has grow n up and taken in to  neighbouring  
la n ds  th at o ften  appear stra-uge and u n fa m ilia r .  As H ayek  
has put it :  "T h e re  is  s c a rc e ly  an in d iv id u a l phenomenon
o r even t in  s o c ie ty  w ith  w hich  we can d ea l adequate ly  
w ith o u t knowing a g re a t  d ea l o f s e v e ra l d is c ip lin e s , not 
to  speak o f the know ledge of p a r t ic u la r  fa c ts  th a t w i l l  be 
re q u ire d . None of us can fe e l but v e ry  hum ble when he 




so c ia l p ro ce ss  . . .  In  an Id e a l w o rld  an econom ist who 
knows no la w , an a n th ro p o lo g is t who knows no econom ics , 
a psy ch o lo g is t who knows no p h ilo s op h y , or a h is to r ia n  
who does not know alm o st e v e ry  su b jecf aitouid be 
in c o n c e iv a b le ; ye t the fa c t is ,  of c o u rs e , th a t the 
l im ita t io n s  of our c a p a c it ie s  make such d e fic ie n c ie s
A tte m p ts  have ac c o rd in g ly  been made to  avoid  
d is cu ss in g  in  d e ta i l is sues in ne igh b o u rin g  d is c ip lin e s  
excep t in  so fa r  as these is sues a re  e s s e n tia l in  a 
d is cu ss io n  of the chosen to p ic . W here p o s s ib le , an attem p t 
has been made to exam ine how econom ists  have found 
so lu tio n s  to s im i la r  p ro b lem s.
E m il K auder in  an o th er c o n te x t, has re fe r r e d  to 
some of h is fe e lin g s  in  w r i t in g  h is  book. " I  was t h r i l le d  
by the d is c o v e ry  of new in s ig h ts  and the d igg ing  out of 
old  docum ents. F u r th e rm o re  at a t im e  l ik e  th is  i t  is 
a g re e a b le  to d e s c rib e  a ph ilo s op h y  of ev eryd ay  l i fe  
w hich does not d e fin e  man as . .  . a puppet dancing at 
the command of m u lt ip l ie r  and a c c e le ra to r ,  but which  
sees in  man a person  who s e le c ts  h is lu n c h , h is d in n e r,  
h is  w a rd ro b e  , and h is  house. " ^  The a u th o r ex pres ses  
s im ila r  se n tim e n ts .
I t  re m a in s  fo r  me to  ex p res s  my deut and thanks 
to P ro fe s s o r  L .M .  Lachm ann . Anyone who is  f a m il ia r  w ith  
h is  id e as  w i l l  n o tice  im m e d ia te ly  how g re a t h is in flu en c e  
has been in  the w r i t in g  of th is  th e s is . N eed less to s a y ,
I  b ea r f u l l  re s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  a l l  m is co n c ep tio n s .
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C H A P TER  1
JN 2.R 0 D U C T IO N
M uch of the advance in  econom ic th e o ry  has 
re s u lte d  fro m  a c o n s is te n t ap p lica tion , o f B u b je e tiv ia m .
The a im  of th is  th e s is  is  to set on a f i r m  foundation  
the b a s ic  p o stu la te s  o f s u b je c tiv is m  and then to exam ine  
aoniB ot the consequences fo r  econom ic th e o ry  of the 
s u b je c t iv is t  approach .
I t  seem s n e c e s s a ry  at th is  e a r ly  stage to  define  
b r ie f ly  w hat is  m eant by s u b je c tiv is m  in  th is  th e s is .
(In  C h ap ter 6 the b as ic  p o stu la te s  of s u b je c tiv is m  are  
exam ined  in  g re a te r  d e t a i l . ) The s u b je c t iv is t  approach  
holds th a t s o c ia l phenom ena m ust be e x p la in ed  by being  
deduced fro m  the p lans and ac tio n s  of in d iv id u a ls . I t  
is  ac c o rd in g ly  n e c e s s a ry  to d e fin e  e x a c tly  w hat is  m eant 
and assum ed by the no tion  of "a  p la n"  and to d iscuss the 
pro b lem s th a t th is  ra is e s  fo r  econom ic th e o ry . The 
p la n  r e fe r s  to th a t co n s is te n t p a tte rn  w hich  l ie s  behind  
o b s e rv a b le  ac tio n  and which con ta ins  the v a rio u s  purposes  
of the a c to r  bound to g e th e r w ith  the means to be em ployed. 
Each p lan  con ta ins  d if fe re n t  su b je c tiv e  e le m e n ts . "N ot 
m e re ly  do the purposes soug'it in  i t  r e f le c t  the su b je c tiv e  
choice o f e n d s , but what purposes a re  re g a rd e d  as 
. a tta in a b le  in a g iv en  s itu a tio n  depend on su b je c tiv e  
ex p ec ta tio n s  of an u n c e rta in  fu tu re  as w e ll  as on 
s u b je c tiv e  judgem ent o f the re le v a n c e  of pas t e x p e r ie n c e , 
s u b je c t iv e ly  in te r p r e te d ,  to  th is  fu tu re . The notion
of the p lan  and some p ro b lem s fo llo w in g  fro m  th is  notion  





I t  m igh t soem c o n tra d ic to ry  to have suggested j [
in  the f i r s t  p ara g rap h  above th at much of the advance in  ; \
econom ic th e u ry  has re s u lte d  fro m  a co n s is te n t a p p lic a tio n  ■
of s u b je c tiv is m  and then to  suggest, in  the p rev io u s  \
p a ra g ra p h , th a t i t  is  n ec e s s a ry  to exam ine the consequences I
o f th is  approach fo r  econom ic th e o ry . I f  much of the  
advance in econom ic thought has b *en  the re s u lt  o f an 
a p p lic a tio n  of the s u b je c t iv is t  m ethod (and th is  must 
s t i l l  be e s ta b lis h e d ) then s u re ly  the consequences o f s u b je c t ! -  \ 
vis m  m ust bt w e ll known ? And i f  th is  is  s o , how can the -
p re s e n t to p ic  be iu s tif is d ?  j
In  th is  jp n e c tio n , two im p o rta n t po in ts  are  
brought out in the h is to r ic a l  in tro d u c tio n  in  C h ap ter 2 . ;
The f i r s t  is  th a t the s u b je c t iv is t  r e v o lu t io n , or the 
m a rg in a l re v o lu t io n , of the 1870s and a l i t t l e  e a r l i e r ,  
w hich e s ta b lis h e d  th a t econom ic va lu e  m ust be seen as 
the consequence of the in te ra c t io n  of a p p ra is in g  m in d s , 
should not be looked  at as a co m plete  a p p lic a tio n  of 
s u b je c t iv is t  p r in c ip le s . The m ain  reason  fo r  th is  
co n c lu s io n , w hich is  e la b o ra te d  upon la te r  in  th is  th e s is , i
if* th a t the t r a c ts  o i d e te rm in is m  to bo found In  the 1
w r i t in g s  cf the e a r ly  " s u b je c t iv is ts "  a re  in c o m p a tib le  |
w i'H  s u b je c tiv is m  as d efined  in  th is  th e s is . W hereas  
in  o ur d e f in it io n  the autonom y of human ac tio n  is  o f the 
ess ‘n e e , the "s u b je c t iv is m "  of the e a r ly  " s u b je c t iv is ts "  
co n ta ined  concep tions th a t v io la te  th is  p r in c ip le . But 
since an adequate d is cu ss io n  of th is  m a tte r  now would  
re q u ire  too g re a t  a d e to u r, i t  is  le f t  to  la t e r  p a rts  of 
th is  th e s is . I t  was o n ly  much la te r  th a t M ie e s , in flu en c ed  




rIn flu e n c e  of d e te rm in is m  and th e re fo re  d e c la re d  the autonomy 
of m e  s o c ia l s c ie n ce s .
S ince s u b je c tiv is m  has been n o ta b ly  espoused by m em bers  
o f the A u s tr ia n  S c h o o l, th re e  c h a p te rs  have been devoted to 
an ex a m in a tio n  o f the developm ent o f s u b je c tiv is m  at the bands 
o f it s  fo u n d e r, C a r l M en g ar and two of h is  su c ce ss o rs , M ls e s  
and H ayek . I t  is  p a r t ic u la r ly  in te re s t in g  to note the la t t e r 's  
e a r ly  ideas on s u b je c tiv is m  and the subsequent m o d if ic a tio n  
of th ese  id e a s , la r g e ly  u nder the In flu e n c e  of K a . l  Popper,. 
C h ap ters  3 , 4 and 5 a re  devoted to these m em bers of the 
A u s tr ia n  School.
The second p o in t brought out in  the h is to r ic a l in t r o ­
d u ction  is  th a t i t  was on ly much la te r  th a t some of the m ost 
Im p o rta n t consequences of s u b je c t iv is m , nam e ly  u n c e rta in ty  
and the consequent im p o rta n c e  o f e x p e c ta t io n s ,w e re  in tro d uc ed  
in to  econom ic th e o ry . In  th is  co n n e ctio n , the outstanding  
exam ples a r e ,  of c o u rs e , K n ig h t's  R is k , U n c e r ta in ty and P r o f i t  . 
the w o rk o f J . A . Schum peter and the ro le  o f u n c e rta in ty  in  
K e y n e s ' w r i t in g s , p a r t ic u la r ly  h is w r i t in g s  in  the f ie ld  o f m oney.
H o w e v e r, eve. K eynes ex p e rie n c e d  d if f ic u lty  in  
in c o r p o ra t i^ s  the e ffe c ts  of u n c e rta in ty  in to  h is  an a ly s is  
and I t  is  th is  d i f f ic u lt y  th a t has le d  Shackle to  c o n tra s t the  
method and th" m eaning of K ey n es ' a n a ly s is . The consequences  
of u n c e r ta in ty  and the im p o rtan c e  o f e x p ec ta tio n s  fo r  econom ic  
th e o ry  c o n s titu te  re c u r r in g  them es in th is  th e s is  p a r t ic u la r ly  
in  C h ap ters  7 , 9 and 10 , F u r th e rm o re  i t  is  no ted  th at a la rg e  
p a rt  o f m odern  econom ic th e o ry  has a ttem p ted  to s id e -s te p  
the p ro b le m s  ra is e d  by u n c e rta in ty  and e x p e c ta tio n s .
We tu rn  now to  exam ine the h is to r ic a l developm ent 
of th e  s u b je c t iv is t  approach to  econom ic th e o ry .
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rC H A P TE R  2
H IS T O R IC A L  IN T R O D U C T IO N
" i t  is  p ro b ab ly  no e x ag g e ra tio n  to say th a t e v e ry  
im p o rta n t advance in  econom ic th eo ry  during  the la s t  
hundred ye a rs  was a f u r th e r  step in  the co n s iste nt 
a p p lic a tio n  of s u b je c « iv is m . T h at the o b jec ts  of 
econom ic a c t iv i ty  cannot be d efined  in  o b je c tiv e  te rm s  
but o n ly  w ith  re fe re n c e  to a human purpose goes w ithou t 
s a y in g ."  P. A . H ayek: The C o u n te r-R e vo lu tio n  o f S c ie nc e . ^
1 . I n t r oductio n
The h is to ry  o f econom ic thought has been c h a ra c te r iz e d  
b y in c re a s e d  co n s id e ra t io n  o f the consequences, both 
in ten d ed  and un in te n d ed , o f human a c tio n . In  the next 
se ction  th is  p ro ce ss  is  d iscussed  beginn ing w ith  the 
o b je c tiv e  la b o u r th e o ry  o f va lu e  o f Adam Sm ith and 
D av id  R ic a rd o  and co n tinu ing  w ith  the im p a c t oi the 
s o -c a lle d  s u b je c t iv is t  re v o lu tio n  in the 18 70 s . The 
im p o rtan c e  of L o rd  R obbins* f 'm o u s  essay of 19 32 ,
An E s s a y on t he N a tu re  and Sig n i f ic ance of Econom ic Sci en c e , 
is  then d iscussed  fo llo w e d  by a co n s id e ra tio n  of some of 
the e a r ly  in flu e n c e s  on M is e s ' p ra x e o lo g y . L a s t ly ,  the 
co m plete  a p c -ic a tio n  of s u b je c tiv is m  and its  consequences, 
as ev id e n t in  the w r i t in g s  of M is e s , is  b r ie f l y  exam ined .
2 . F rom  C la s s ica l to  N e o -C la s s ic a l Thought
An im p o rta n t co n c ern  of the c la s s ic a l econom ists  
was the a tte m p t to  account fo r  e x c h a n g e -v a lu e . Adam
rSm ith begins by d iB tin gu ish in g  between u se -v a lu e  and 
ex e lia n g e -v a lu e . The fo rm e r  r e fe r s  to the to ta l u t i l i t y  
th a t a p a r t ic u la .1 good o r s e rv ic e  a ffo rd s  the consum er. 
Adam Sm ith r e j sets the im p o rtan c e  of u s e -v a lu e  la 
econom ic a n a ly s is  a f te r  a d iscuss ion  of the s o -c a lle d  
P a ra d o x  of V a l ie .  A cc o rd in g  to  th is  p a ra d o x , d iam onds  
w hleh  a f fo rd  a ..ower le v e l  of t o ta l  u t i l i t y  than 'w a te r , 
n e v e rth e le s s  exchange at a h ig h e r p r ic e  than  w a te r .
Adam Sm ith  then c o n c en tra ted  h is  a tte n tio n  on an 
e x p la na tio n  o f e x c h a n g e -v a lu e . Since the ra te  at 
w hich a good exchanges fo r  an o th er o ften  f lu c tu a te s ,
Adam Sm ith  u ndertook the se arch  fo r  a " r e a l"  va lue  
th e o ry  w hich  w ould e x p la in  the ac tu a l exch a n g e-va lu e  
e x is tin g  at any t im e . Thus he a s s e rte d  th a t in  th a t  
" e a r ly  and rude s ta te  o f s o c ie ty "  c h a ra c te r iz e d  by 
f re e  land  and zero  ac cu m u la tio n  of c a p it a l ,  va lue is  
d e te rm in e d  by the la b o u r costs o f the goods to  be 
exchanged:
" I f  among a nation  of h u n te rs , fo r  e x a m p le , i t  u s u a lly  
costs  tw ic e  the la b o u r to k i l l  a bea ve r w hich i t  does to 
k i l l  a d e e r ,  one b e a v e r  should n a tu r a l ly  exchange fo r  or  
be w orth  two d e e r . I t  is  n a tu ra l th a t what is  u s u a lly  the 
produce of two d a y j ’ o r two h o u rs ' la b o u r , should be 
w o rth  double o f what is  u s u a lly  the produce of one day 's  
o r one h o u r 's  la b o u r . . . "
In  th is  way the la b o u r th e o ry  o f va lu e  ach ieved  
p ro m in e nc e in  the hands of the g re a te s t  o f the e a r ly  e la s i 
w r i te r s .  In  th is  e a r ly  and rude s ta te  o f s o c ie ty  the 
a c tu a l exchange va lu e  o f a com m odity  w hich  m ight 
f lu c tu a te  fro m  t im e  to  t im e  is  n o n eth e le ss  d e term in ed  
by the n um ber of la b o u r h ours em bodied  in  i t .  I t  is
L
rth is  i t  at is  the foundation  of Adam S m ith 's  " re a l th eo ry  
of v a lu e ."
H o w e v e r, Adam  Sm ith r e a liz e d  th a t in  the re a l  
w o rld  w hero  c a p ita l has been a c c u m u l a t e . t l i e  exchange- 
va lu e  o f a good is  not d e term in ed  by the num ber 01 ’.a b ru r  
hours em bodied in  i t .  In  the r e a l  w o rld  the " n a ' i r * . ! 
pYice" o f a good or s e rv ic e  is  d e te rm in e d  by th e  "n o rm a l 
am ounts"? ay ab le to  the fa c to rs  th a t produce i t .  The  
" n a tu ra l p r ic e "  is  th e re fo re  com posed o f the money costs  
of p ro d u ctio n  th a t a re  the "n o rm a l paym ents" to  the 
fa c to rs  la n d , la b ou r and c a p ita l.  The " n a tu ra l p r ic e "
(w hich  corres po n d s  to M a r s h a l l ’ s lo n g -ru n  p r ic e )  is  
th a t p r ic e  to w ard s w hich  the d a ily  o r "m a rk e t"  p r ic e  
is  tend ing .
H av ing  b r ie f l y  exam ined  Adam  S m ith 's  e x p la na tio n  
of the d e te rm in a tio n  of e x c h a n g e -v a lu e , i t  is  o f re le v a n c e  
to  note s e v e ra l re as on s th a t have been put fo rw a rd  to  
account fo r  Adam S m ith ’ s em phasis on t  .e ro le  p layed  
by la b o u r in  the d e te rm in a tio n  o f v a lu e . As w i l l  be shown 
l a t e r , i ' was on th is  po in t th a t the n e o -c la s s ic a l  
econom ists  d if fe re d  m ost s tro n g ly  w ith  t h e ir  p re d e c e s s o rs .
S e v e ra l a tte m p ts  have been made to e x p la in  Adam  
S m ith 's  em phasis on the p a r t  p layed  by la b ou r in  d e te rm in in g  
v a lu e . I t  has been contended fo r  exam ; ‘ hat the d o c tr in e  
of n a tu ra l law  as put fo rw a rd  in  the la b  g ’ lue and p ro p e r ty  
th e o r ie s  o£ Hobbes and Locke p ro fou n d ly  in flu en c ed  th e  
c la s s ic a l fo rm u la t io n .  ^ I t  has a lso  been argued th a t  
C a lv in is m , w hich  p la ce d  w o rk  at the c e n tre  o f i t s  s o c ia l  
th e o lo g y , in flu e n c e d  Adam Sm ith and le d  h im  to  see the
L
1v a lu e  of a com m odity  as d e te rm in e d  by the la b ou r 
em bodied in i t .  ^  F in a l ly ,  Adam  S m ith 's  concept 
of the " n a tu ra l p r ic e "  is  sa id  to have been in flu en c ed  
by the A r is to te lia n -S c h o la s tic  concept o f jus tum  p re tiu m . * 
I t  is  o b v io u s ly  not p o ss ib le  to  ta lk  w ith  any 
c e r ta in ty  about tu •< fa c to rs  w hich  have had an im p o rta n t 
in f lu e n c e  on the w r i t in g s  of any au th o r. H o w ev er, 
w h a te ve r the fa c to rs  w hich  in flu e n c e d  Adam Sm ith in  h is  
conception  of e x ch a n g e-va lu e  were^ fo r  p res en t purposes  
two p o in t' m ust be no te d . The essence in  Adam S m ith 's  
d is cu ss io n  of ex e h a n g e -v a lv e  l ie s  in  h is  con c e iv in g  va lue  
as the o b je c tiv e  em bodim ent in  co m m od itie s  o f the 
s e rv ic e s  of fa c to rs  o f p ro d u c tio n , p a r t ic u la r ly  la b o u r. 
Second ly , h is  re je c tio n  of use - i i lu e  Ir- 3" e x p la na tio n  
of e x c h a n g e-va lu e  is  also  im p o rta n t . T h is  re je c t io n  
has e l ic i te d  the fo llo w in g  som ewhat h arsh  com m ent 
fro m  K a u d e r . K au d er, who t ra c e s  the developm ent o f the 
concept o f u s e -v a lu e  and the beginn ings of a th e o ry  of 
m a rg in a l u t i l i t y  back to  A r is to t le ,  accuses Adam Sm ith  
of m aking "w a ste  and ru b b is h  out o f the th in k in g  of 
2 ,0 0 0  y e a r s . The chance to  s ta r t  in  1776 in s te a d  of 
1870 w ith  a m ore c o r r e c t  know ledge of va lue p r in c ip le s  
had been m is s e d ."  ^
Subsequent c la s s ic a l w r i te r s  accep ted  by and la rg e ,  
A dam  S m ith 's  e x p la n a tio n  o f v a lu e . Thus R ic a rd o , who 
r e a l iz e d  th e  sho rtco m in gs  of th e  la b o u r th e o ry  o f v a lu e , 
n e v e rth e le s s  used i t  to  e x p la in  ex ch a n g e -v a lu e  in  the  
r e a l  w o rld . But he ex cluded  la n d - re n t  fro m  the th e o ry  
of ex o h an g e-v a lu e  by assum ing th a t the e x ch a n g e-va lu e  




no re n t  is  p a id .
H ow ever R ica .-d o 's  m a jo r  in te re s t  was in  the 
fac to rs ' th a t d e te rm in e  the d is tr ib u t io n  o f incom e and in 
th is  endeavour the la b ou r th e o ry  of va lu e  proved  to  be 
on ly  u s lig h t h in d ra n c e . R ic a rd o  re a liz e d  th is  as is 
shewn by the le t t e r  he w ro te  to M cC u llo c h  p o in tin g  out 
th a t "the g re a t  Questions of R e n t , W ages and P ro f its  
m ust be ex p la in ed  by the p ro p o rtio n s  in  w hich the whole 
produce is  d iv id e d  betw een la n d lo rd s , c a p ita lis ts  and 
la b o u re rs , and w hich  are  not e s s e n tia lly  connected w ith  
the d o c tr in e  o f v a lu e ." ^
F o r R ic a rd o , la b o u r seem ed to be a u se fu l m easure  
and i t  was fo r  th is  re as on  th a t he em ployed the la b ou r  
th e o ry  o f v a lu e . The re s u lt  was th at va lue was looked  
at as an o b je c tiv e  p ro p e r ty  possessed by a l l  econom ic  
goods. I t  was th is  aspect of c la s s ic a l th e o ry  th a t came 
u nder strong a t ta c k , in  the 1 8 7 0 s , in  the w r i t in g s  of 
C a r l  M n g n r, W a lra s  and Jevons . ^
Ju s t as the c la s s ic a l econom ists  looked at va lue  
f ro m  an o b je c tiv e  po in t o f v ie w , th at i s ,  va lu e  was not 
seen as the re s u lt  o f consum er p re fe re n c e s , so they  
tended to  d e fin e  the l im its  o f '.h e ir  d is c ip lin e  in  o b jec tive  
t e rm s , f i r s t  as the study of w e alth  and la te r  as the study 
of w e lfa re . K ir z n e r  has suggested th a t th is  fo rm u la t io n  
of the d e f in it io n  of econom ics was in p a r t ,  due to  the 
in f lu e n c e  of the m ethods used in  the s u c ce ss fu l n a tu ra l  
s c ie n c e s . The sc ience o f w e a lth , w here w e a lth  is  defined  
in  o b je c tiv e  (m easurab le) te rm s -, f i ts  fa r  m ore e a s i ly  in to  
the m ethod of the p h y s ic a l sc ie nce s than  does the sc ience
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rof human ac tio n  w h e re  the s u b je c t -m a tte r  is  e n t ire ly  
d if fe re n t  to th a t o f the p h y s ic a l sc ie n ce s . Thus K irs n e r  
concludes th a t "T h e  ex ten t o f the gap betw een the 
conception  o f a eo ience em brac in g  the t o ta l i t y  of a c tio n , 
on the one hand , and a conception  of a sc ience of w e a lth  
on the o th e r , owes so m e th in g , i t  would a p p e a r, to the 
ease w ith  w hich  th e  la t t e r  could be in c o rp o ra te d  in to  a 
s tru c tu re  o f u n iv e rs a l knowledge in  w hich  th e  p h y s ic a l 
sc ie n ce s occupied  so conspicuous a p o s it io n ." ^
I t  is  thus concluded th a t the c la s s ic a l conception  of 
the s u b je c t -m a tte r  of econom ics was couched in  o b je c tiv e  
t e rm s , th a t is  w ith o u t di r e o t re fe re n c e  to the p lans and 
a c tio n s  of in d iv id u a ls .
A . M a rg in a l U t i l i ty  T h eory
D u rin g  the n in e te en th  c e n tu ry , p a r t ic u la r ly  the 
la t t e r  h a l f ,  d is a ffe c tio n  grow w ith  the c la s s ic a l fo rm u la t io n . 
In  G e rm any th is  d is a f fe c t io n  was seen in  th e  teach ings of 
o f the H is to r ic a l School, The o b jec tio n s  of the H is to r ic a l  
School to c la s s ic a l econom ics can be grouped in to  th re e  
head ings: In  th e  f i r s t  p lace i t  was c la im e d  th a t
econom ic la w s , e s ta b lis h e d  by deducing the consequences 
of s e v e ra l p o s tu la te s , could  not have u n iv e rs a l v a lid i ty .
Thus the law s of Sm ith and R ic a rd o  could  not be re g a rd e d  
as u n iv e rs a lly  v a l id .  Econom ic la w s , even i f  th ey  could  
be found , m ust bo thought of as s p e c ific  to  t im e  and p la c e . 
E conom ic co n d itio n s  m ust be seen as in  a constan t s ta te  
of change and d ev e lop m e n t. F o r th is  reason  the H is to r ic a l
rSchool -wanted to  re p la c e  the deductive  m ethod of R ica rd o  
and o the rs  w ith  in d u ctio n  fro m  the co n d itio n s th a t could  
be observed in  the s o c ie ty  at each p o in t in t im e .  The 
second c r it ic is m  o f the H is to r ic a l School was th at the . 
c la s s ic s , acco rd ing  to  K n ie s , s ta r te d  fro m  the p rem ise  
th a t man was m o tiv a te d  by s e l f - in te r e s t  on ly. H ow ever th is  
is  e n t ir e ly  u n re a lis t ic :  the m o tive s of man a re  e x tre m e ly
co m p lex . The H is to r ic a l School th e re fo re  re je c te d  the 
c la s s ic a l fo rm u la tio n  based on the p re m is e  of s e l f - in te r e s t .  
L a s t ly , the H is to r ic a l School s tre s s e d  the u n ity  o f s o c ia l 
l i f e ,  nam ely  th a t a l l  s o c ia l p ro ce ss es  a re  In te rc o n n e c te d  
and th a t econom ics cannot be se p ara ted  fro m  the o the r  
s o c ia l sc ie n ce s .
F u r th e r  com m ent on the view s o f the H is t o r ic a l  School 
is  postponed u n ti l the next ch a p te r w hore C a r l  M o n g e r's  
op p os ition  to the c r i t ic is m s  of the H is to r ic a l School is  
c o n s id e re d . We tu rn  now to exam ine the dev e lop m e n ts  of 
m a rg in a l u t i l i t y  th e o ry .
B e fo re  1871 va lue th e o ry , as we have se en , a ttem p ted  
to  fin d  in t r in s ic  va lu e  in  o b je c ts . I t  was acknowledged  
th a t  to  possess va lu e  an o b je c t must be use fu l and sc arce  
but th is  was n e v e r fo llo w e d  th rough  " to  the p o in t of 
r e a lis in g  th a t w hat was re le v a n t  was not m e re ly  man’ $ 
r e la t io n  to  a p a r t ic u la r  th in g  o r to a c la s s  of th ings but 
the  p o s it io n  of th e  th in g  in  the whole m e an s-e nd  s tru c tu re  - - -  
the  w hole scheme by w hich  men decide how to  a llo c a te  the r e ­
s o u rc es  at t h e ir  d isposal among th e! d if fe re n t  en d eavours.
T h e  b re a k  w ith  the c la s s ic a l t r a d i t‘00 f in a l ly  came in  
the  e a r ly  1870s a lthough i t  is  now g e n e ra lly  re co g n ized  
th a t su b je c tiv e  u t i l i t y  th e o r ie s  w e re  fo rm u la te d  e a r l i e r .
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n o ta b ly  by Gossen in  1 8 5 4 . In  the e a r ly  I f  70s th re e  w r i te r s  
ind ep e n d en tly  fo rm u la te d  a s u b je c tiv e  th e o ry  of v a lu e .
C a r l M o ng e r in A u s t r ia ,  Leon W a lra s  in  F ran c e  and ;
W ill ia m  S tan ley Jevons in G re a t B r ita in  a l l  s ta r tin g  ]
fro m  d if fe re n t  p o in ts  a r r iv e d  u lt im a te ly  at s t r ik in g ly  1
s im ila r  co n c lu sion s thus la unch ing  w hat was la te r  to be 
c a lle d  the m a rg in a l re v o lu tio n  which la id  the foundations  
o f m odern  p r ic e  th e o ry . As Schum peter has sa id : "W hat
m a tte rs  . . .  is  not the d is c o v e ry  th a t people b u y , s e ll  or 
produce goods because and in  so fa r  as th ey  va lu e  them  j
'ro m  the po in t o f view  of the s a tis fa c tio n  of n ee d s , but ‘
a d is c o v e ry  o f q u ite  a d if fe re n t  k ind: the d is c o v e ry  th a t I
th is  s im p le  fa c t and i ts  so u rc es in  the law s of human j
needs a re  w h o lly  s u f f ic ie n t  to e x p la in  the b a s ic  j
fa c ts  about a l l  the  co m plex phenom ena of the m odern  j
exchange econom y, and th a t in  sp ite  o f s tr ik in g  )
ap p e ara n ce s to the c o n t ra r y , human needs a re  th e  d r iv in g  '
fo rc e  of the econom ic m echanism  beyond the R obinson  
C rusoe econom y o r the econom y w ith o u t exchange. •
The e s s e n tia l e le m e n t in  m a rg in a l u t i l i t y  th e o ry  j
was f i r s t  put fo rw a rd  in  the concept of v a lu e -in -u s e  [
w hich was f i r s t  used in  the w r i t in g s  o f A r is to t le .  •
A cc o rd in g  to tho concept o f v a lu e -in -u s e  the econom ic j
im p o rta n c e  of a good o r s e rv ic e  is  r e la te d  to  it s  u t i l i t y  i
and s c a r c ity . O th er su p p o rte rs  of the concept o f v a lu e -
in -u s e  inc luded  w r i te r s  such as G a lia n i,  T u rg o t, B en tham ,
C ournot and D u p o it. Thus J e re m y  D ea th a m ‘ s F e l ic i f ic
C a lc u lu s , w hich  s p l it  p le a s u re  and pain  in to  s m a ll p a r t ic le s  j .




rof happ iness produced by a p a r t ic l ;  o f w e a lth  (each  
p a r t ic le  being  of the same m a gn itu d e) w i l l  be le es  
and le s s  at e v e ry  p a r t ic le ;  the second w i l l  produce 
le s s  than the f i r s t ,  the th ird  le ss  than the second and so 
o n ."  <J'4)
I t  is  of In te re s t  to note and account fo r the 
s im i la r i t y  in  the th e o r ie s  o f M o n g e r, W a lra s  and 
Jevona p a r t ic u la r ly  sipce th o re  was no contact between  
them  u n ti l a f te r  th e y  had p u b lished  th e ir  w r i t in g s . I t  
has been c la lm od  by some w r i te r s  th a t the r is e  of 
m a rg in a l a n a ly s is  m igh t have been due in  p a rt  to  the 
in flu e n c e  of C a th o lic is m  as w e ll  as the in flu en c e  of a 
r e v iv a l o f K a n tia n is m  . H o w e v e r, both v iew s  have
been ad e q u ate ly  re fu te d  w hich  leads K auder to conclude
th a t "d u rin g  the n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry  p h ilo s o p h ic a l, e th ic a l,  
and re lig io u s  fo rc e s  d id  not any lo n g e r dom inate  the 
dev elop m e n t o f m a rg in a l u t i l i t y  th e o ry ; the need fo r  
a p la u s ib le  va lu e  th e o ry  w ith o u t c o n tra d ic t io n s  gu ided  
the va lu e  t h e o r is ts .11
The in flu e n c e  of u t i l i t a r ia n is m  on the r is e  of 
m a rg in a l u t i l i t y  th e o ry  has been fa r  g re a te r  than the  
In flu e n c e  e i th e r  of C a th o lic is m  o r of the r e v iv a l  in  
K a n tia n is m . The p h ilosophy of u t i l i t a r ia n is m  was 
f i r s t  put fo rw a rd  in  the f e l i c i f i c  c a lc u lu s  of J e re m y  
B entham . A cc o rd in g  to  B en th am , man Is  governed by 
s e nsations of pain  and p le a s u r e , by a ttem p ts  to avo id  
the fo rm e r  and to  a tta in  the l a t t e r .  The d r iv in g  fo rc e  
of human ac tio n  is  to  be found in th is  p r in c ip le  w hich  
als o  con ta ins m o ra l o v e rto n e s . Thus in  h is I n tro d u c tio n 
to  th e P r i n cip le s  o f M o r a ls  and L e g is la tio n  , Bentham
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rhse sa id  th a t "N a tu re  has placed, m ankind und-.r the 
governance of two so v ere ig .i m a s te rs , p.aiu and p le a s u re  .
I t  is  fo r  them  alone to p o in t out what we ought to do , as 
w e ll as to d e te rm in e  what we s h a ll d o .” From  th is
p r in c ip le  B entham  d e riv e d  a law  of d im in is h in g  u t i l i t y  
th a t took in to  account the q u a n tity  of happiness re s u lt in g  
fro m  sm a’ l  p o rt io n s  of w e a lth .
I t  is  w id e ly  acknow ledged th at B en th am 'a  in flu en c e  
is  seen most c le a r ly  in the w r i t in g s  o f W. S. Jevons.
Jevons in  fa c t ,  d e fined  p o l i t ic a l  econom y as the m echanics  
o f p le a s u re  and p a in . H ow ever s s u rp r is in g  fe a tu re  is  
the n e g lig ib le  in flu e n c e  th a t B entham  had on the econom ic  
th e o r ie s  o f people such as D a v id  R ic a rd o , Jam es M i l l  and 
John S tu a rt  M i l l  p a r t ic u la r ly  since R ic a rd o  and Jam es  
M i l l  w o re B en th am 's  co n te m p o ra r ie s  and ac quain tances .
The m a tte r  is  s t i l l  m ore s u rp r is in g  s ince Jam es M i l l  
and John S tu a rt M i l l  in te g ra te d  u t i l i t a r ia n is m  in to  th e ir  
s o c ia l p h ilo s op h ie s  but d id  not app ly  the f e l i c i f ic  c a lc u lu s  
to  the th e o ry  of econom ic v a lu e . ^ ^
M y rd a l has c la im e d  th a t the p h ilosophy of n a tu ra l  
law  and the d o c tr in e  o f u t i l i t a r ia n is m  are  two im p o rta n t  
fa c to rs  to  be taken  in to  account in  u n d ers ta nd ing  the 
developm ent o f econom ic th e o ry . Th u s , fo r  exam ple, i t
was a lo g ic a l step fo r  J e vo n s , having  d is co ve re d  the d r iv in g  
fo rc e  o f human ac tio n  in  the h e d o n is tic  p le a s u re -s e e k in g  
p r in c ip le ,  to  d e r iv e  the re la t io n s h ip  between dem and, 
supply and p r ic e  fro m  a m ore fu nd a m en ta l re la t io n s h ip  
betw een p le a s u re  and pain  and the m eans at the d is po s a l 
of the co n s u m er. V a lu e  was thus seen as the consequence
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of a ttem p ts  by consum ers to  m a x im ize  the p le a s u re  to 
be ob ta ined  fro m  spending a g iv en  am ount of w e a lth .
A lthough  M y rd a i's  a n a ly s is  o f the in flu e n c e  of 
u t i l i t a r ia n is m  on th e  th e o ry  o f m a rg in a l u t i l i t y  is  
s u p p o rtab le  in  the case of Je vo n s , the same cannot 
be sa id  fo r  W a lra s  and M e a g e r. M onger and W a lra s  
w e re  not h e d o n is ts , Thus in  h is  a u th o r’ s co p y , M enger  
e x p re s s ly  re je c te d  pain  and p le a s u re  as the on ly d r iv in g  
fo rc e s  of human a c tio n . H o w e v e r, although M enger
re je c te d  hed o n is m , he re p la c e d  pain and p le a s u re  w ith  
som ething  s i m i la r , nam e ly  s e l f - in te r e s t .  Thus although  
i t  cannot be said  th a t M en g er was d ir e c t ly  in flu e n c e d  by 
u t i l i t a r ia n is m ,  th e re  a re  s im ila r  t ra c e s  o f d e te rm in is m  
in  h is  fo rm u la t io n . In s te a d  of p le a s u re  and pain  
c o n s titu t in g  the d r iv in g  fo rc e s  o f human a c t io n , M enger  
saw the u lt im a te  a im  of in d iv id u a l a c t io n , n am e ly  "the  
d e s ire  fo r  the m ost co m plete  s a t is fa c t io n  o l needs 
p o ss ib le  ( fo r  the m ost co m plete  c o v e rin g  of m a te r ia l  
needs p o s s ib le )"  as "one of the m ost o r ig in a l fa c to rs  of 
econom ics u lt im a te ly  g iven  by the p a r t ic u la r  s i tu a tio n , 
independent o f human c h o ic e . "
Subsequent m a rg in a l u t i l i t y  th e o ry  h o w e v e r , becam e 
m ore s o p h is tic a te d  as the d e te r m in is t ic  e lem e n t was 
d im in is h e d  and the cho ices o f ac tin g  in d iv id u a ls  s tre s s e d . 
Thus fo r  e x a m p le , in  h is  p ap e r " P r in c ip le s  o f C om m odity  
V a lu e 1’ of 188-1 B U hm -B aw erlc In c lu d ed  not on ly  e g o is t ic a l 
g o a ls  "but a lso  e v e ry th in g  w hich  seem s w o rth  s tr iv in g  
f o r . "  A lthough B B hm -B aw erk la te r  c o n tra d ic te d  th is
p r in c ip le  o f " n e u tra l u t i l i t y " , i t  found fav ou r w ith  m any  
w r i te r s  .who saw i t  as a u s e fu l way o f th e o r is in g  w ith o u t
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rthe  need fo r  p h ilo s o p h ic a l and p s y c h o lo g ic a l concepts. 
Am ongst these w r i te r s  m ust be In c lu d ed  M is e s  whose 
id e as  on u t i l i t y  th e o ry  w i l l  la te r  be exam ined ,
We conclude t h e r e fo r e , th a t the fa c to rs  w hich  
in /luoncec’ the m a rg in a l u t i l i t y  th e o r is ts  w e re  many and 
v a r ie d  .but th a t too g re a t  aa em phasis on any p a r t ic u la r  
fa c to r  >nust be av o id ed . I t  seem s re a s o n a b le  to  suggest 
as K au d er Has s a id , th a t the o v e rr id in g  need th a t gu ided the  
va lue th e o r is ts  was " fo r  a p la u s ib le  va lue th e o ry  w ith o u t
In  th is  s e c tio n , the r is e  of m a rg in a l u t i l i t y  th e o ry  
has been ex am in ed  as have some of th e  fa c to rs  in flu en c in g  
the m a rg in a l u t i l i t y  th e o r is ts . F o r p re s e n t p u rp o s e s , the 
im p o rta n c e  of the m a rg in a l re v o lu tio n  l ie s  in  the change 
of em phasis th a t i t  b ro u g ht. V a lu e  was now seen as the  
d ire c t  re s u lt  o f the in te ra c t io n  oi  a p p ra is in g  m inds and 
the ac tin g  human being was a c c o rd in g ly  p laced a t  the 
co n tre  of the study of econom ics .
3. Beyond the M a rg in a l R ev o lu tion
In  th is  s e c tio n  two fuctha.c developm ents in  the  
ap p lic a tio n  of s u b je c tiv is m  w i l l  be no te d . F i r s t ,  a b r ie f  
look w i l l  bo tak en  at the s u b je c t iv is t  approach of L o rd  
B obbins in  h is  1932 e s s a y , An E ssay on t he N a tu re  and 
S ig n if ic ance of E conom ic Scien c e ^ ile c o n d ly , the w r itin g s  
of some of the fo re ru n n e rs  o f Ludwig Von M is e s  w i l l  be 
exam ined  w ith  the aim  of un d ers ta n d in g  hi, w th e ir  








rd iscuss ion  of th e  m ethodology of M ls e s  is  to be found in  
C h ap ter 4 .
D e f in it io n s  of econom ics p r io r  to  th a t o f Robbins  
focussed on kin_ds_ of b eh aviour such as the m a te r ia l is t  
d e fin it io n  of econom ics w hich  took in to  account those  
kinds of human b e h a v io u r re la t in g  to  the ac cu m u latio n  
of w e s lth . B o b b in s ' conception  on the o the r h and , "m ay  
bo d es crib ed  as a n a ly t ic a l .  I t  does not a tte m p t to p ic k  
out c e r ta in  k in d s of b e h a v io u rs , but focusses a tte n tio n  
on a p a r t ic u la r  aspect o f b e h a v io u r; the fo rm  im posed  
by the in flu e n c e  of s c a r c ity . T^he s u b je c t -m a tte r  of 
econom ics is  seen as th a t beh a v io u r w hich  in v o lv e s  the  
a llo c a tio n  of sc a rc e  moans w hich  have a l te rn a t iv e  uses 
among d if fe re n t  ends . T h e re fo re  the s ig n ific a n c e  of 
B o b b ins ' d e f in it io n  l ie s  in  h is  conception  of e c o n o m ics , 
not as the study of o b je c t iv e ly  d e fin e d  w e a lth  co n s is tin g  
of goods and s e rv ic e s , but as the study of the consequences  
of a c e r ta in  aspect of human b e h a v io u r in  g e n e ra l ,  nam e ly  
th a t in v o lv in g  th e  a llo c a tio n  of s c arce  m eans. In  th is  
way the s c a r c ity  of moans and the choice of the ac ting  
in d iv id u a l is  em ph a sized  and econom ic th e o ry  is  seen 
as a " s e r ie s  of deductions fro m  the fu nd a m en ta l concept 
of s c a r c ity  o f t im e  and m a te r ia ls . " T h u s , fo r
e x a m p le , the law  of d im in is h in g  m a rg in a l u t i l i t y  is  
deduced fro m  th is  b a s ic  p o s tu la te !  b o b b in s ’ d e fin it io n  
is  p a r t ic u la r ly  su ite d  to  p r ic e  th e o ry  w hich  e x p la in s  
p r ic e s  and q u a n tit ie s  in  te rm s  of the consequences of 
the in te ra c t io n  of p la nn ing  in d iv id u a ls  ac tin g  w ith in  the 
c o n s tra in ts  o f a g iv en  s itu a tio n .
L
rI .  o rd e r  to  m a in ta in  the o b je c tiv e  o r wer t fv o l  
n a tu re  o f ec o n o m ics , R obbins re g a rd e d  the a c to r 's  
ends as g iv e n . "E conom ics is  e n t ir e ly  n e u tra l between  
ends; th a t is ,  in  so f a r  as the ac h ie ve m en t of any end 
is  dependent on s c arce  m e a n s , i t  is  germ ane to the 
p reo c cu p a tio n s  of th e  E c o n om is t, Econom ics is  not 
concerned  w ith  ends as such. I t  assum es that human 
b e ings have ends in  the sense th a t th ey  have ten denc ies  
to  conduct which can be d e fin e d  and und ers to o d , and 
i t  asks how th e ir  p ro g re s s  to w ard s thei r  o b je c tiv e s  Is  
co n d itio n ed  by the s c a r c ity  o f means -  how the d is po s a l  
of s c arce  means is  co n tin g en t on these u lt im a te  
v a lu a t io n s .1' H ow ever in  re g a rd in g  ends as g iv en ,
R obbins b y -p as se d  many of the m ost in te re s t in g  p rob lem s  
in  the s o c ia l sc ie n ce s in  g e n e ra l and p a r t ic u la r ly  in 
ee o n o m ics . The p ro ce ss  o f ch o os ing , in  an u n tte rta iti  
w o rld  and c o n s tru c tin g  p la ns  em bodying the pu rp o se s , 
means and o b stac le s  o f the in d iv id u a l,  and the p ro ce ss  
of re v is in g  and m o d ify in g  these p lans in  the lig h t of new 
know ledge gained o ve r t im e , is  u n fo rtu n a te ly  ig n o re d .
Y e t i t  is  p re c is e ly  th is  fe a tu re  of human ac tion  th a t must 
be understood in  o rd e r  to e x p la in  econom ic p ro ce ss es .  
These fe a tu re s  w i l l  be exam ined  in  g re a te r  d e ta i l  in  
la t e r  C h ap ters .
N e v e r th e le s s , a lthough R obbins d id  not exam ine  
.the p ro ce ss  of choosing and re v is in g  p la n s , h is  d e fin it io n  
of econom ics does b r in g  th e  ac tin g  in d iv id u a l in to  the 
ce n tre  o f the econom ic s ta g e . In  o rd e r  to account fo r  
econom ic phenom ena, i t  is  n ec e s s a ry  to begin w ith  the  
ac tin g  in d iv id u a l.
L
rThe w r i t e r  who has perh a p s been most uncom prom is ing  
in  c a rry in g  s u b je c tiv is m  to  i ts  lo g ic a l conc lusions is  
L u d v ig  von M is e s , M is e s * p ra x e o lo g y  is  exam ined in  
g’•e a te r  d e ta i l  in  C h ap ter 4 . In  th is  h is to r ic a l  in t r o ­
d uction  h o w ev er, the id e as  o f tw o of the fo rb e a rs  of 
M is e s  w i l l  be d is cu ss ed , n am e ly  C roce and M ax  W eb er.
la  h is  famous debats  w ith  P a re to , C roce in s is te d  
th a t an act is  econom ic in  so f a r  as i t  is  a co n s is te n t 
ex p res s io n  of human p u rp o se . ^82) ac tion
aim ed  at the a tta in m e n t o f chosen goals  c o n s titu te s  the 
a re a  of the e c o n o m is t's  le g it im a te  c o n c ern . P a re to , on 
th e  cither hand , argued th a t econom ic th e o ry  should deal 
o n ly  w ith  the consequences of Lumen ac tion  as ev id e nt 
in  econom ic v a r ia b le s , le a v in g  the r e s t  to  the p h ilo s o p h e rs . • 
Tne d if fe re n c e  betw een C roce and P a re to  is  th e re fo re  to 
be found in  th e ir  re s p e c tiv e  a tt itu d e s  to  te le o lo g y . C rocs  
c la im e d  th a t the " f in a l  cause" o f econom ic phenom ena is  
to  He found in  p u rp o s e fu l human ac tio n  w h ile  P a re to  held  
th a t the concept o f purpose should have no p la ce  in  
econom ic th e o ry .
The c o n f l ic t  betw een C ro c e 's  s u b je c tiv is m  and 
P a re to 's  fo rm a lis m  is  echoed in  m any la te r  m e th o d o lo g ica l 
c o n tro v e rs ie s . Thus those espousing the m a th e m a tic a l 
fo rm u la tio n  of econom ic th e o ry  s e e k , as P e re to  held  a l l  
ec o nom ists  sh ou ld , to  u n d ers tand  the in te r re la t io n s h ip  
betw een  d if fe re n t  econom ic v a r ia b le s  as set out in  the 
fo rm  of m a th e m a tic a l eq u a tion s . T h is  m ethod, by its  
v e r y  n a tu re , ig n o re s  the p ro c e s s e s  w h e reb y  the in d iv id u a l  
fo rm u la te s  and re v is e s  the p lans w hich  guide h is  a c tio n s .
rA tte n tio n  is  thus focussed o n ly  on the in te r r e la t io n  of 
the econom ic phenomena w h ic h  a re  th e  consequences  
of human a c tio n . C oncepts such as purpose o r plan  
a re  o m itte d  e n t ir e ly  fro m  *h is  system  w hich thus 
ap p ro x im a te s  m o re  c lo s e ly  the m ethod of the p h ys ica l 
sc ie n c e s . I t  was th is  v iew  th a t Schum peter p u t fo rw a rd  
in  1908 and w hich le d  K ir e n e r  to com m ent th a t
” „ „ .  the absence of man fro m  S ch u m p eter's  econom ics  
re m a in s  a c la s s ic a l f e a tu re . T h is  e f fo r t  to ex em pt, or 
ra th e r  in t e r d ic t ,  the e c o n o m is t, qua ec o n o m is t, fro m  in ­
v e s tig a tin g  the b eh a v io u r o f man as an econom ic agent 
stem s f ro m , o r at le a s t  runs p a r a l le l  to , S chum peter's  
drea m  of re p la c in g  the concep t o f c a u s a lity  or purpose  
in  econom ics by the type o f re la t io n s h ip  ex p res se d  by 
the m a th e m a tic a l fu n c tio n . H ere  S c h u m p eter's  enthusiasm  
f o r  th e  m a th e m a tic a l m ethod in  econom ics and fo r  the 
p h y s ic a l sc ie n ce s g e n e ra l ly  is  undoubtedly re s p o n s ib le  
fo r  h is  e x p l ic i t  re je c tio n  o f te le o lo g y  as in  any way 
e s s e n tia l to  the conception  o f econom ic phenom ena.
The c a te g o ry  o f pu rp o se has no p la c e  in  a p o s it iv is t  
system  fro m  w hich  a l l  but fu nd a m en ta l re la t io n s h ip s  
have been c a r e fu lly  e x o rc is e d . "  ^ The p ro b lem s
th a t a r is e  fro m  C ro c e 's  s u b je c tiv is m  are  d iscussed  
la te r  in  th is  th e s is .
M ax  W eb er re g a rd e d  econom ics as a p a r t  o f soc io logy. 
The la t t e r  he d e fined  as "a  sc ie n ce  w hich  a ttem p ts  the 
in t e r p r e t iv e  un d ers ta n d in g  o f s o c ia l ac tio n  in  o rd e r  
th e re b y  to a r r iv e  at a c a u s a l e x p la n a tio n  %.£ i t s  course  
and e f fe c ts . In  'a c t io n 1 is  in c lu d ed  a l l  human b eh a v io u r
rw hen and in  so f a r  as th e  ac tin g  in d iv id u a l a ttaches a 
s u b je c tiv e  m eaning to  i t .  A ctio n  in  th is  sense m ay be 
e ith e r  o v e rt  o r p u re ly  in w a rd  or s u b je c tiv e ;  i t  may 
co n s is t o f p o s it iv e  in te rv e n tio n  in  a s itu a tio n , o r of 
d e l ib e ra te ly  re fra in in g  fro m  such in te rv e n tio n  o r of 
p a s s iv e ly  acquiescing in  the s i tu a tio n . A c tio n  is  s o c ia l  
in  so fa r  a s , by v ir tu e  o f the su b je c tiv e  m eaning attached  
to  i t  by th e  ac tin g  in d iv id u a l (o r in d iv id u a ls ) ,  i t  takes  
ao c o rn t o f the b eh a v io u r of o the rs  and is  th e re b y  
o r ie n te d  in  it s  c o u rs e ."
W e b e r 's  concept o f V e rs te h e n  has im p o rtan t  
im p lic a tio n s  f o r  th e o r e t ic a l econom ics . In  o rd e r  t r  
u n d ers tand  human ac tio n  the s o c ia l s c ie n tis t  m ust u n d e r­
stand  the m eaning  th a t in d iv id u a ls  attac h  to t h e ir  a c tio n s . 
To ac com plish  th is  ta s k  W eb er e n lis te d  the aid  o f the 
" id e a l ty p e "  and b is  a n a ly s is  co n s is ts  of e s ta b lis h in g  
the m eaning  th a t the ac tin g  in d iv id u a ls  attac h  to  th e ir  
a c tio n s . Thus the concept o f purpose and the p la ns  made 
by the in d iv id u a ls  are  p la ce d  at the c e n tre  o f an an a ly s is  
of human a c tio n . I t  is  th is  th a t m akes the s u b je c t -m a tte r  
of the s o c ia l sc ie n ce s in h e re n t ly  d if fe re n t  fro m  the 
n a tu ra l s c ie n c e s . ^  * One can u n ders ta nd  human ac tio n  
in  a way th a t  n a tu ra l phenom ena cannot be unders tood . 
T h is  has o ften  been confused by s o c ia l s c ie n tis ts  who 
have been im p re s s e d  by the successes of the n a tu ra l  
sc ie n c e s . T h ey "a re  a p p a re n tly  asham ed of the one th ing  
th a t r e a l ly  d is tin g u is h e s  s o c ia l s c ie n ce s  fro m  n a tu ra l  
s c ie n c e s , n am e ly  the fa c t th a t the student o f human ac tio n  
is  h im s e lf  an ac tin g  human b eing and th e re fo re  has at
rh is  command a souroe of knowledge u n a v a ila b le  to the 
student o f the phenom ena iT  n a tu re  . . . S o c ia l s c ie n tis ts  
la b o u rin g  under the in f e r io r i t y  com plex th ey  have 
developed under the f ru s t ra t in g  no tion  th a t the methods 
of the n a tu ra l sc ie nce s are  the o n ly  t r u ly  s c ie n tif ic  
ones . . .  m is ta k e  the p re s c r ip t io n  of s c ie n tif ic  
'o b je c t iv i ty ' fo r  a p re s c r ip t io n  of 's u b je c t iv is m ' -  
contusing  's u b je c t iv e 1 in tho sense of im p a r t ia l  w ith  
's u b je c t iv e ' in  the sense of co g n izan t o f in n o r e x p e rie n c e s ."
Tho use o f W e b e r 's  m ethod p roves p a r t ic u la r ly  
u se fu l in the f ie ld  o f m a rg in a l a n a ly s is  w here i t  y ie ld s  
a p ra g m a tic  In te rp re ta t io n  in s te ad  of re g a rd in g  "man as 
a p le a s u re  m a ch in e . " A h ed o n is tic  in te rp re ta t io n
of m a rg in a l u t i l i t y  im p lie d  a m e c h a n is tic  e x p la na tio n  
of human ac tio n  and was soon re je c te d  as inadequate  
by p s y c h o lo g is ts . And M y rd a l has s tre s s e d  the c i r c u la r  
re ason ing  in v o lv e d  in  h ed o n is tic  m a rg in a l u t i l i t y  
th e o ry . " . . .  th is  is  th e  fund a m en ta l fla w  of h ed o n is tic  
th e o ry . I t  p re s e n ts  an e la b o ra te  m e c h a n is tic  system  in  
which men a re  gu ided by se nsations of p le a s u re  and p a in , 
w hich they as s o c ia te  w ith  v a r io u s  co u rs es of a c t io n , 
a lw ays m a x im iz in g  ne t p le a s u re . The th e o ry  is  c la im ed  
to be c o r r e c t  in  tL . sense th a t anybody who ac ts  in 
accordance w ith  i t  ac ts  as the th e o ry  c la im s  he does."
A m a rg in a l u t i l i t y  th e o ry  based on " s e lf  in te re s t"  faces  
s im ila r  o b je c tio n s .
H ow ever by ap p ly in g  W e b e r 's  m eth o d , a p ra g m a tic  
in te rp re ta t io n  of m a rg in a l u t i l i t y  -h eo ry  is  p o ss ib le  which  
seem s to overcom e the p ro b lem s in h e re n t in  a m e ch an is tic  
e x p la n a tio n . Thus W eb er a s s e rts  th a t the th e o ry  of
L j
rm a rg in a l u t i l i t y  is  "not p s y c h o lo g ic a lly  s u b s ta n tia te d , 
but ra th e r  . . .  p ra g m a t ic a lly ,  i . e .  on the em ploym ent 
of the c a te g o rie s  : ends and m eans. "
In  a s im ila r  w a y , M ig o s  s ta te s  th a t the "law  of 
m a rg in a l u t i l i t y  and d ec rea s in g  m a rg in a l v a lu e  is  
independent o f G ossen 's  law  of the s a tu ra tio n  of wants 
( f i r s t  law  of G ossan). In t re a tin g  m a rg in a l u t i l i t y  we 
d ea l n e ith e r  w ith  sensuouo en joym ent nor w ith  sa tu ra tio n  
and s a t ie ty . We do a o t  tra n s c e n d  the sphere o f p ra x e o -  
lo g io a l re as on ing  in  e s ta b lis h in g  the fo llo w in g  d e fin itio n ?
Ws c a ll  th a t em ploym ent of a u n it  of a homogeneous supply  
w hich  a man m akes i f  h is supply is  n u n its , but would  
n ot m a k e , i f  o the r th in g s  be ing  e q u a l, h is supply w e re only  
n ~ 1 u n its , the le a s t  u rg en t em ploym ent o r th e  m a rg in a l 
em p lo y m e n t, and the u t i l i t y  d e r iv e d  fro m  i t  the m a rg in a l 
u t i l i t y .  I d o rd e r  to a tta in  th is  know ledge we do not need  
any p h y s io lo g ic a l o r p s y c h o lo g ic a l e x p e r ie n c e , knowledge 
o r re a s o n in g . I t  fo llo w s  n e c e s s a r ily  fro m  our assum ptions  
th a t people act (choose) and th a t in the f i r s t  ease ac ting  
man has n u n its  o f a homogeneous s upply and in  the second 
case n -  1 u n it .,. U nder these c o n d itio n s  no o the r re s u lt  
Is  th in k a b le . Our s ta te m e n t is  fo rm a l and a p r io r is t io  
and does not depend on any e x p e r ie n c e . "
I t  can be r e a d ily  seen fro m  M is e s ’ s ta te m en t th a t 
a c le a r  l in e  can tie draw n betw een psychology and econom ics , 
.W hile th e  fo rm e r  is  concerned  w ith  wh# people behave ae 
th e y  do , th a t is, w ith  m o t iv e s , the l a t t e r  assum es th a t  
people m ake p lans w hich  em body th e ir  purposes and w hich  
guide t h e ir  ac tio n s and exam in es  the consequences of these 
a c tio n s .'
L
ras.
 ^ la  th is  C h ap ter we have b r i e f l y  surveyed  the
advances th a t have been made in  econom ic th eo ry  as 
v a re s u lt  o f a co n s is te n t a p p lic a tio n  of s u b je c tiv is m .
F in a l ly  the s u b je c t iv is t  approaches of C ro c e , M ax  W eber 
and M is e s  w e re  b r ie f ly  looked a t .  The s u b je c t iv is t
approach to econom ics is  seen to c o n s is t la  a process  
j o f deduction  fro m  the p o stu la te  th a t man acts w h  '.in  a
! p a r t ic u la r  s itu a tio n  and in  ac tin g  m ust choose between
| d if fe re n t  a l te rn a t iv e s . M an  ac ts  because he p re fe rs  th at
| s itu a tio n  w hich he expects  w i l l  r e s u lt  fro m  h is ac tions
; to  the s itu a tio n  th a t he ex p ec ts  w i l l  fo llo w  h is  in a c t iv i ty .
But a lthough the ec o n o m is t is  concerned  w ith  the p u rp o ses 
th a t gu ide human a c tio n , he ie not concerned w ith  the 
m otiv e s  of human a c tio n . That concern  he le a v e s  to  the 
psy ch o lo g is t.
H o w e v e r, when the ac tin g  man is  p laced  at the ce n tre  
of econom ic th e o ry  d i f f i c u lt  p ro b lem s a r is e .  M a n ’ s actions  
a re  g e a re d  to the fu tu re ;  they are  a im ed  at producing  a 
fu tu re  s ta te  of a f f a ir s .  A t each po in t in  tim e  the a - t in g  
in d iv id u a l fa c e s  a l te rn a t iv e  ac tio n  schem es betw een w hich  
he m ust choose in o rd e r  to  ach ieve h is  ends. H is  d ec is io n  
i  w i l l  be based on e x p e c ta tio n s as to the p o ss ib le  consequences
o f each ac tio n  schem e. B ut these consequences, in  a 
i changing w o rld  cannot be known w ith  c e r ta in ty . A t a la te r
d a te , w ith  the new know ledge g ained  fro m  new e x p e r ie n c e s ,  
.the in d iv id u a l m igh t d ec ide th a t h is  p re v io u s  d e c is io n ,  
now looked  at fro m  an e x -p o s t po in t o f v iew , was w rong .
T h a t i s ,  the In d iv id u a l is  n o t in  a p o s it io n  of e q u il ib r iu m  
ove r t im e . Thus when a tte n tio n  is  focussed in  econom ic  




passage of tim e  ;and changing knowledge w hich is  a fu nc tio n  I 
o£ t im e ) ,  of ex p ec ta tio n s  and u n c e r ta in ty , come to the fo re . i
These a re  d i f f i c u l t  p ro b le m s , to eay the le a s t ,  and •:
i t  is  not s u rp r is in g  th a t we f in d , in  the h is to ry  o f j
econom ic th ou g h t, the developm ent o f " tec hn iqu e s"  to  !
overcom e these tro u b les o m e m a tte r s . Thus nThe s ta tic  i
e q u il ib r iu m  system s of W a lra s  and P a re to , the g re a te s t '
ac h ie ve m en t of n e o -c la s s ic a l ec o n o m ic s , co n ta in  both  
su b je c tiv e  and o b je c tiv e  e le m e n ts , ta s te s  and q u a n tit ie s  j
of t g s o u t  cos. T M b is  p o ss ib le  because of the t im e le s s  •
c h a ra c te r  o f these sy s te m s. Once in d iv id u a ls  have i
re v e a le d  th e ir  p re fe re n c e s , these becom e "d a ta 11 l ik e  a l l  :
o th e rs . In d iv id u a ls  a re  f r e e  to  ch o o s e, bu t having  once j
chosen they are  not f r e e  to change t h e ir  m inds: th e re  ;
l i t e r a l l y  is  "no t im e "  fo r  th a t .  " In  these system s
M a te s , a su b je c tiv e  phenom enon, a re  t re a te d  in  the same 
way as o b je c tiv e  phenom ena such as re s o u rc e s  and te c h n ic a l )
k n o w ledge, as exogenous v a r ia b le s . But to do th is  is  to  j
do v io le n c e  to the fa c ts  fo r  ta s te s  o ften  change, and change j
in tin u n p re d ic ta b le  w a y . And when th is  happens th e re  m ust 
a c c o rd in g ly  be c o rre s p o n d in g  a d jus tm en ts  in  the dependent )
v a r ia b le s . To t a lk  o f a ttindoncy to w ard s e q u il ib r iu m  in  a ;
s itu a tio n  l ik e  th is  we would have to  a s s e rt  th a t the " re a c tio n  
v e lo c it ie s "  of the dependent v a r ia b le s  a re  such th a t th e  ;
re q u ire d  ad jus tm en ts  take p la c e  b e fo re  any new change in [
the independent v a r ia b le s  o c c u rs . I t  is  im p o s s ib le  to see j
how such an a s s e rt io n  in  any p a r t ic u la r  s itu a tio n  can be \
a u to m a t ic a lly  m ade. |
a re  m ade to  b r in g  e x p e c ta tio n s  w ith in  the re a lm s  of fo rm a l 
a n a ly s is . W h ile  we can at le a s t  conc eiv e o f ta s te s  re m a in in g




constan t o ve r t im e  (although  we cannot p re d ic t  th a t th e y  w i l l  
do so) the same cannot be sa id  re g a rd in g  e x p e c ta t io n s , fo r  
ex p e c ta tio n s  and change go hand in  hand. E x p ec ta tio ns  r e fe r  
to  a n t ic ip a tio n s  re g a rd in g  fu tu re  p o in ts  in  tim e  and these  
a n tic ip a tio n s  a re  based on the e x p e rie n c e  of the a c to r . Since 
ex p ec ta tio n s  alw a ys r e fe r  to fu tu re  and since o ve r tim e  
the ex p e rie n c e  of the a c to r  co n tin u es , ex p ec ta tio n s  in  a 
changing w o r ld , a re  th em s e lv es  bound to change. But they  
change in  u n p re d ic ta b le  w ays w ith  the re s u lt  that a l l  a ttem pts  
to c la s s ify  them  am ongst the "d a ta "  of a fo rm a l system  m ust 
be re s is te d .
In  the same ve in  Shackle has draw n a tte n tio n  to  the 
c o n tra s t betw een th e  m ethod and the m eaning  of K ey n es ’ 
th e o ry . "K eynes* m eaning  was the p re c a r io u s n c s s  and 
f r a g i l i t y  of e x p e c ta tio n s , and the e f fe c t  on m en’ s d e c is io n s  
of t h e ir  la te n t ,  and so m etim es acknow ledged , aw areness of 
th is  in s ta b i l i t y .  H is  m ethod o r fo rm a l fra m e  was an 
e q u il ib r iu m , a s ta te  o f a f f a ir s  w here the net in v es tm e n t  
in tended  by one se c to r  of s o c ie ty , the e n t e r p r is e r s ,  was 
equa l to  the saving  in tended  by s o c ie ty  as a w h o le ."
Thus a lth o u g h , as has been shown, some of tb t m ost 
im p o rta n t advances in  econom ic thought have re s u lte d  fro m  
the a p p lic a tio n  of s u b je c t iv is m , th e re  has at the same t im e  
been a tendency to  s id e -s te p  the m ost im p o rta n t im p lic a tio n s  
of s u b je c t iv is m . F o r ,  i f  -h ang ing  ex p ec ta tio n s  a re  to be 
bro u g ht in to  econom ic a n a ly s is , the p r ic c  th a t m ust be paid  
is  the accom panying e lem e n t o f u n p re d ic ta b ility  th a t is 
in tro d u c e d . F o r w ith  the passage of t im e ,  the knowledge  
and ex p e c ta tio n s  o f in d iv id u a ls  w i l l  change in  u n p re d ic ta b le  
w ays .
In  C h a p te rs  7 to  10 some consequences of these  
d if f ic u lt ie s  fo r  econom ic th e o ry  a re  d iscussed .
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rO H A P TE H  3
M EN G ER  AND TH E M E T H O D E N 5 T R E IT
In  tho h is to r ic a l  in tro d u c tio n  some aspects of 
th e  develop it-an t of c la s s ic a l econom ics w e re p o rtra y e d  
and the r is e  o f the s u b je c tiv e  th e o ry  of va lu e  was 
d is cu ss ed . I t  was seen th a t d u ring  the m idd le  o f the  
n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry  d is a ffe c tio n  g rew  w ith  the in h e r ite d  
s tru c tu re  o f c la s s ic a l ec onom ics . In  G erm any th is  
d is a ffe c tio n  was re v e a le d  in  the r is e  o f the H is to r ic a l  
School o f E conom ics . I t  was the ideas o f th is  school 
th a t le d  C a r l M onger in  1883 to w r i te  h is  book 
"U ntersuchungen  lib e r d ie M ethode d e r S o c ia lw is se ns ch a ftf  
und d e r P o litis c h e n  Oekonom ic in s bcsondere. "
1 , T h e H is t o r ic a l School
In  G e rm any the H is t o r ic a l  School o f Econom ics  
atta c k e d  the m ethods of tho c la s s ic a l ec onom ists  and  
in s is te d  th a t s c ie n t if ic  econom ic th e o rie s  should  
c o n s titu te  the e n d -re s u lt  of h is to r ic a l  a n a ly s is .  
A c c o rd in g  to th is  school a genuine th e o ry  could  
o n iy  em erge as a re s u lt  o f a g re a t  d ea l o f d e rc r ip t iv e  
w o rk  done on past and p re s e n t In s titu t io n s  and 
s tru c tu re s . D if fe r e n t  p e rio d s  of the h is to r ic a l  school 
can he d is c e rn e d  a n d , to  some e x te n t , op in ions  
changed in  the d if fe re n t  p e r io d s . Thus w h ile  the 
" o ld e r  h is to r ic a l  schoo l" (co n s is tin g  of people such
( L e ip z ig , 1 8 8 3 ). ^
ras W . R e s e lle r , B . H ild e b ra n d  and K . K a le s )  
b e lie v e d  th a t the o n ly  way to  ach ieve an accep tab le  
un d ers ta n d in g  of econom ic phenom ena was through  
p u re ly  h is to r ic a l  a n a ly s is , the "Y o u n g er H is to r ic a l  
School" founded by G ustav S c h tn o lle r was m ore  
re a d y  to concede th e  im p o rtan c e  o f a n a ly t ic a l th e o ry . 
The la t t e r  schoo l’ " re g a rd e d  h is to r ic a l study as the  
e m p ir ic a l approach to  an e v e n tu a l th s o re t ic a l  
ex p la n a tio n  of s o c ia l in s t itu t io n s . Through the 
study of h is to r ic a l  developm ent i t  hoped to  a r r iv e  
at the dev elop m e n t o f s o c ia l w o le s , fro m  w h ic h , 
in  t u rn , could be deduced the h is to r ic a l  n e c e s s itie s  
go ve rn in g  each phase of th is  dev e lop m e n t. " ^
The Y ounger H is t o r ic a l  School b e lie v e d  econom ics  
to  be an e s s e n tia l p a r t  o f s i c ia l  a n a ly s is  and in s is te d  
th a t econom ics cou ld  not be se p ara ted  fro m  an u n d e r­
stand ing  of the r e s t  of s o c ie ty . "N o th ing  in  the 
s o c ia l cosmos o r chaos is  r e a l ly  outs ide o f S c h m o ile r ia  
e c o n o m ic s ."  ^ I t  was th is  b e l ie f  th a t le d  the m em bers  
o f the Y ounger H is t o r ic a l  School tv  produce a g re a t  
am ount o f d e s c r ip t iv e  in fo rm a tio n  on in s titu t io n s  and 
s tru c tu re s  and on d if fe r e n t  h is to r ic a l  p e r io d s .
The Y o unger School a lso  devoted i t s e l f  to  
questions o f s o c ia l p o lic y  and S c h tn o lle r was 
in s tru m e n ta l in founding the V e re in  ftir  S o c ia lp o litik  
in  18 78 . T h is  in te r e s t  le d  the school to be 
des ig n ated  as " p ro fe s s o r ia l S o o ia li.ro "  (K a th e d e rs o z ia li  
The m e m bers o f th e  school s tre n o u s ly  a s s e rte d  th e ir  
va lu e  judgm ents v h lc h  they took fo r  g ra n te d . I t  was 
h is  opv .s it ic m  to  th is  tendency to expound va lue
rjudgm ents th a t la te r  lev' M ax  W eber to  c a l l  fo r  a 
we r t f r e j  s o c ia l sc ie n c e . H o w ev er, th is  "has 
o b lite ra te d  the fa c t  th a t th e ir  s c ie n tif ic  c r edo 
was e x tre m e ly  c r i t i c a l  o f va lu e  judgm ents and 
of the p ra c t ic e  oC econom ists  to  id e n t ify  th e m ­
se lv es w ith  p o l i t ic a l  p a r t ie s  and to  recommend 
m e as ures , " ^
M e n g e r , d is tu rb e d  by tho econom ic w r itin g s  
of the G erm an H is t o r ic a l  S chool, se t out to  defend  
the a n a ly t ic a l m ethod of the c la s s ic a l ec onom ists .
In  1883 ho w ro te  h is  P ro b le m s of E conom ics and 
So c io logy a f te r  h is  P r in c ip le s  o f E conomic s ,  ^  1 8 7 1 ,  
had re c e iv e d  a coo l re c e p tio n  at the hands of the 
H is to r ic a l School. The P ro b le ms of E cono m ic s  and 
Socio logy was u n fa v o u ra b ly  re v ie w e d  by G ustav  
S o h m o lle r , and M e n g e r re p l ie d  to th is  in  1884 In  
a b ro ch u re  e n t it le d  T he E r r ors o f the Hi s to r ic a l School 
in  G e rm nn P o l i t i c a l E con omy (D ie  I r r th ttmox des 
His t o r i s fn is  in  uur deutmohcn N atio n  aid  konom ie ).
Thus began the fam ous M eth o d ftns^.r e i t  , th e  c o n f lic t  
over tho M ethods a p p ro p ria te  to the study of econom ies .
The a im  o f P ro b le m s  of E c o n o m ic s and S oc io logy  
was to defend what M e n g e r thought to  be the p ro p e r  
fu n c tio n  ot -sonomic th e o ry  a g a in s t the d o c tr in e s  of 
the H is t o r ic a l  School. A cc o rd in g  to  M e n g e r , the  
p ro p e r  fu nc tio n  of th e o ry  is  the re c o n s tru c tio n  of 
the s tru c tu re  o f s o c ia l w holes fro m  t h e ir  e le m e n ts  by 
a m ethod th a t M e n g e r c a lle d  the a to m is tic  o r com ­
p o s it iv e  method*.  ^H a y e k , in  e la b o ra tin g  upon th is  
m ethod -has sa id  th a t " . . .  the m ethod of the s o c ia l
r r
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sc ie n ce s is  b es t d es crib ed  as co m p o s itive  o r s y n th e tic .  
I t  is  the s o -c a lle d  w h o le s , the groups of e lem e n ts  which  
a re  s t r u c tu r a l ly  co nnected , w hich we le a rn  U- e i .g le 
out fro m  the t o ta l i t y  o f o bserved  phenomena on ly as a 
r e s u lt  to  our sy s te m a tic  f i t t in g  to ge the r c f  the 
e lem e n ts  w ith  f a m il ia r  p ro p e r t ie s , and w hich we b u ild  
up o r re c o n s tru c t fro m  thu known p ro p e r t ie s  o f the 
e le m e n ts ."  ^  The a im  of econom ic th e o ry , accord ing  
to M e n g e r , is  to  p ro v id e  an unders ta n d in g  of the  
econom ic r e g u la r it ie s  th a t a re  to  be observed in  the 
r e a l w o r ld , o f the succession  and co e xisten c e of 
econom ic phenom ena. The an tith e s e s  between the 
Y ounger H is to r ic a l School and M en g er were th e re fo re  
" h is to r ic a l in d u ctio n  v e rs u s  d e d u c tio n , in d iv id u a liz in g  
versus g e n e ra liz in g  and d e s c r ip tiv e  econom ics  
econom ics th a t se arch es  fo r  law s and p a tte rn s .
H o w e v e r, i t  is  g e n e ra l ly  conceded th a t M en g er stood  
on much f i r m e r  ground th a t h is  opponents.
The r e s t  of th is  se c tio n  is  devoted  to an 
ex a m in a tio n  o f some o f the id e a s  put fo rw a rd  in  
M o n g e r 's  P ro b le m s  of E conom ics and Socio lo g y .
The conc lusion  con ta ins  an ex a m in a tio n  of M enger as 
a s u b je c t iv is t .
2 . P ro b le m s of E c onom ic s and Socio lo g y .
(8)
H ayek has p o in ted  out th a t th e i 
to  M e n g e r 's  booled In  th e  f i r s t  p lace  
a tta c k  on the H is t o r ic a l  School re fe r  
Then th e re  is  M e n g e r 's  e x p o s itio n  oi
a re  th re e  aspects  
h e re  is  M o n g e r 's  
ed to  b r ie f l y  above, 




rth e o re t ic a l a n a ly s is . L a s tly  M e a g e r develops an 
o rg an ic  th e o ry  o f the o r ig in  o f In s t itu t io n s . T h is  
la s t  aspect of M e n g e r 's  book was put fo rw a rd  as an 
answ er to  the fo llo w in g  question : "How can i t  be th a t
in s titu t io n s  w hich  se rv e  the common w e lfa re  and are  
e x tre m e ly  s ig n ific a n t  fo r  i ts  developm ent came in to  
be ing  w ith o u t a common w i l l  d ire c te d  tow ard  
e s ta b lis h in g  th em ? "
The f i r s t  aspect has been a llu d e d  to above. 
M e n g e r’ s view  of the n a tu re  o f t h e o re t ic a l econom ic  
an a ly s is  is  d iscussed  in  the re m a in in g  p a r t  of th is  
se ction  w hereas the t h ird  aspect o f M e n g e r’ s book 
is  d iscussed  in  the co n s id e ra t io n  o f M onger as a 
s u b je c t iv is t  as w e ll  as in  connection  w ith  n is  ideas  
on the o rig in s  of m oney.
In  c r i t i c iz in g  the H is t o r ic a l  S c hool, M onger  
draw s the d is tin c tio n  betw een the "e x a c t"  and the 
" e m p i r ic a l - r e a l is t ic "  approach to  s o c ia l phenomena 
in  g e n e ra l and to  econom ics in p a r t ic u la r .  The exact 
approach r e fe rs  to  the a n a ly t ic a l -d e d u c t iv e  method  
w hich  a im s at m aking  "us aw are o f t he law s ho ld ing  
f o r an a n a ly t ic a l l y o r abst r a c t ly co n c e iv e d econ omic 
w o rld  . . . "  The a n a ly t ic a l m ethod th e re fo re  m akes
us aw are of the r e g u la r i t ie s  in the co e x is ten c e  and 
success ion  of phenom ena th a t e x is t  in  the r e a l  w o rld  
by deducing co n c lu sion s fro m  c e r ta in  p re s u p p o s it io n s . 
The p re s u p p o s itio n s  r e fe r  to  a" a b s tr a c tly  conceived  
econom ic w o rld  and m a y , th e re fo re  not be found in  pure  
fo rm  in  r e a l i t y .  As a re s u lt  o f th is . M onger concedes, 
the p re d ic t io n s  made by a n a ly t ic a l econom ics m igh t not
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rbe c o m p le te ly  a c c u ra te  when ap p lied  to  cond itions  
in  the r e a l  w o rld ;  the p re d ic t io n s  a re  "e x a c t"  on ly  
fo r  the a b s tr a c tly  conceived  econom ic w o rld .
N onetheless , a n a ly t ic a l econom ics does th ro w  lig h t  
on the r e a l  w o r ld  because of the o v e rr id in g  im p o rtan c e  
of s e l f - in te r e s t .  T h is  po in t w i l l  be e la b o ra te d  upon 
In  g re a te r  d e ta i l  la t e r  in  a d iscuss ion  of M o n g e r 's  
T ie w  on s e lf - in te r e s t .
The " e m p i r ic a l - r e a l is t ic "  ap p ro a ch , on the o the r  
hand , r e fe r s  to the study of " In d iv id u a l (c o n c re te )  
phononeua and th e ir  in d iv id u a l (c o n c re te ) re la t io n s h ip s  
in  t im e  and s p a c e ,"  and in c lu d es  the sc ie nce s of
h is to ry  and s ta t is t ic s .
A lthough the two m ethods a re  used to g e th e r in  the  
s o c ia l sc ie n c e s , the d is tin c tio n  betw een  them  m ust be 
k e p t c le a r ly  in  m in d . The approach adopted by each  
m ethod in  ex am in in g  the e ffe c t  of a change in  demand  
on the p r ic e  o f a com m odity  m ay be used to i l lu s t r a t e  
the d if fe re n c e  betw een  the two m e thods. The "e x a c t"  
m ethod deduces fro m  the fo llo w in g  p re s u p p o s itio n s  the 
e x a c t change in  p r ic e  th a t w i l l  r e s u lt :  " (1 ) th a t a l l
the  econom ic su b je c ts  co n s id ere d  h ere  s t r iv e  to p ro te c t  
th e ir  econom ic in te re s t  f u l ly ;  (2 )  th a t in  the p r ic e  
s tru g g le  th e y  a re  not in  e r r o r  about the econom ic g o a l to 
bo pursued n o r about the p e r t in e n t  m e as ures fo r  re ac hin g  
I  ; (3 ) th a t the econom ic s i tu a tio n , as f a r  as i t  is  of
in f lu e n c e  on p r ic e  fo rm a t io n , is  not unknown to  th em .
(<i) th a t no e x te rn a l i t  fee  im p a ir in g  th e ir  econom ic  
free d om  (the p u rs u it  - Ih e ir  econom ic in te re s ts )  is  
exerted" on th e m ."  ^  The -e s u ltin g  change In p r ic e
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1can bo o x a c tly  deduced fro m  these p re s u p p o s itio n s , 
th a t i s ,  fo r  th is  " a b s tr a c tly  conceived  econom ic 
w o rld . " M onger concedes th a t in  the r e a l  w o rld  
in f lu e n c e s  excluded  in  the p re s u p p o s it io n s , such 
as e r r o r ,  ig n o ra n c e , in te r fe r e n c e  w ith  m a rk e t fo rc e s  
and so oh , do e x is t  and w i l l  cause a d e v ia tio n  fro m  
the re s u lts  p re d ic te d  by the ex a c t th e o ry . N e v e rth e le s s  
ex ac t th e o ry  p ro v id e s  us w ith  an unders tand ing  of 
econom ic phenom ena as a re s u lt  of r e g u la r l t  in  
the co e x is ten c e  and success ion  of phenom ena th a t  
e x is ‘ in  the r e a l  w o r ld . T h is  r e g u la r ity  " is  a fa c t  
w hich  luvst p ro b a b ly  be a t t r ib u te d  to the c ircu m s ta n ce  
th a t people in  th e ir  econom ic e f f o r ts ,  even i f  not 
e x c lu s iv e ly  and w ith o u t ex ce p tio n , n e v e rth e le s s  are  
p re d o m in a n tly  and r e g u la r ly  governed by th e ir  in d iv id u a l  
in te re s ts  and on the w hole and re g u la r ly  re c o g a iz e  the 
la t t e r  c o r r e c t ly ,  even i f  not in  a l l  cases and a b s o lu te ly . 
T h is  " fa c t"  is  re c o g n ize d  In  the p res u p p os itio n s  of 
ex a c t th e o ry  w hich  have the c ffe o t of is o la t in g  the 
in d iv id u a l fro m  the u n c e r ta in ty  and la c k  o f knowledge  
th a t fa c e  h im  in  i.h e "rea l w o r ld " . In sp ite  o f th is  
is o la t io n  M en g er c o n s id e rs  th a t the re s u lts  y ie ld e d  
by ex a c t th e o ry  a re  o f im p o rta n c e  in  understanding: 
econom ic j henom ena.
The r e a l i s t ic - e m p ir ic a l  ap p ro a ch , on the o ther  
hand , in  e x p la in in g  the e ffe c ts  of an in c re a s e  in demand  
"s ta te s  th a t an in c re a s e  in  need as a ru le_ is  a c tu a lly  
fo llo w e d  by one in  r e a l ,  p r ic e s ,  and to  be s u re , an 
in c re a s e  w hich  as a ru le  stands in  a c e r ta in  re la t io n s h ip  





rmeans can be d e te rm in e d  in  an ex ac t w a y .1'
Thus "e x a c t econom ics by n a tu re  has to make us aw are  
of the l aws h o ld in g fo r  an a n a ly t ic a l ly  or  a b s tra c t ly  
con ce iv ed  econom ic w o r ld , w h ereas e m p ir ic a l -  
r e a l i s t ic  econom ics has to  make us aw are o f the 
re g u la r i t ie s  in  the succession  and co e xisten c e o f the 
r ea l phenom ena of human econom y (w h ich , in d e e d , in  
t h e ir  " f u l l  e m p ir ic a l r e a l i ty "  also  co n ta in  num erous  
e le m e n ts  not em erg e nt fro m  an a b s tra c t econom ic  
w o rld .')"
M o ng e r concluded th a t the fa u lt  o f the H is to r ic a l  
School was th a t i t  f e l t  th a t the h is to r ic a l m ethod was 
capable o f c o n tr ib u tin g  to  an advance of th e o re t ic a l  
ec o n o m ics . T h is  h o w e v e r, is  no t p o s s ib le  as th e  two  
m ethods a re  c o m p le te ly  d if fe re n t .
A la s t  p o in t in  connection  w ith  M o n g e r 's  m ethod  
m ust be made and th is  is  h is  b e l ie f  th a t the m ethod  
a p p ro p r ia te  to the ex ac t o r ie n ta tio n  o f econom ics is  
the same as th a t w hich  is  used in  a n "o rg a n lc "  e x p la na tio n  
of s o c ia l in s titu t io n s  w h ich  d ev e lop e d , not as a re s u lt  
of the common w i l l ,  but as the un intended consequences  
of in d iv id u a l a c tio n s . The m ethod is  to reduce econom ic  
and s o c ia l phenom ena " to  the i n d iv id u a l fa c to rs  o f th e ir  
c a u s a tio n , and by in v e s tig a tin g  the law s by w hich  the 
c o m p lic a te d  .phenom ena of human econom y under d iscuss ion  
h e re  a re  b u i l t  up fro m  th ese  e lem  n ts . " T h is
approach has been c a lle d  a to m is tic  or co m p o s itive  
by M e a g e r h im s e lf  and m e th o d o lo g ica l in d iv id u a lis m  
by S c hum peter.
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r3. M en g er as a S u b je c tiv is t
H av in g  exam ined  the h is to r ic a l  background to 
M en g o i *a P ro b le ms of E o onom ioe and Sociology and 
some of the fund a m en ta l id e a s  con ta ined  in th is  book, 
we tu rn  now to  the d i f f i c u lt  ta s k  of assessing to what 
ex te n t M e u g e r can r ig h t fu l l y  be c a lle d  a s u b je c tiv is t  
in  tho s p e c ific  sense of the w ord  used in  th is  th e s is . ^  
In  o rd e r  to  p ro v id e  an an s w e r to  th is  quei on, M o n g e r's  
view s  on the fo llo w in g  to p ic s  w i l l  be exam ined : h is
ex p la n a tio n  o f the developm ent of s o c ia l in s titu t io n s  
and the im p o rtan c e  o f s e l f - in te r e s t  in  econom ic th e o ry .
(a ) The Devt-lo 'm u n i of  S o c ia l In s t i t u t io n s .
In  Book 3 , C h ap ter 2 ,  M en g er d if fe re n t ia te s  between  
two types of in s t itu t io n s :  those w hich  came in to  being  as
tho re s u lt  of in ten d ed  human a c t io n , fo r  exam ple as a 
re s u lt  o f le g is la t io n , and on the o th e r hand, those  
in s t itu t io n s  "w h ich  se rv e  the common w e lfa re  and are  
e x tre m e ly  s ig n if ic a n t  fo r  its  developm ent but which  
come in to  being  w ith o u t a common w i l l  d ire c te d  tow ard  
e s ta b lis h in g  th em . " In  M o n g e r 's  te rm in o lo g y  the
second type o f in s titu t io n  is  o f o rg a n ic  o rig in  . The 
p r ic e  system  and the d ev elopm ent o f money serve
as ex am ples  of the la t t e r  type of in s t itu t io n . A lthough  
an ana logy can be draw n betw een s o c ia l in s titu t io n s  and 
n a tu r a l o rg a n is m s , M e n g e r p o in ts  to the l im ita t io n s  of 
th is  c o m p a ris o n . *2 8 *
The concep tual d is tin c tio n  betw een these two types
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of in s t itu t io n s  Is  im p o rta n t fo r  M en g er since on ly  
the f i r s t  typo can be e x p la in ed  p ra g m a tic a l ly .  In  
o th e r w o rd s , in s t itu t io n s  w iiioh  a re  the in tended  
re s u lt  of hnman ac tio n  can be in te rp re te d  "by 
in v e s tig a tin g  tho a im s w hich  in  the c o n c re te  case 
have guided the s o c ia l u n io n s , or th e ir  r u le r s , in  
the e s ta b lis h m e n t and advancem ent o f the s o c ia l  
phenom ena under d iscuss ion  h e re . We In v e s tig a te  
the a ids which have been at th e ir  d 'a p o s a l In  th is  
case , the o b stac le s w hich nave w o rked  ag a in st the  
c re a tio n  and developm ent o f those s o c ia l s t ru c tu re s ,  
tho way and m anner in  w hich the a v a i la b le  a ids w e re  
used fo r  e s ta b lis h in g  them . We f u l f i l  th is  tas k  so 
much the m ore v o r fe c t ly  the m ore exam ine the  
u l t i m ate re a l a im s  of tho a c tiv e  su b je c ts  on the one 
hand , and the m ost a r tt r in a l m eans w hich  they had at 
t h e ir  command on the o th e r , and the m ore we come to  
un d ers ta n d  the s o c ia l phenom ena roICTTSng bade to a 
p ra g m a tic  o rig in  as lin k s  in  a chain  o f re g u la t io n s  fo r  
the re a lis a t io n  o£ th e  above a im s ."
H o w e v e r, s o c ia l s tru c tu re s  ev.oh as la w , la n gu a g e, 
the s ta te  and m a rk e ts , th a t is ,  s t ru c tu re s  w hich are  
thy un intended consequenccs of human a c tio n , c a rn o t  
be in te rp re te d  in the same way as in s titu t io n s  of the  
f i r s t  ty p e . R a th e r they m ust be unders tood  "by 
re du c in g  them to th e ir  e le m e n ts , to the I n d iv idual 
fa c to rs  o f th e ir  c a u s a tio n , and by in v e s tig a tin g  the 
la w s  by w hich the c o m p lic a te d  phenom ena of human  
econom y under d is cu ss io n  h e re  are  b u ilt  up fro m  these  
e le m e n ts . " Thus in o rd e r to  u n ders ta nd  th at
rphenomenon r e fe r r e d  to as the p r ic e  system  the  
t h e o r is t  m ust e x p la in  the a ttem p ts  o f many 
in d iv id u a ls  to  a tta in  the purposes set out in 
the p lans th a t gu ide th e ir  a c t io n s . M en g er  
thus suggests th a t the " a to m is tic "  m ethod , which  
is  the m ethod a p p ro p ria te  to the "e x a c t"  o rie n ta tio n  
o f th e o re t ic a l ec o n o m ics , is  a lso  a p p ro p ria te  to an 
un d ers ta n d in g  of s o c ia l In s t itu t io n s  o f the second
H aving exam ined  M o n g e r 's  e x p la na tio n  of 
in s t itu t io n s  i t  m ay be questioned w h e th e r M o n g e r's  
c le a r -c u t  d is t in c tio n  betw een in s titu t io n s  of the f i r s t  
and second type has se rv ed  to obscure the im p o rta n t  
s im i la r i t y  betw een th em . T h is  is  not to  argue th a t  
the d if fe re n c e  does not e x is t  o r is  not im p o rta n t. In  
th e  f i r s t  case th e  s o c ia l in s t itu t io n  is  the d ire c t  re s u lt  
of ac tio n  oriented to  the a tta in m e n t of p la n s , fo r  e x a m p le ,  
plans of le g is la to rs  m ight load  to  the o r ig in  o f a new 
in s t itu t io n . The second type o f in s t itu t io n , on the o ther  
hand , is  the ind irect re s u lt  o f human ac tio n  to be s u re , 
but it s  u l t im a t e cause is  the p u rp o s e fu l ac tio n  of 
in d iv id u a ls . Thus in  o rd e r  to  u n d e rs ta n d  both k inds  
of in s titu t io n s  i t  is  n e c e s s a ry  to  ex p la in  them  by 
deducing them  fro m  the p lans o f in d iv id u a ls . The 
im p o rta n t s im i la r i t y  betw een the two typ es  of 
In s titu t io n s  could perh a p s have been em phasized  m ore  
s tro n g ly .
r(b ) T he Im p o rtan ce  of Se l f - In te re s t
Book l ,  C h ap ter 7 e n t it le d  "T h e  Dogma of S e lf -  
In te re s t  in T h e o re tic a l Econom ics and i ts  P o s it io n  in  
R e la t io n  to the T h e o re tic a l P ro b le m s of the L a t te r "  
i s ,  fo r  the purposes to be c o n s id ere d  h e re , one of the 
m ost in te re s t in g  in  the book. In  th is  ch a p te r M onger  
co n s id ers  a c r i t ic is m  of the H is to r ic a l School re g a rd in g  
the ro ln  of s e l f - in te r e s t  in  th e o re t ic a l econom ics . The  
essence of th is  argum ent o f the m em bers of the H is to r ic a l  
School is  th a t the assum ption  of s e lf - in te r e s t  th a t l ie s  at 
the h e a rt  of econom ic th e o ry  is  u n r e a l is t ic .  In  the r e a l  
w o rld  fa c to rs  such as p u b lic  s p i r i t ,  the fo rc e  o f custom  
e tc . i r e  a lso  im p o rta n t and should be taken  in to  account. 
I f  these fa c to rs  a re  to  be acknowledged as in  jo r ta n t ,  
th ese  c r i t i c s  a rg u e , th en  th e  re s u lts  p re d ic te d  b y an 
econom ic th e o ry  based on the assum ption  of s e l f - in te r e s t  
m ight not o cc ur in  r e a l i t y .  We should th e re fo re  re je c t  
the p r in c ip le  th a t "hum ans t r u ly  a re  gu ided in  th e ir  
econom ic a c t iv i ty  e x c lu s iv e ly  by co n s id e ra tio n  o f th e ir  
in d iv id u a l in t e r e s t s ."
In  a n s w e rin g  these c r i t i c s  M en g er su pp lies  them  
w ith  a d d it io n a l am m u nition . F o r , he a rg u e s , why is  
th e  a tta c k  of u n re a lis m  con fined  to the "dogma of 
s e lf - in te r e s t"  ? The H is t o r ic a l  School cou ld  ju s t as 
w e ll c r i t i c iz e  the o th e r p res u p p os itio n s  of econom ic  
th e o ry  suoh as the assum ption  of n o n -in te r fe re n c e  w ith  
the fo rc e s  o f the m a rk e t. We a l l  know th a t in  r e a l i ty  
th is  in te r fe r e n c e  does e x is t .
M en g er a lso  p o in ts  out th at by fo cuss ing  on e r r o r
rand ipno_r.»tnoo the H is to r ic a l School could po in t to  the 
same in d e te r in in a n c y  th a t m ust app ly  to  the conc lusions  
of t h e o re t ic a l ec onom ics . And i t  m ust be accepted th a t  
ig n o ran c e  and e r r o r  a re  im p o rta n t fa c to rs  In  the r e a l  
w o r ld . As M e a g e r put i t :  "Even i f  econom ic humans
alw ays and e v e ry w h e re  le t  th em s e lv es  be guided  
e x c lu s iv e ly  by th e ir  s e l f - in te r o s t ,  the s t r ic t  r e g u la r ity  
of econom ic phenom ena w ould  n o n eth ele ss have to be 
co n s id ere d  im p o s s ib le  because of the fa c t g iv en  by 
ex p e rie n c e  th a t in  in n u m e ra b le  oases they a re  in  e r r o r  
about th e ir  econom ic in t e r e s t ,  or in  ig n o ran c e  of the  
econom ic s ta te  o f a f f a ir s  . . .  The p re s u p p o s itio n  of a 
s t r ic t  r e g u la r ity  o f econom ic phenom ena, and w ith  th is  
of a th e o re t ic a l econom ics in  the m u lt ip le  m eaning of 
the w o rd , is  not o n ly  the dogma of e v e r -o o n s ta n t s e l f -  
in t e r e s t ,  bu t a ls o  the dogma of the ' in f a l l i b i l i t y 1 and 
•o m n is c ie n c e 1 of humans in  econom ic m a tte rs . "
In  support o f t h e o re t ic a l econom ics M e n g s r s ta te s  
th a t the a im  of the ex ac t o r ie n ta tio n  of econom ics is  to 
reduce "hum an phenom ena to the ex p res s io ns  o f the most 
o r ig in a l and the m ost g e n e ra l fo rc e s  and im p u ls es  of 
human n a tu re . " T h is  is  not to deny the e x is te n ce
of o the r im p o rta n t fa c to rs  in c lu d in g  Ig n o ran c e  and e r r o r ;  
i t  is  to re c o g n ize  th a t "am ong human im p u ls e s  th a t w hich  
im p e ls  each . in d iv id u a l to  s t r iv e  fo r  h is  w e ll-b e in g  is  by 
f a r  the m ost common and m ost p o w e r fu l. " M onger
co n c lu d e s , t h e r e fo r e , th a t an "u n d ers ta n d in g  of one of 
th e  m ost im p o rta n t s ides of human l i f e "  th a t is  an 
un d ers ta n d in g  of econom ic phenom ena, can be ob ta ined  
w ith  a th e o ry  th a t exam in es  the consequences of the
ra ttem p ts  to p ro v id e  f o r  m a te r ia l n ee d s , a th eo ry  th a t  
assum es "the f re e  p la y  o f th a t p o w e rfu l eoonom ie  
im p u ls e , s e l f - in te r e s t  un in flu en ce d  by o the r im pu ls es  
and o the r c o n s id e ra tio n s  ( p a r t ic u la r ly  e r r o r  or  
5gnc>ranoe)".^®^uch "a  th e o ry  s im p ly  m ust p ro v ide  us 
w ith  a c e r ta in  u n d e rs ta n d in g ." *3 1 ^
W hat conc lusion  can be draw n fro m  M o n g e r's  
vie w s  on the developm ent o f s o c ia l in s titu t io n s  and on 
the ro le  o f s e l f - in te r e s t  In econom ics? I t  is  in te re s t in g  
to  note th a t A" ngcr re c o g n ize s  the im p o rtan c e  in  the 
r e a l  w o rld  of the d i f f ic u lt ie s  th a t face the ac tin g  
in d iv id u a l such as e r r o r ,  ig n o ran c e  and so on and he 
re a l iz e s  th a t in  r e a l i t y  s t r ic t  re g u la r i t ie s  m ay not occur 
as a re s u lt  o f "the fre e d o m  o f the human w i l l " .  xf
the w i l l  is  f re e  then at any po in t in  t im e  the in d iv id u a l  
a c to r  m igh t "change hts m ind" and th e re fo re  ac t in  an 
u n fo re se en  w ay. In  re c o g n iz in g  ig n o ran c e  and e r r o r  
M onger p o in ts  to  the fa c t  th a t th e  w o rld  changes in an 
unexpected  w ay. F o r f  ou rs  w e re  a s ta tio n a ry  w o rld  
then ig n o ran c e  and e r r o r  would d is a p p e a r o ve r tim -’ . 
T hese a re  im p o rta n t m a tte rs  and w i l l ,  in d e e d , be the  
concern  of the re s t  o f th is  th e s is .
~he c r u c ia l q u e s tio n , h o w ev er, w hich  m ust be 
answ ered  in dec id in g  w h e th e r M en g er m ay be re g a rd e d  as 
a s u b je c t iv is t  (o r , in  M is e s ' te rm in o lo g y , a p ra x e o lo g is t)  
.o r  n o t, r e la te s  to h is  v iew  re g a rd in g  the d e te rm in a n ts  
of human a c tio n . Does M en g er see men as being f re e  to  
fo llo w  th e ir  own chosen g o a ls  w ith in  a g iven  s i tu a tio n ,  
o r does he see human ac tio n  as b e in g , in  some sense , 
d e te rm in e d ?  M e n g e r can le g it im a te ly  be r e fe r r e d  to
L
ras a s u b je c t iv is t  o n ly  i f  h is  view  is  co n s is te n t w ith  the 
fo r m e r . I t  is  to  th is  question  th a t we m ust now tu rn .
We have a lre a d y  seen th a t in h is e x p la na tio n  of 
s o c ia l in s titu t io n s  o f the f i r s t  type , th a t is ,  in s titu t io n s  
th a t a re  the in tended  consequences of human ac tio n ,
M e a g e r ho lds th a t "the ul t im a t e r e a l  a im s of the a c tiv e  
su b je c ts  on the one hand , and the most or ig in a l means 
w hich  they had th e ir  comm and on the o th e r ,"  must
be ex am in ed . In s titu t io n s  of the second type on the o ther 
hand , such as m a rk e t p r ic e s  , wages and in te re s t  ra te s  
a re  " the  un intended re s u lt  o f in n u m e ra b le  e f fo r ts  of 
econom ic su b je c ts  p u rsu ing  in d iv id ual in te re s ts " ,  
th a t is ,  they are  "the  un intended s o c ia l re s u lts  of 
in d iv id u a lly  te le o lo g ic a l fa c to rs . " Does M onger see
these ac tio n s as being  in  any way d e term in ed ?
It  is  in  a tte m p tin g  to answ er th is  question  th a t we 
become aw are o f  a c e r ta in  a m b ig u ity  in  M o n g e r's  w r i t in g .  
On the one hand the no tion  o f in d iv id u e ls  p ursu ing  th e ir  
own u lt im a te  a im s and in te re s ts  seem s to be fre e  of any 
d e te rm in is m . B ut on the o th e r hand th e re  a re  p a rts  in  
the book -where M e a g e r suggests th a t a l l  econom ic ac tio n  
is  d e te rm in e d  by the d e s ire  to  s a t is fy  d e term in ed  needs 
w hich  d e s ire  i t s e l f  is  " u lt im a te ly  g iv e n "  and is  
" indepe nde nt o f human c h o ic e . " A t a f a i r l y  e a r ly  p a r t  • 
of the book (on Page 63) M en g er says th a t " the  m ost 
o r ig in a l fa c to rs  o: human econom y a re  the n e e d s , the 
goods o ffe re d  d ir e c t ly  to humans by n a tu re  (both the 
consum ption  goods and the means of p ro d u ctio n  co n c ern e d ),  
and the d e s ire  fo r  the m ost co m plete  s a tis fa c tio n  of 
needs p o ss ib le  ( fo r  the m ost co m plete  co v e rin g  of
rm a te r ia l needs p o s s ib le ), A l l  these fa c to rs  are  
u lt im a te ly  g iv en  by the p a r t ic u la r  s itu a tio n , independent 
o f human ch o ic e . The s ta r t in g  p o in t and the g oal of 
a l l  econom y (need and a v a ila b le  q u a n tity  o f goods on 
the one hand and the p o ss ib le  co m pleteness of s a t is ­
fa c tio n  of the m a te r ia l needs on the o th e r) are  
u lt im a te ly  g iven  to the econom ic hum an, s t r ic t ly  
d e te rm in e d  in  re s p e c t to  t h e ir  n a tu re  a : ' t h e i r  
m e a s u re ."  ^86) g im jig r  id e as  are  e x p res se d  in  
A ppend ix  V I  e n t it le d  "The S ta r tin g  P o in t and the Goal
I t  is  these a m b ig u itie s  th a t n e c e s s ita te  a guarded  
answ er to  the question  re g a rd in g  w h e th e r M onger can 
be re g a rd e d  as a s u b je c t iv is t .  We a c c o rd in g ly  conclude  
th a t although W e n g e r's  approach was a s u b je c t iv is t  
approach in  so fa r  as i t  advocated  th a t  econom ic  
phenom ena m ust be ex p la in ed  by being  deduced from  
the ac tio n s o f in d iv id u a ls  (M o n g e r 's  a to m is tic  or 
co m p o s itive  a p p ro a c h ), th e re  a re  o th e r  passages in  
h is  book w hich lead  us to suspect th a t the v o lu n ta r is t ic  
n a tu re  o i human a c tio n , an e s s e n tia l p a rt  o f the 
s u b je c t iv is t  approach to econom ic th e o ry , is  ove rlo o ke d  
in  fav ou r o f a m ore d e te r m in is t ic  v iew .
In  o rd e r to  f u r th e r  c la r i f y  the s u b je c t iv is t
• ex p la n a tio n  of the developm ent o f s o c ia l in s titu t io n s  
we tu rn  now to  a b r ie f  ex a m in a tio n  o f the o r ig in s  of
of a l l  Human Econom y a re  S t r ic t ly  D r 1vrm lnod". (p. p. 2 1 6 -2 1 $
r n
The O rig in s  of Mo:
I t  is  w id e ly  acknowledged th a t the developm ent 
of money can be tra c e d  to  a ttem p ts  to reduce the 
costs  o f conducting exchange tra n s a c tio n s . In
th is  w ay the g ra d u a l use o f one com m odity  in  a 
system  th a t was o r ig in a lly  c h a ra c te r iz e d  by b a r te r  
can be ex p la in e d . The developm ent o f m e ta llic  
c u rre n c y  and la te r  a c r e d it  system  w ith  such fe a tu re s  
as c r e d it  c a rd s . G ir o , cheques e tc . can >jO s im i la r ly  
ex p la in e d . To say th a t the c r e d it  system  developed  
bec au se i t  enabled  costs to be reduced is  to say that 
in d iv id u a ls  d e s ire d  to  reduce costs in  o rd e r to ach ieve  
th e ir  chosen purposes m ore e f fe c t iv e ly . B ut th is  does 
not mean th a t the in d iv id u a ls  concerned  are  aw are of 
the consequences of th e ir  a ttem p ts  to  do as w e ll in  
the m a rk e t as they can . As Schneider has put i t :  
"U n a n tic ip a te d  consequences of pu rp o s iv e  in d iv id u a l  
ac tio n s  can u lt im a te ly  b u ild  in to  m a^oive s tru c tu re s  -  
'a  w o rld  we n e v e r m ade1 -  whose ’ a to m is tic ’ o rig in s  
and d e r iv a t io n s , as M onger m ight s a y , a re  qu ite  
uaknown to in d iv id u a l a c to rs . " I t  is  now in tended
to  show how the m edium  of exchange developed w ith in  
tha f ra m e w o rk  of a b a r te r  econom y in  o rd e r to i l lu s t r a t e  
the un intended consequences of s p e c ific  p u rposive  
ac tio n s o f in d iv id u a ls .
B a r te r  begins in  a s o c ie ty  when in d iv id u a ls  
exchange th e ir  su rp lus  o f goods, th a t is  the amount 
o i goods o v^ t and above tb a t re q u ire d  to s a t is fy  th e ir  




ia d iv id n a l exchange  
he has a d ire c t  wan 
in d iv id u a ls  observe  
in  the m a rk e t fo r  s
3 h is  goods
th a t th ere  
ime goods t
hors  fo r  which
• t im e  c e rta in  
ore s tab le  demand
T hese goods f u l f i l  a v e ry  g e n e ra l 
fo r  the s t a b i l i ty  Jn t h e ir  dem and, 
th is  e v e n t, p ro v id e d  th ey  fe e l tha 
w i l l  continue at le a s t in  the short 
to  exchange t h e ir  goods fo r  these
id  and th is  accounts 
'•ose who no tice  
o sta b le  demand 
n , w i l l  bo p re p a re d  
t e r  goods. These
goods w i l l  then  be exchanged at some la te r  stage in  
o rd e r to ob ta in  the v a r io u s  goods th a t the in d iv id u a l 
w anted . In d iv id u a ls  thus began exchanging  t h e ir  goods 
fo r  goods w hich they d id  not want d ir e c t ly  but w hich w ere 
m ore m a rk e ta b le . Thus a lthough the in d iv id u a l d id  not 
obta in  the f in a l g oal o f h is  p lanned o p e ra tio n  (the 
o b ta in in g  of the goods th a t he needed) be n e v e rth e le s s  
approached i t  by ac q u ir in g  a m a rk e ta b le  good th a t could  
then  r e la t iv e ly  e a s i ly  be exchanged f o r  the goods th a t 
he d e s ire d . A lthough  two tra n s a c tio n s  w o re re q u ire d  
in  o rd e r to obta in  the d e s 1. <1 good, the c o s t  invo lved  
was reduced  as com pared  to  the b a r te r  s itu a tio n  as a 
r e s u lt  of the p ro b le m  o i a double co inc id e nc e of 
w ants being  ove rco m e .
At f i r s t  "the in d ir e c t  demand fo r  goods w ith  a 
s ta b le  demand was e x e rc is e d  by i f m o s t  p ers p ic ac io u s  
and ab le s t econom ic su b je c ts  fo r t h e i r  own ad v a n ta g e ,"  
but w ith  t im e  the success of the p ra c t ic e  spread  and 
the m edium  of exchange becam e g ra d u a lly  m ore  
a c c e p ta b le . In  th is  w ay money developed fro m  the
a ttem p ts  of in d iv id u a ls  to  do as w e ll  as t h iy  can in  




rC H A P TE R  4 
TH E M E TH O D O LO G Y  OF LU DW IG  VON M ISES
1 . I n t r od u c t io n
M e n g e i wav fo rtv tn a te  tv  have two students in  
p a r t ic u la r  who continued h i s w o rk  and by c o n tin u a lly  
r e fe r r in g  back to h im  in  t h e ir  w r i t in g s , helped to 
found the "A u s tr ia n  School" of E conom ics . T h ey w ere  
B U hm -B aw erk  and W ie s e r . I t  was these fo llo w e rs  of 
M en g er who taugh t the young Ludw ig Von M is e e . In  
th is  section  some of the m ain  m e th o d o lo g ica l tenets  
of M is e s 1 w r i t in g s  w i l l  be an a ly se d,
2 . P ra xe o lo g y
M is e s , who was s tro n g ly  opposed to  the d o ctrin e s  
o f p o s it iv is m , set fo rw a rd  h is  own m ethodology of 
p u re ly  lo g ic a l deduction  fro m  s e lf -e v id e n t  ("a  p r i o r i 1') 
a x io m s . T h is  approach he r e fe r r e d  to ad p rax eo log y , 
"P ra x e o lo g y  is  a th e o r e t ic a l and s y s te m a t ic , not a 
h is to r ic a l ,  sc ie n ce . I ts  scope is  human ac tio n  as such, 
ir r e s p e c t iv e  of a l l  e n v iro n m e n ta l, a c c id e n ta l, and 
in d iv id u a l c l r  um stenc •; o f the co n c re te  ac ts . I ts  
c o g n itio n  is  p u r e l j  fo rm a l and g e n e ra l w ith o u t re fe re n c e  
to  the m a te r ia l con ten t and the p a r t ic u la r  fe a tu re s  of 
the a c tu a l ca se . I t  a im s at know ledge v a lid  fo r  a l l  
in s ta n c e s  in  w hich  the c o n d itio n s  e x a c tly  co rrespond  
to those im p lie d  in  I ts  assum ptions and in fe re n c e s .
rn
I t s  s ta te m en ts  and p ro p o s itio n s  a re  not d e r iv e d  fro m  
e x p e rie n c e . They a r e ,  l ik e  those o f lo g ic  and 
m a th e m a tic s , a p r i o r i .  They a re  n o t su b je c t to  
v e r if ic a t io n  o r f a ls if ic a t io n  on the ground of exp erien c e  
and fa c ts . Th ey  a re  both lo g ic a lly  and te m p o ra lly  
an teceden t to  any com prehens ion  of h is to r ic a l  fa c ts .
•They are  a n ec e s s a ry  re q u ire m e n t of any in te lle c tu a l  
gras p  of h is to r ic a l  ev en ts . W ith o u t them  we should  
not bo ab le  to  see in  the course o f ev en ts  anything  
e ls e  than k a le id o s c o p ic  change or c h a o tic  m uddle.
W hat a re  the s e lf -e v id e n t  (1la p r io r i" )  axiom s  
r e fe r r e d  to  by M is e s ?  "The s ta r tin g  p o in t o f a l l  
p ra x e o lo g ic a l th in k in g  is  not a r b i t r a r i l y  chosen 
a x io m s , but a s e lf -e v id e n t  p ro p o s it io n , fu lly , c le a r ly  
and n e c e s s a r ily  p re s e n t in  e v e ry  human m in d . An 
u n b rid g ea b le  g u lf s e p a ra te s  those a n im als  In  whose 
m inds th is  co g n itio n  is  p re s e n t fro m  those in  whose 
m inds i t  is  not fu lly  and c le a r ly  p re s e n t. The  
c h a ra c te r is t ic  fe a tu re  o f man ie  p re c is e ly  th a t he 
c o n s c io u s ly  a c ts . M ac  is  Homo A gens, the ac ting  
a n im a l . . .  To act m eans: to  s t r iv e  a f te r  ends , th a t
is ,  to  choose a g oal and to  re s o r t  to  m eans in  o rd e r  
to  a tta in  the goal so u g h t."  ^  T h is  ax iom  is  s e lf -  
ev iu e n t in  th at i t  is  not a p re c ip ita te  o f ex p e rie n c e  
and cannot p o s s ib ly  be re fu te d . "E x p e rie n c e  te lls  
us som ething  we d id  not know b efo re  and could not 
le a rn  but fo r  hav ing  the e x p e rie n c e . But the c h a ra c te r is t ic  
fe a tu re  o f a p r io r i  know ledge is  th a t we cannot th in k  of the  
tru th  o f i ts  n eg a tion  or o f som ething  th a t w ould  be at 
v a r ia n c e  w ith  i t .  " ^
u
rIn  o rd e r to e x p la in  a p a r t ic u la r  s itu a tio n  the  
p ra x e o to g is t  in tro d u c e s  c e r ta in  assum ptions in to  the 
chain  o f h is  p ra x e o lo g ie a l re ason ing  concern ing  the 
a c tu a l c o n d itio n s  w ith in  w hich human ac tio n  takes  
p la c e . He then " t r ie s  to  fin d  out how these sp e c ia l  
co n d itio n s a f fe c t  the re s u lt  to  w hich  h is  reason ing  
m ust le a d . The question  of w h e th e r o r not the r e a l  
c o n d itio n s  of the e x te rn a ! w o rld  corres po n d  to these  
assum ptions is  to  be answ ered by e x p e r ie n c e ."  ^
M is e s  contends th a t I t  Is  not p o ss ib le  to  to st 
the co n c lu sion s d e riv e d  fro m  the p ra x e o lo g ic a l  
reas on ing  as the fo llo w in g  quota tion  c le a r ly  shows.
(T h is  w i l l  be d iscussed  in  m ore d e ta i l  b e lo w .)
"The e x p e rie n c e  w ith  w hich  the sc ie nce s o f human 
action  have to  d ea l is  a lw ays an ex p e rie n c e  o f com plex  
phenom ena. No la b o r a to ry  e x p e rim e n ts  oan be p e r ­
fo rm e d  w ith  re g a rd  to  human ac tio n . We are  n e v e r in  
a p o s it io n  to ob se rve  the chan" \ in  one e lem e n t o n ly ,  
a l l  o th e r  c o n d itio n s  of the even t being equa l to a case 
in  w hich  the c le m e n t concerned  d id  not change.
H is to r ic a l e x p e rie n c e  as an e x p e rie n c e  of com plex  
phenom ena does not p ro v id e  us w ith  fa c ts  in  the sense 
in  w hich the n a tu ra l sc ie nce s em pi y th is  te rm  to 
s ig n ify  is o la te d  e v en ts  te s te d  in  e x p e rim e n ts .
The in fo rm atio n  con veyed by h is t o r ic a l ex pe r ie n c e 
c annot be used as bu ild in g  m a te r ia l fo r  th e con s tru c t io n 
of th e o r ie s  and the p re d ic t io n  of fu tu re  e v en ts . E v e ry  
h is to r ic a l  e x p e rie n c e  is  open to  v a r io u s  In te rp re ta t io n s ,  
and is  in fa c t in te rp re te d  in  d if fe r e n t  w ays . . .  I t  is  
im p o s s ib le  to  re fm -m  the sc ie n ce s o f human action
ra c cord ing  to the p a tte rn  o f p hys ics and the o ther 
n a tu ra l s c ie n ce s . T h e re  i s no me ans t o esta b lis h  
an a p o s te r ior i  th e o ry  o f human conduct and socia l  
ev en ts . H is to ry  can n e ith e r  prove n o r d is prov e any 
g e n e ra l s ta te m en t in  the m a nner in  w hich  the n a tu ra l  
sc iences accept o r re je c ta n  hyp o th es is  on the ground  
of la b o ra to ry  e x p e rim e n ts . N e ith e r  e x p e rim e n ta l  
v e r if ic a t io n  nor e x p e r im e n ta l fa ls i f ic a t io n  of a g e n e ra l 
p ro p o s itio n  arc  p o ss ib le  in  th is  f ie ld .  Com plex  
phenom ena in  the p ro d u ctio n  o f w hich v a r ious c a u sa l  
ch a in s are  in t e r l aced cannot te s t any th e o ry . Such 
phenom ena, on the co n tr a r y , becom e in te l l ig ib le  o n ly  
through an in te r p r e ta t io n i n t e rm s of th eo r i es pr e v io u s ly  
developed fro m  o the r sourc e s . "  ^  ( i . e .  fro m  p ra x e o -
lo g ic a l re a s o n in g .)
A s th is  q u o ta tion  show s, th e re  a re  two se p ara te  
p o in ts  th a t m ust be d is tin g u is h e d . On the one hand it  
is  held  th a t in  the f ie ld  o f human ac tio n  h is to r ic a l  
ev ide nc e cannot re fu te  a th e o ry  in t he sa me w ay as i f  
can in  the f ie ld  o f the n a tu ra l sc ie n c e s . On the o ther  
hand, and th is  is  a s e p a ra te  p o in t, i t  is  held  th a t  
h is to r ic a l e x p e rie n c e  cannot at a l l  r e fu te  th e o rie s  
d ea lin g  w ith  human a c tio n . Indeed , h is to r ic a l e x p erien c e  
ap p e ars as " k a le id o s c o p ic  change and ch a o tic  m udd le” ^  
in .the absence of p ra x e o lo g ic a l re as on ing  w hich  enables  
us to un d ers ta n d  these e v e n ts . I t  is  Im p o rta n t to  
d if fe r e n t ia te  betw een  these two p o in ts . Thus e ls e w h e re  
M ls e s  concludes th a t "T h e re  is  no means to  expose a 
fa u lty  th e o ry  o th e r than to  re fu te  i t  by di s c u rs ive 
re as on ing  o r to s u b s titu te  a b e t te r  th e o ry  fo r  i t . "  ^
r3 . Some B ef ls o tio n s  on P r axeol oi*y
T lie  m ethod p roposed b y  M is e s  and o u tlin e d  above 
has le d  oae w r i te r  to  r e te r  to  ja ie e e  as "A n outstanding  
exam ple of an ec o n o m ist who does not a ttem p t to co n firm  
b is  the -y e i th e r  v ia  d iro o t c o m i r m ation  o f the p o stu la te s  
or v ia  in d ire c t  c o n firm a tio n  through v e r if ic a t io n  of 
'd ed u c tiv e ly  d e riv e d  th e o re m s . " ^  The w r i te r  concludes  
th a t " M is e s ’ a p r io r is t ic  p o s itio n  coupled w ith  the com ­
p le te  la c k  o f any t ra c e s  o f c o n firm a tio n  p ro ce d u res  must 
needs lead  us to the c o n c lu s ion  th a t h is  system  is  
e m p ir ic a lly  i r r e le v a n t .  "
As one w ould e x p e c t, M is e s  c las h es  w ith  Popper  
who holds th a t s c ie n t if ic  s ta te m en ts  are  those w hich  a n ,  
in  p r in c ip le , c o n c e p tu a lly  re fu ta b le . S c ie n t if ic  hypo­
th ese s  , acco rd ing  to  P o p p e r , m ust be dropped when 
e x p e rim e n ta tio n  shows th a t they a re  in c o m p a tib le  w ith  
'he o bserved  fa c ts  o f e x p e rie n c e . M is e s  agreep th a t  
"The p o s it iv is t  p r in c ip le  o f v e r i f ia b i l i t y  as r e c t if ie d  
by P o p p er is  u n a s s a ila b le  as an c-pi s te m o lo g ic a l p r in c ip le  
of th e  nature 1 sc ie n c e s "  but ho lds th a t " i t  is  m ean ing ­
le s s  when a p p lied  to anyth ing  about w hich  the n a tu ra l  
sc ie nce s cannot supply any in fo rm a t io n "  '^L°^ th a t i s ,  
when a p p lie d  to the f ie ld  of human n o tion . "T h e re  are  
in th is  o r b it  no such th in g s  as e x p e r im e n ta lly  e s ta b lis h e d  
fa c ts . A l l  ex p e rie n c e  in  th is  f ie ld  is ,  as m ust be 
re p e a te d  again  and a g a in , h is to r ic a l e x p e r ie n c e , th a t  is , 
e x p e rie n c e  o i com plex phenom ena. Such an ex p e rie n c e  
can n e v e r produce som ething  having  the lo g ic a l c h a ra c te r  




In  th is  connection  th e re  are  s e v e ra l po in ts  th at 
m ust be m ade. To begin w ith  i t  m ust be noted th at 
Papa.ttdreou’ s com m ents o re  no t e n t ir e ly  a c c u rs te .
I t  is  not t ru e  to say th at th e re  is  a "com plete  la c k  
of any t ra c e s  of c o n firm a tio n  p ro c e d u re s ” in  the 
m ethodology proposed by M is e s . I t  has been noted  
above th a t M is e s  c la im s  th a t the te s t  o f e x p erien c e  
m ust be used in o rd e r to  dec ide on "w h e th e r o r ,iot 
the r e a l c o n d itio n s  of the e x te rn a l w o rld  correspond  
to these su p p le m en tary  a s s u m p tio n s ."  N svc'-tno'
i t  is  tru e  th a t th is  is  the f u l l  ex ten t of tho e m p ir ic  
content of M is e s ’ approach .
In  com m enting  on M is e s 1 d isagreem ent w ith  Popper  
i t  is  in c id e n ta lly  noted th a t th is  p o in t o f view  of M is e s  
is  a lso  in  c o n f lic t  w ith  m e la te r  view  o l ' la y e k . As 
w i l l  be shown in  the nex t c h a p te r , Hayok has moved 
fro m  a p o s itio n  n e a r to  t h a t  o f M ia e s  to  a new p o s itio n  
much n e a re r  to  K a r l  P o p p er,
In  eom m enting  on the l im ite d  e m p ir ic a l content 
of M .isos1 m ethodology the fo llo w in g  p o in ts  roust be 
m ade. In  the f i r s t  p la c e , i t  is  d i f f ic u l t  to see why the 
co n c lu sion s of p ra x e o lo g lc a l reas on ing  c a n r.it  be tes te d  
ag a in s t the ev id e n c e . Of course i t  m ust be ad m itted  
th a t the hypotheses of th e o rie s  in  the s o c ia l sc ie- ces 
cannot be te s te d  in  tbo gome w ay as those in  the n a tu ra l  
sc ie n c e s . P re d ic t io n  and c o n tro l is  not p o ss ib le  in  
tho same way as i t  is  in some of tho n a tu ra l s c ie n ce s .  
T h is  is  w id e ly  acknow ledged by m ost w r i te r s  who have 
concerned  th e m s e lv e s  w ith  the methodo? gy of the 
s o c ia l s c ie n ce s .
L
rBut th is  does not mean th a t the fa c ts  cannot 
be used at a l l  In  o rd e r to te s t  the oonclus ioas of 
th e o r ie s  in  the s o c ia l sc ie n c e s . N ot is  i t
c o n s is te n t fo r  M is e s  to  con tend , as be does, that 
the  fa c ts  (com plex h is to r ic a l  phenom ena) a re  too 
co iap l'-x  to  a llo w  fo r  th is  te s tin g . T h is  cannot be 
accep ted  since M is e s  h im s eJ f has sa id  th a i e x p erien c e  
m ust be used in  dec id in g  w h e th e r p a r t ic u la r  su p p lem entary  
assum ptions m ay be a d m itte d  in to  the e x p la na tio n  of 
a p a r t ic u la r  s itu a tio n  o r n o t. In  dec id in g  w hether these  
assum ptions c o rres po n d  to the " rc -1  co n d itio n s  of the  
e x te rn a l w o r ld ” i t  is  n e c e s s a ry  to be ab le to com pare 
th e  co n d itio n s  w ith  the assu m p tio n s . B ut i f  th is  can 
be do n e, as M is e s  says i t  ca n , then why cannot .e 
co n c lu sion s of p ra x e o lo g ic a l reas on ing  be com pared  
w ith  the o bserved  fac ts ?  Fot th is  re as on  i t  is  con­
c luded  th a t i t  is  p o ss ib le  to  te s t  the conc lusions of 
th e o r ie s  in  the p o o ia l sc ie n c e s . T h e re fo re , th e re  a re  
not ju s t tw o  a l te rn a t iv e s  w ith  regard , to the conc lusions  
of p rs x e o lo g f ' ‘ a n a ly s is  as M is e s  suggests th e re  a re .  
M ise s  has h e l ih a t  " e i th e r  one can unm ask lo g ic a l  
e r r o r s  in t h i  chain  o i the d eductions w hich  produced  
th ese  r e s u lts ,  o r one m ust .'know ledge t h e ir  c o rre c tn e s s  
and v a l id i t y ."  T h e re  ic  a ro th e r  p o s s ib i l i t y ,  nam e ly
th a t the con c lu s ion  can be te s te d  a g a in s t the fa c ts .
H o w e v e r, th e re  is  one re s e rv a tio n  th a t must be 
made re g a rd in g  the above co n c lu s io n . A lthough the 
co n c lu sion s d e riv e d  fro m  hypotheses in th e o rie s  of 
th e  s o c ia l sc ie n ce s m ay be c o n firm e d  (th a t is ,  not 
re fu s e d ) th is  does not en ab le  us to conclude th a t these
rhypotheses w i l l  n e c e s s a r ily  ho ld  ( th a t Is ,  be c o n firm e d )  
at a la te r  d a te . O v er t im e  s o c ia l phenom ena m ight  
change in  an u n p re d ic ta b le  way as the knowledge of 
the in d iv id u a ls  concerned changes. Thus although  
h is to r ic a l  s o c ia l phenom ena m igh t c o n firm  a h ypo thes is  
at a g iven  p o in t in  t im e  th e re  is  no lo g ic a l reason  why 
they should do so again  in  the fu tu re . in  the s o c ia l
sc ie n ce s th e re  is  no e q u iv a le n t o f the " c o n tin u ity  of 
e n v iro n m e n t"  ax iom  in  the n a tu ra l sc ie n c e s . Thus the 
purpose of te s tin g  a th e o ry  is  to  have an a d d it io n a l 
chock on the ex te n t to  w hich  th a t th e o ry  is  capable of 
e x p la in in g  a g iven  ( h is to r ic a l)  s o c ia l s itu a tio n . T h e o rie s  
In  th e  s o c ia l s c ie n ce s  cannot lo g ic a l ly  in fo rm  us about 
what w i l l  happen in  the fu tu re . They can on ly t e l l  us 
w hat w i l l  happen i f  c o n d itio n s  re m a in  the same as 
po stu la te d  in  the assum ptions o£ tUe th e o ry . T h is  
m a tte r  is  d iscussed  in  g re a te r  d e ta i l  in  C h ap ter 10 .
4 • Some F u r t h e r  Conse quences of M is e s 1 P ra x e o lo gy
a . Law s in  E conom ics: W h ile  M is e s  p o in ts  to the fa c t  
th a t taw s have been e s ta b lis h e d  in  the n a tu ra l sc iences  
and acknow ledges the im p o rta n c e  of th is  fo r  human 
a c t io n , he d en ie s  th at th is  re g u la r i t y  c h a ra c te r iz e s  
the w o r ld  o f human a c tio n . As M is e s  put i t ;  "The  
m ethods of ths n a tu ra l s c ie n ce s  cannot be a p p lied  to 
human b eh a v io u r because th is  b e h a v io u r, a ';a rt  fro m  
w hat q u a l i f ie r  i t  as human ac tio n  and as s tud ied  by the  
a p r io r i  sc ie n ce  of p ra x e o lo g y , la c k s  the p e c u lia r ity  
th a t c h a ra c te r iz e s  ev en ts  in  the f ie ld  o f the n a tu ra l  
s c ie n c e s , v i z . ,  r e g u l a r i t y . ''
L
r52 .
M is e s  th e re fo re  c r i t i c iz e s  those who put fo rw a rd  
s o -c a lle d  s t a t is t ic a l  law s as fa il in g  to  d if fe re n t ia te  
slow change fro m  absence o f change. S ta t is t ic s  r e f e r ,  
by d e f in it io n , to  pas t ev en ts  but th ese  events can , and 
do, change w ith  the passage of t im e .
We n o te , th e r e fo r e , an im p o rta n t d if fe re n c e  
betw een the m ethods of M is e s  and M e n g e r. W hile  
M is e s  r e je c ts  th a t r e g u la r i t y  e x is ts  in the w o rld  of 
human a c tio n , M e n g e r, as is  shown above, holds
th a t the r e g u la r i t y  to be observed in  the coexistence  
and succession of s o c ia l phenom ena is  due to  the  
im p o rtan c e  o f the m otive  o f s e l f - in te r e s t .
b . T i me and U n c e rt a in ty i n E conom ics; The f in a l  
causes of s o c ia l phenom ena are  to  be found in  the 
id e a s , thoughts and consequent a c tio n s  of in d iv id u a ls .  
R eduction  beyond th is  p o in t is  not p o s s ib le . B ui 
human ac tio n  is  o r ie n te d  to w a rd  the fu tu re  w hich is  
u n c o r la in . The ex p e c ta tio n s  of ac tin g  humaus m ay be 
co n firm e d  o r c o n tra d ic te d  w ith  the passing  of t im e .
Thus v a lu a tio n s  and id e as  m igh t have to be m o d ified  
and changed as the fu tu re  becom es the p res en t and 
a d d it io n a l know ledge is  a c q u ire d .
As M is e s  puts i t :  "A ctio n  is  a lw ays d ire c te d  tow ard
the fu tu re ;  i t  is  e s s e n tia lly  and n e c e s s a r ily  a lw ays a 
pla nn ing  and ac tin g  fo r  a b e t te r  fu tu re  . . .  The uneasiness  
th a t im p e ls  a man to act is  causedby d is s a tis fa c tio n  w ith  
expected  fu tu re  c o n d itio n s  as they would p ro b ab ly  develop  
i f  noth ing  w e re  done to  a l t e r  th e m ."
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re . P ra x e o lo g y  and jslie Fu t u re ; Can p ra x e o lo g ic a l 
reas on ing  y ie ld  k a o w le d je  about the fu tu re  aetione  
of in d iv id u a ls ?  The a p r io r i  o f p ra x e o lo g ic a l th in k in g  
is  th a t man ac ts  co n s c io u s ly . S o c ia l phenom ena can 
be reduced  as f a r  as the id e a s  and thoughts which  
guide human ac tio n  but no fu r th e r .  M an th in ks  w ith in  
an en v iro n m e n t w hich  in flu e n c e s  h im  and w hich cons ists  
a lso  of o th e r  p e o p le . N oth ing  can as ye t be sa id  about 
the e x a c t n a tu re  of th is  in f lu e n c e . I t  th e re fo re  fo llo w s  
tb f.t the fu tu re  id e as  and thoughts o f man cannot be 
fo re s e e n . F u tu re  human phenom ena and the re s u lts  
th e re o f, th e re fo re , cannot be p re d ic te d . T h is  is  not to 
deny th a t in fa c t th e re  Is  o ften  re g u la r i t y  in  the human  
w orld , and the id e as  w hich  in s p ire  people today aften  
continue to  in s p ire  them  to m o rro w . B u t th is  is  not 
n e c e s s a r ily  so as the h is to r y  o f thought in any d is c ip lin e  
shows "New id e as  do not o r ig in a te  in  an id e a lo g ic a l  
vacuum . T h ey a re  c a lle d  fo r th  by the p re v ic x e ly  
ex is tin g  id e o lo g ic a l s t ru c tu re ;  th e ) a re  the response  
o ffe re d  by a m a n 's  m ind to the id e as  dev< ' '  ned by h is  
p re d e c e s s o rs . B ut i t  is  an a r b i ta r y  surm ise to  assume  
th a t th e y  w e re bound to  come an;' th a t i f  A had not 
g e n e ra te d  th e m , a c e r ta in  B o? '! w ould h a \d  p e rfo rm e d  
the Sob," {2 I}
H o w e v e r, the Im p o s s ib il i ty  of p re d ic t in g  fu tu re  
s o c ia l ev en ts  does no t ex c lu de  the p o s s ib il i ty  o f what 
m ay be r e fe r r e d  to as a lio g a tlve  p re d ic t ion. We can 
aay th a t a t any tim e  in  the fu tu re  A and B cannot e x is t  
to g e th e r w here the e x is te n c e  of A lo g ic a lly  p rec lu d es
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rth e  ex is te n c e  o f B . Thus i t  can be s ..id  th a t w here  
th e  p la ns  of d if fe re n t  in d iv id u a ls  o r groups of in d iv id u a ls  
a re  in c o n s is te n t then the p lans o f at le r.s t one in d iv id u a l ;
o r group w i l l  be f ru s tra te d  and w i l l  h a . o be sub­
s e q u en tly  re v is e d . But o f course noth ing  c an be said  
about the content o f the re v is e d  p lu o s . ;
d . P ra x e o logy and P s yc h o lo g y  P ra x e o lo g y  m ust be 
d is tin g u is h e d  fro m  psycho logy . The fo rm e r  is  concern , 
w ith  p u rp o s e fu l ac tio n  w h ile  psychology d ea ls  w ith  an 
e x p la n a tio n  of why people behave the w ay they do and 
th e re fo re  w ith  the mo t iv a tio n s  o f  human a c tio n . 
A cc o rd in g  to  M is& s  " . . .  r a t io n a lis m , p rax eo lo g y  and 
econom ics do not d e a l w ith  the u lt im a te  sp rings and 
g o a ls  of a c t io n , but w ith  the me an? a p p lied  fo r  the  
a tta in m e n t of an end sought. H ow ever unf-.thotnable  
the depths m ay be fro m  w hich  an im p u ls e  or in s t in c t  
e m e rg e s , the means w hich man chooses fo r  its  
s a t is fa c t io n  a re  d e te rm in e d  by a r a t io n a l c o n s id e ra tio n  
of expense and s u c c e s s ."
e . K now ledg e of the M in d s  of O th e r P eop le ;  "The  
c a te g o rie s  o f va lu e  and of ac tio n  a re  p r im a ry  pud
a p r io r ls t ic  e le m e n ts  p re s e n t to  e v e ry  human m ind . , . 
O nly because we a re  aw are o f these c a te g o rie s  do we 
know w hat m eaning  m eans and have a key to  in te rp re t  
o th e r p e o p le 's  a c t iv i t ie s .  " We a re  able to u n d e r­
stand the ac tio n s  o f o th e r people because we o u rse lv es  
a re  ac tin g  human b e in g s . Some of th e  m any problem s  
ra is e d  by f-hu- " r a d ic a l ly  s u b je c tiv e ” approach are
J
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rd iscussed  in  the n ex t se ctio n  in contieetion  w ith  the 
same p o in t made b y  H aye> .
5 , o n o lu B lo ii-
; grey.t In s ig h t ia  the w r i t in g s  of M is e s  is  
Ur.a.i hi, ik -, '.-otioa can he in te rp re te d  "as the products  
<:)' ...ja iia , m a n ifo s ta tio n s  of a d ire c tin g  and c o n tro llin g  
L u .lre d  at In  th is  way a l l  human ac tio n  has a 
i o j io a l  y t r io t u ic .  T h e re  is  th e re fo re  such a th in g  as a 
■•bglc ofactivin it lo e e ly  lin k e d  to  the lo g ic  of our thought, 
r /e  act by v l r w i .  .-f the fa c t  th a t we fh in k  b e fo re ."
rC H A P T E R  5
H A Y B K ’ S A PPH O A C H  TO THE P P IL .-S O P H Z
OF T H E  SO C IA L SC rBN C -.' i  |
1 . I n t r o d u ction '
Th is  sectton  on H ayek is  w r i t te n  w ith  re fe re n c e  
m a in ly  to t ’ie fo llo w in g  two esBays:  D eg re es of
E x p la n a tio n , 1955 , and The T h e o ry  o f Com plex  
P henom ena. 1964 . ^  Tha reason fo r  th is  is  th at  
although the id e as  e la b o ra te d  in  these essays have 
re c e iv e d  gome tre a tm e n t in  H a y tk ’ s e a r l i e r  •
w r i t in g s , th e re  are  m any new ide iid  th a t em erge  
o n ly  In th ese  la te r  w r i t in g s .
I t  w i l l  bo noted in th is  se ctio n  that, H ayek has 
been g r e a t ly  in flu en c ed  by the w r i t in g s  of K a r l F o p p e r. ,
A s a re s u lt  o f th is  in f lu e n c e , H a y e k , who e a r l i e r  j
denounced th e  in tru s io n s  c? the mothodB of the n a tu ra l ;
s c ie n ce s  in to  the s o c ia l sc ie n ce s ( w hich  he r e fu r re d  |
to as 's c ie n t is m 1) la te r  c la im e d  th a t the d iffe re n c e s  I
a re  not th at g re a t .  As he says in the p re fa c e  to  j
S ta d ias in  P h ilo s o phy P o l it ic s  & d Econom ics: j
"R = a d ers  o f some of my e a r l i e r  w r i t in g s  may n o tice  j
a s l ig h t change 1% the tone of m y d is cu ss io n  of the I
a t t ’ tude w hich  I  then  c a lle d  ’ s c ie n tis m ’ : The re as on  t
fo r  th is  is  th a t S ir  K a r l  P o p p er has taugh t me th a t  
n a tu ra l s c ie n tis ts  d id  not r e e l l y  do what m ost o f them  
n ot on ly  io ld  us th a t th e y  d id  but a lso  u rged  the 
re p re s e n ta t iv e s  of o the r d is c ip lin e s  to im i ta te .
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rThe d iffe re n c e  between the two groups of d is c ip lin e s  
has th e re b y  been g re a t ly  n arrow ed  and I  keep up the 
argum ent u r ly  because so many s o c ia l s c ie n tis ts  are  
s t i l l  t r y in g  to  im ita te  w hat they w ro n g ly  b e lie v e  to 
be the m ethods of the n a tu rn l sc ie n c e s . The  
in te lle c tu a l debt v M c h  I owe to  th is  o ld  f r ie n i’ fo r  
h av in g ta u g h t me tJiis is  cut one o i many 
Popper h im s e lf  r e fe r s  to th is  sta te m en t in  h is  
c o n tr ib u tio n  to  the essays in honour o f H ayek . ^
2 . Com piox P henom ena
Popper has argued th a t the s c ie n tif ic  m ethod  
is  h y p o th e tic a l-d e d u c t!v e . S c ie n t if ic  p re d ic t io n  
p roceeds by the s p e c ific a t io n  of "hypotheses" or 
"n a tu ra l la w s"  ..nti i n i t i a l  s itu a tio n s  in c lu d in g  the 
know ledge of the a c to r /s  c o n c ern e d , fro m  w hich  
prognoses a re  d e r iv e d . The p rognoses are  then  
co n fro n te d  w ith  o b se rva b le  fa c ts  in  o rd e r  to  
atte m p t to re fu te  the hypotheses fro m  which they  
are  deduced. Tho body of s c ie n tif ic  knowledge  
co n s is ts  of those hypotheses th a t have not been  
re fu te d . In vi h or  w o rd s , the s c ie n t if ic  m ethod, 
i t  is  c la im e d , co n s is ts  in  e x p la in in g  the known by 
the  unknown, "W hat is  m eait by th is  ap p a ren t paradox  
is  th a t the advance of know ledge co n s is ts  in  the 
fo rm u la tio n  of new sta te m en ts  whi ch often  re fe r  
to  events w h ich  cannot be d ir e c t ly  o bserved  and 
fro m  w h ic h , in  com b ina tio n  w ith  o th e r statem ents  




of d is p ro o f by o b s e rv a tio n . "
In assess ing  tlie  a p p lic a b il i ty  o f th is  method  
a d is tin c tio n  must be draw n between what Hayek 
r e fe r s  to  as " s im p le  phenom ena" and "com plex  
phenom ena. " S im ple phenom ena, fo r  excm ple the 
phenom ena s tud ied  by p h , s ic s , r e fe r  to  those  
phenom ena "w here the num ber of s ig n if ic a n t ly  
connected v a r ia b le s  of d if fe re n t  k inds is  s u f f ic ie n t ly  
s m a ll to  enable us to  study them  as i f  they fo rm ed  
a c losed  system  fo r  w hich  we can observe and co n tro l  
a l l  the d e te rm in in g  f a c to r s ."  In  d ea lin g  w ith
co m plex phenom ena, on the o th e r hand, the s c ie n tis t  
dea ls  w ith  a com plica ted  in te ra c t io n  between a la rg e  
num ber o f v a r ia b le s . C om plex phenomena a re  to be 
found both in  the f ie ld  o f the n a tu ra l sc iences and 
the s o c ia l sc ie n c e s . The s u b je c t m a tte r  o f some of 
the b io lo g ic a l s c ie n ce s  se rv e  as an exam ple of 
co m plex phenom ena in  the n a tu ra l sc ie n c e s . In  
d e a lin g  w ith  com plex phenom ena, H ayek contends , 
a d if fe re n t  approach is  re q u ire d . Since in  these  
s itu a tio n s  o b se rva tio n  d iscloses on ly l im ite d  
re g u la r i t ie s  "we u s u a lly  ask to  what ex ten t our 
e x is tin g  know ledge of the fo rc e s  at w o rk , o r o f the  
p ro p e r t ie s  o f some of the e lem e n ts  o f the com plex, 
may account fo r  what we o b s e rv e . We endeavour to  
f in d  out w h e th e r th is  m ay be d e r iv e d  by deduction  
fro m  what we know about the b eh a v io u r under s im p le r  
c o n d itio n s  o f some of the fa c to rs  in v o lve d , " 1 ^
In  o th e r w o rd s , in d ea lin g  w ith  com plex phenom ena we 
p ro ce ed  fro m  the known to the unknown in s te ad  of
u
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rthe o the r way around.
The d if f ic u lt ie s  in h e r e n t  in  th is  approach are  
s tre s s e d  by H ayek: "we can n e v e r be c e r ta in  th at
what we know about the ac tio n  o f those fo rc e s  under 
S im p le r co n d itio n s w i l l  app ly  t o m ore com plex  
S itu a tio n s , and we w i l l  have no d ire c t  way of tes tin g  
th is  as sum ption , since our d i f f i c u l t y  is  p re c is e ly  
th a t we a re  unable to  a s c e r ta in  by o b se rva tio n  the presence  
and s p e c ific  a rran g em en t o f the m u lt ip l ic i t y  o f fa c to rs  
which fo rm  the s ta r t in g  p o in t o f o ur d ed uctive  r e a s o n in g ." *8  ^
Thus the s c ie n tis t  who s tu d ie s  com plex phenomena does 
not in v en t new hypotheses bu t ra th e r  se le c ts  c e rta in  
hypotheses fro m  what is  a lre a d y  known to h im  about 
the e lem e n ts  of the phenomenon co n c ern e d . These  
known hypotheses are  used in  the m odel in  o rd e r  to 
deduce the conc lusions th a t fo llow .
The p ro b lem  of d e r iv in g  hypotheses or assum ptions  
fo r  use in  a th e o ry  of co m plex phenom ena has a lre a d y  
been re fe r r e d  to by H ayek in  1937 in  Econom ics  
and Kno w le d ge . In  th is  a r t ic le  H ayek s ta te s  that 
the assum ptions fro m  w hich  th e  P u re  Log ic  o f Choice  
s ta r ts  (the assum ptions c o rres po n d in g  to the a p r io r i  
assum ptions made by M fs ee  n a m e ly , th a t m a n ’ s ac tions  
a re  p u rp o s iv e )" a re  fa c ts  w h ich  we know to be common 
to  a l l  human th o u g h t."  H o w ev er, H ayek c la im s  in  th is  
a r t ic le ,  in  o rd e r  to e x p la in  s o c ia l p ro c e s s e s , i t  is  
n e c e s s a ry  to  in troduce s u b s id ia ry  hypotheses or 
a s sum ptions. These h ypo thes es , w hich  m ust be se le c ted  
fro m  the in f in i t e  v a r ie ty  o f p o s s ib le  s i tu a tio n s , "concern  
the re la t io n  of the thought o f an in d iv id u a l to  the outs ide  





c a u sa l connect!  
kn o w ledge. "
the ta s k  th a t re  
h ypothes es , an 
betw een e x p e rie  
w onder w he the r
e x te rn a l faces. And the hypothei 
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In deed , one m ight 
j  to say anything
of s ig n ific a n c e  about th is  co m p lica te d  m a tte r .  I t  
is  the d if f ic u lty  of s ta tin g  p re c is e ly  how exp erien c e  
in flu e n c e s  the know ledge of d if fe re n t  people and th e re ­
fo re  th e ir  thoughts and id e as  w h ic h , as is  shown ab o v e , 
le d  M is e s  to conclude th a t the la t t e r  c o n s titu te s  the 
" f in a l  cause" o f h is to r ic a l even ts  and a re  th e re fo re  
in c ap ab le  of being  re du c ed  any fu r th e r .  As Ilayok  
c o r r e c tly  points out in  th is  a r t ic le ,  the assum ption  
o f a tendency tow ards e q u il ib r iu m  does make Im p lic it  
assum ptions about the re la t io n s h ip  betw een knowledge 
and e x p e r ie n c e , but i t  m ust be questioned  as to how 
much can be known about th is  com plex re la t io n s h ip .
In  h is  la te r  fo rm u la tio n  Ifay ek  acknow ledges the 
d if f ic u lt y  by p o in tin g  out th a t s o c ia l phenom ena are  
com plex and th a t th e r e fo r e , since the s c ie n tis t  cannot 
ade q u ate ly  s p e c ify  the hypotheses and in i t i a l  s itu a tio n s  
to  be in c o rp o ra te d  in  the m o d e l, he m ust p ro ce ed  from  
the p a r t ia l  knowledge of the phenomenon th at is  
a v a ila b le  to  h im . I t  is  th is  m ethod th a t H ayek c a lls  






W hereas the th e o rie s  o f s im p le  phenom ena, fo r  !
exam ple m e c h a n ic s , y ie ld  s p e c ific  p re d ic t io n s , the \
th e o r ie s  o f com plex pheuomenR p re d ic t  th at a p a tte rn  
o* a c er t a in  kind  w i l t  appear in  d e fin e d  c irc u m s ta n c e s . :
N e v e rth e le s s  th is  p re d ic t io n , since i t  s ta te s  at the same '
t im e  the p a tte rn s  th a t w i l l  not a p p e a r, is  f a ls if ia b ie  
and is  th e re fo re  an e m p ir ic a l s ta te m e n t. H ayek 
em phasizes th a t the n a tu re  o f com plex phenomena is  
such that s p e c ific  p re d ic t io n s  cannot be m ade. I t  is  :
th e re fo re  in c o r re c t  to a t t r ib u te  th is  fa c t  to  the '
undeveloped n a tu re  of the sc ie n ce s co n c ern e d . In  the •
f ie ld  of the s o c ia l s c ie n c e s , io r  e x a m p le , " in d iv id u a l  
e v en ts  r e g u la r ly  depend on so many co n c re te  c ircu m s ta n ce s  
th a t we s h a ll n e v e r in  fa c t be in  a p o s it io n  t . a s c e r ta in  !
them  a l l;  and . . .  in  consequence not on ly the id e a l o f ;
p re d ic t io n  and c o n tro l m ust la r g e ly  re m a in  beyond our ;
re a c h , but also  the hope re m a in  i l lu s o r y  th a t we can 
d is c o v e r b y o b s e rv a tio n  re g u la r  connections between  
the in d iv id u a l e v e n ts . The v e ry  in s ig h t w hich th eo ry  
p ro v id e s , fo r  e x a m p le , th a t a lm o st any even t in  the 
course of a m a n 's  l i f e  may have some e f fe c t  on a lm ost 
any of h is fu tu re  a c tio n s , m akes i t  im p o s s ib le  th at we 
t ra n s la te  o ur th e o re t ic a l knowledge in to  p re d ic t io n s  of 
s p e c ific  e v e n ts . "
Thus the .sciences of com plex phenom ena, which  
a im  at ex p la in in g  r e g u la r i t ie s  in  these phenom ena, can 
o n ly  y ie ld  p re d ic t io n s  about gener a l  p a tte rn s  th a t w i l l  j
appear under c e r ta in  gen e ra l c o n d itio n s . I t  is  not j
p o ss ib le  to  p re d ic t  s p e c ific  events th a t w i l l  occur at ;
u
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ra p a r t ic u la r  t im e  aad p la ce  such as the p r ic e s  and 
q u a n tit ie s  o f a l l  the goods and s e rv ic e s  a v a ila b le  in  
the econom y. N e v e rth e le s s  '’P re d ic t io n s  of & p a tte rn  
a re  . . .  both te s ta b le  and v a lu a b le . Sine., the th eo ry  
t e l l s  us u nder w hich g e n e ra l co n d itio n s a p a tte rn  of 
th is  s o rt  w i l l  fo rm  i t s e l f ,  i t  w i l l  enable us to c re a te  
such co n d itio n s and to  observe w he the r a p a tte rn  of 
th e  k in d  p re d ic te d  w i l l  ap p e ar. And since the th eo ry  
te l ls  us th a t th is  p a tte rn  a s su re s  a m a x im iz a tio n  of 
output in  a c e r ta in  sense., i t  a lso  en a b les  us to  c re a te  
the g e n e ra l c o n d itio n s  w hich w i l l  as su re  such a 
m a x im iz a t io n , though we are  ig n o ran t o f many o f the  
p a r t ic u la r  c irc u m s ta n c e s  w hich w i l l  d e te rm in e  the 
p a tte rn  th a t w i l l  a p p e a r ."
I t  is  e v id e n t fro m  th is  la s t  s ta te m en t as w e ll  
as fro m  o the r s ta te m en ts  made e l s e w h e r e , t h a t  
H ay ek  holds th a t  a th e o ry  o i co m plex phenom ena whose 
p re d ic t io n s  o f g e n e ra l p a tte rn s  have not been c o n tra ­
d ic te d  by o b s e rv a tio n , does p ro v id e  know ledge about 
the fu tu re . I t  is  thus suggested , as th e  la s t  footno te  
c le a r ly  show s, th at th e  th e o rie s  o f com plex phenomena 
whose hypotheses h a v j not been re fu te d , can se rv e  to 
reduce thu u n c e r ta in ty  w ith  w hich  human ac tion  must 
contend. The ac tin g  human being  is  p ro v ide d  w ith  the 
in fo rm a tio n  th a t c e r ta in  s o c ia l e v e n tu a l it ie s  a re  not 
p o s s ib le . I f  th e o r ie s  can p ro v id e  th is  u s e fu l function  
then th e ir  im p o rta n c e  in  a study o l human ac tion  cannot 
bo u n d e rra te d . M is c s  has shown th a t the ac ting  human 
cun be in fo rm e d  of the consequences of some of h is
raotione by th e  know ledge p ro v ide d  by the n a tu ra l sc ie n ce s . 
I f  the s o c ia l sc ie n ce s can p ro v id e  a s im i la r  s e rv ic e , even 
though th e ir  p re d ic t io n s  are  o f a m ore g e n e ra l n a tu re  and 
not s p e c ific  as are  the p re d ic t io n s  of the n a tu ra l s c ie n ce s , 
then human ac tio n  becom es e a s ie r  In  th a t c e r ta in  s o c ia l 
consequences ca n , at th e  o u ts e t, be ex clu de d . S oc ia l 
th e o r ie s  ac c o rd in g ly  f u l f i l  a purpose s im ila r  to  th a t of 
in s t itu t io n s  w hich a lso  in c re a s e  the c e r ta in ty  w ith  which  
human d e c is io n s  are  ta k e n . H o w e v e r, since H ay ek 's
th e o ry  la  being  coneit’ o red  h e ro , com m ent on these  
im p o rta n t im p lic a t io n s  is  re s e rv e d  fo r  the c r i t i c a l  
re f le c t io n s  on H a y e k 's  th e o ry  la te r .
3 . H ayek and M lse s
H aving  exam ined  H a y e k 's  approach to com plex  
phenom ena in  g e n e ra l and to the s o c ia l sc iences in  
p a r t ic u la r ,  a few w ords m ay be said  about some of the 
d if fe re n c e s  betw een the m ethod suggested by H ayek  
and th a t suggested by M ls e s . The la t t e r ,  as has been 
shown, re g a rd s  econom ics as a kind  o f lo g ic . A ccord ing  
to  M is e s , econom ics co n s is ts  of deductions fro m  a p r io r i  
assum ptions w hich cannot be re fu te d . In  ex p la in in g  
a p a r t ic u la r  s itu a tio n  s u b s id ia ry  assum ptions m ust 
be in c o rp o ra te d  in to  the chain  of p ra x e o lo g lc a l re ason ing  
and co n c lu sion s a re  then  d e r iv e d . I f  th e re  has been no 
fa u lt  in  the ded u c tiv e  cha in  and i f  the s u b s id ia ry  
assum ptions c o rres po n d  to  the s itu a tio n  th at is  to  be 
e x p la in e d , then the conc lusion  m ust be c o r r e c t.  M ise s
r( in  fa c t  in  h is  a ig um en t ag a inst P o p p e t)  c la im s  th at  
in  the sc ie nce s of human ac tio n  th e re  are  "no suoh 
th in gs  as e s p c r fm e a ts l ly  e s ta b lis h e d  fa c ts . A ll  
ex p e rie n c e  in  th is  f ie ld  i s , as m ust be repeated  
aga in  and ag a in , h is to r ic a l e x p e r ie n c e , th a t is  
e x p e rie n c e  of com plex phenom ena. Such an exp erien c e  
can n e v e r produce som ething  having  the lo g ic a l c h a ra c te r  
of w hat the n a tu ra l sc ie n ce s c a ll  fa c ts  o f e x p e r ie n c e ." ^  
M is e s  thus c la im s  chat in  the s o c ia l sc iences i t  is  not 
p o ss ib le  to co n fro n t the conc lusions of p ra x c o lo g ic a l 
re ason ing  w ith  the fa c ts  o f the s itu a tio n . T h is  is  not 
p o s s ib le  because these fa c ts  c o n s is t of a co m p lica te d  
in te r re la t io n s h ip  betw een  a la rg e  num ber o f v a r ia b le s .  
M is e s  thus concludes th a t th e re  is  no way in  which a 
th e o ry  can ‘le  re fu te d  i f  the assum ptions and the chain  
o f ded u c tiv e  reas on ing  a re  c o r r e c t.  "T h e re  is  no means 
to  expose a fa u lty  th e o ry  o the r than to re fu te  i t  by 
d is c u rs iv e  reas on ing  and to  s u b s titu te  a b e t te r  th eo ry  
f . ,
( I t  hae been no ted  th a t a lthough M is e s  re je c ts  
th a t the conc lusions of a p ra x e o lo " ic a l th e o ry  can be 
te s te d  by co n fro n tin g  them  v i th  the p a r t ic u la r  fa c ts  o f 
the s itu a tio n  he n e v e rth e le s s  ho lds th a t "e x p e rie n c e "  
m ust be used as the c r i te r io n  in  dec id in g  w h e th e r the 
s u b s id ia ry  a s su m p tio n s , in tro d u c e d  in to  ihe p ra x c o lo g ic a l  
re a s o n in g , a re  '-a lid  o r n o t. )
On the o the r hand i t  has been shown th at Hayek"s  
a n a ly s t s depends to a f a r  g re a te r  degree on e m p ir ic a l  
o b s e rv a tio n . W h ile  fo r  M is e s  the c r i te r io n  ac cord ing
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rto w liloh the s u b s id ia ry  assum ptions a re  ad m itted  in to  
the p ra x e o lo g ic a l re as on ing  p ro v ide s  the only l in k  
betw een  econom ic th e o ry  and e m p ir ic a l e b s e rv a tie n ,  
fo r  H ayek o b s e rv a tio n  p la ys  a fa r  m ore im p o rta n t ro le .  
A cc o rd in g  to the la t t u r ,  the g e n e ra l p a tte rn s  th a t arc  
p re d ic te d  by the econom ic th e o r ie s  m ust be sub jected  
to  e m p ir ic a l te s tin g . I f  g e n e ra l p a tte rn s  are  p re d ic te d  
th is  w i l l  im p ly  th a t o th e r p a tte rn s  w i l l  not be observed; 
i» they are  o b se rve d , then  the th e o ry  is  taken to be 
re fu te d . I f  the th e o ry  is  not re fu te d  then  i t  w i l l  p ro v ide  
u s e fu l knowledge about the fu tu re . (1?) H ayek points  
out th at since th e o r ie s  o f com plex phenomena y ie ld  on ly  
g e n e ra l p re d ic t io n s , i t  is  d i f f ic u l t  to  e l im in a te  in f e r io r  
th e o r ie s . A lthough th is  d if f ic u l t y  is  acknowledged by 
H ayek he contends th a t i t  is  e s s e n tia l in  a l l  cases to t ry  
to  re fu te  th e  th e o ry . K is e s  on the o the r hand , as has 
been se en , b e lie v e s  th a t th is  p o s s ib il i ty  is  not open to 
the s o c ia l sc ie n ce s because of the com plex n a tu re  of 
t h e ir  su b je c t m a tte r .
A no the r in te re s t in g  d if fe re n c e  betw een M ls e a  and H ayek  
Is  the approach ta k e r  by each re g a rd in g  the d e te rm in is m  
of human a c tio n . A cc o rd in g  to M is e s , fu tu re  s o c ia l 
phenom ena cannot be p re d ic te d  because these phenomena 
depend on the a c tio n s  o f in d iv id u a ls  w h ic h , in  tu rn ,  
a re  dependent upon the thoughts and Ideas of the same 
in d iv id u a ls . M is e s  acknow ledge-, th a t the id e a s , thoughts 
and va lues o f in d iv id u a ls  a re  in flu en c ed  by the p a r t ic u la r  
s o c ia l m il ie u  in c lu d in g  the id e a s  o f o the r in d iv id u a ls .  
N e v e rth e le s s  the e x a c t n a tu re  o f th is  in flu en c e  cannot
rbe s t ip u la te d  and th e re fo re  i t  is  not p o ss ib le  to  p re d ic t  
fu tu re  human ac tio n . A c c o rd in g ly  M te ee  r e je c ts  the 
b e h a v io u ris t  e x p la na tio n  o f human ac tion  c o n t-'.^ e d  aa 
a re sponse to an e x is tin g  s t im u lu s  s i tu a tio n , and he 
als o  re je c ts  the " m a te r ia l is t 1' e x p la na tio n  o f human 
b eh a v io u r w h ereby a i l  b eh a v io u r has p h y s ic a l causes. 
" E v e ry  in d iv id u a l is  born in to  a d e f in ite  s o c ia l and 
n a tu ra l m il ie u  . . .  An in d iv id u a l is  a t any in s ta n t of 
h is  l i f e  the p ro d u ct of a l l  th e  e x p e rie n c e s  to  which h is  
an c es to rs  w e re  exposed p lus those to w hich he h im s e lf  
has bo f a r  been exposed . . .  He is  im bued w ith  d e fin ite  
r e lig io u s , p h ilo s o p h ic a l, m e ta p h y s ic a l, and p o lit ic a l  
id e a s , w h ich  he som etim es e n la rg e s  o r m o d ifie s  by h is  
own th in k in g . " H o w ever, when we say th a t the va lue
ju d g m en ts , thoughts and id e as  of the in d iv id u a l are  
u lt im a te ly  given, fa c te  we are  sa.yi»g th a t "W e 60 not 
know why and how d e f in ite  c o n d itio n s  of the ix te rn a l  
w o rld  cause in  a human m ind a d e f in ite  re a c tio n . We 
do not know why d if fe re n t  people and the same people 
at v a r io u s  in s ta n ts  o f th e ir  l iv e s  re a c t  d if fe r e n t ly  to 
the same e x te rn a l s t im u l i .  We cannot d is c o v e r the 
n e c e s s a ry  connection  betw een an e x te rn a l even t and the 
id e as  i t  p roduces w ith in  the human m in d ."  ^
H ayek a r r iv e s  at the same c o n c lu s io n  . ,e ly  
th e  im p o s s ib il i ty  o f p re d ic t in g  human a c tio n , but v ia  
a d if fe re n t  ro u te . H ayek argues th a t even i f  we w ere  
to  accep t the p r in c ip le  o f u n iv e rs a l d e te rm in is m , exact 
p re d ic t io n  would s t i l l  not be p o ss ib le  because of the 
com plex n a tu re  of human a c tio n . "E ven  i f  the a s s e rtio n
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ro i  a u n iv e rs a l d e te rm in is m  w e re  m e a n in g fu l, s c a rc e ly  
any of the conc lu sions u s u a lly  d e r iv e d  fro m  i t  w i l l  
th e re fo re  fo llo w  . . .  we m a y , fo r  in s ta n c e , w e ll  be 
ab le  to  e s ta b lis h  th a t e v e ry  s in g le  ac tion  of a human 
being is  the n e c e s s a ry  re s u lt  o f the in h e r ite d  s tru c tu re  
o i h is  body ( p a r t ic u la r ly  of i ts  nervous system ) and of 
i l l  the e x te rn a l in f lu e n c e s  iVfcich have acted  upon i t  s ince  
b ir t h .  We m igh t even be ab le  to  go fu r th e r  and as so rt  
th a t i f  the m ost im p o rta n t of these fa c to rs  w e re  in  a 
p a r t ic u la r  case v e ry  much the same as w ith  m ost o ther 
in d iv id u a ls , a p a r t ic u la r  c la s s  of in f lu e n c e s  w i l l  have 
a c e r ta in  kind  of e f fe c t .  B ut th is  w ould be an e m p ir ic a l  
g e n e ra liz a t io n  based on a c e te r is  p arib us  assum ption  
which we could  not v e r i f y  in  the p a r t ic u la r  in s ta n c e .
The c h ie f  fa c t w ould continue to  b e , in  sp ite  oi o u r  
knowledge of the p r in c ip le  on w hich  the human m ind w o rk s , 
th a t we should not be ab le  to s ta te  the fu l l  set o f p a r t ic u la r  
fa c ts  w hich  b ro u g ht i t  about th at the in d iv id u a l d id  a 
p a r t ic u la r  th ing  at a p a r t ic u la r  t im e . "
I t  is  thus not p o s s ib le  to p re d ic t  s p e c ific  in d iv id u a l  
ac tions at a s p e c ific  t im e  even i f  human ac tion  w e re  
m e c h a n ic a lly  d e te rm in e d . The n a tu re  o f the d e te rm in is m  
is  so com plex th at the  p re d ic t io n  of human ac tio n  re m a in s  
im p o s s ib le . The ac tio n s o f the in d iv id u a l at t im e  t  
m ight th e re fo re  be e n t ir e ly  d if fe re n t  to  h is  ac tio n s  at 
e ith e r  t -  1 o r t  + 1 . The sta te m en t th at the in d iv id u a l  
w i l l  ac t in  e x a c tly  the same way in  id e n t ic a l s itu a tio n s , 
although tru e  i f  we assum e u n iv e rs a l d e te rm in is m , is  not 





of the s itu a tion , 
human ac tio n  i s ,
w il l  not be ab le to  id e n t ify  s im ila r  
itu a t io n s . The p re d ic t io n  of fu tu n  
t h e r e fo r e , not p o s s ib le .
H aving sta te d  th is  conc lusion  w hich  Hayel: roaches  
in  the la s t  q u o ta tio n , some d if f ic u lt y  is  found in  
re o o u c ilin g  th is  w ith  h is o the r co nc lusion  noted above 
th a t th e o rie s  of  the soc ia l  sc ie n ce s can aid  fu tu re  
human ac tio n  {o r , what amounts to the same th in g , 
p re s e n t ac tio n  w hich  by d e f in it io n  is  o rie n te d  to the 
fu tu re ).  I f  i t  is  n et p o ss ib le  to p re d ic t  fu tu re  human 
ac tio n , how then can s o c ia l th e o rie s  be of use to  the 
acting  in d iv id u a l?  The same ques-tion m ight be phrased  
in  a d if fe re n t  way: H ayek c la im s  th a t the g e n e ra l p a t te n
p re d ic te d  by th e o r ie s  o f co m plex phenom ena m ust be 
confron ted  w ith  o b s e rv a b le  fa c ts  in the a tte m p t to  re fu te  
the re le v a n t hypo theses . B ut the "o b s e rv a b le  fac ts "  
a re  the consequences of human ac tio n  and as is  shown 
above fu tu i'-  human ac tio n  cannot be p re d ic te d . In  o the r  
w o rd s , although the g e n e ra l p a tte rn s  p ic d ic te d  m ay, 
in  a p : ir ii lu la r  case , not be re fu te d  by the obse rva b le  
fa c ts  (a lso  of a g e n e ra l n a tu re )  th e re  is  no lo g ic a l  
reason to suppose th at the same w i l l  be tru e  in  the 
next p o in t o f t im e . The " fa c ts "  m igh t change o ve r t im e  
as human ac tio n  ch a n g es . T h is  in e sc ap ab le  conclusion  
fo llo w s  fro m  the im p o s s ib il i ty  o f p re d ic t in g  human a c tio i 
To the ex te n t to w hich  a th e o ry  o f com plex phenomena 
depends upon assum ptions re g a rd in g  s p e c ific  human  
a c tio n s , th is  th e o ry  w i l l  not n e c e s s a r ily  bo ab le to 




rhuman ac tio n  in  the fu tu re  m ight change. (O f c o u rs e , 
the th e o ry  w i l l  on ly e x p la in  past phenom ena i f  the 
assum ptions mado co rres pond  to the p a r t ic u la r  
s itu a tio n s  co n c e rn e d .)
Thus H ayck has concluded both th a t fu tu re  human 
ac tions cannot be p re d ic te d  even i t  a u n iv e rs a l  
d e te rm in is m  is  a c ce p te d , and th a t s o c ia l th e o rie s  
p ro v id e  know ledge the e f fe c t  of w hich is  to reduce  
the u n c e rta in ty  in v o lve d  in  ac tin g  by e lim in a tin g  some 
co n c e iv ab le  consequences of human a c tio n . How are  
these two view s to bo -e c o n o ile d ?
The two op in ions can be re c o n c ile d  i f  i t  is  assumed 
th a t human a c tio n , a lthough u n p re d ic ta b le , is  f a i r l y  
constan t o ve r t im e . Thus a th e o ry , the assum ptions  
of w hich  a re  based on s p e c ific  human a c tio n s  and the 
p re d ic t io n s  of w hich  have been supported  by obse rva b le  
phenom ena w i l l  p ro v id e  u s o f i l  know ledge fo r  the fu tu re  
to  the ex te n t th at fu tu re  ac tio n s are  the same as those  
im p lie d  in  the th e o ry . But of c o u rs e , some p a tte rn s  
of human ac tio  i m ay change over t im e  w ith  the re s u lt  
th a t a th e o ry  m ay becom e le s s  re l ia b le  as t im e  passes.
T h is  p ro b lem  can be i l lu s t r a t e d  by the fo llo w in g  
e x am ple . A ccep ting  th a t i t  is  im p o s s ib le  to  p re d ic t  
the s p e c ific  p r ic e s  and q u a n tit ie s  th a t w i l l  p re v a i l  at 
a p a r t ic u la r  t im e  and p la c e , som ething  can n e v e rth e le s s  be 
s a id  about the p r ic e s  and q u a n tit ie s  th a t w i l l  p re v a i l  
i f  co n d itio n s  tend to be c i th e r  c o m p e titiv e  or m o n o p o lis tic . 
In  o the r w o rd s , the g e n e ra l p r ic e  and q u a n tity  p a tte rn s  
th a t w i l l  r e s u lt  under c o m p e titiv e  c o n d itio n s  can be
rcom pared  to  those re s u lt in g  fro m  m o n o p o lis tic  cond itions, 
But I t  1s n o t p o s s ib le  to  p re d ic t  w h e th e r co n d itio n s in
m o n o p o lis tic . F o r th is  w i l l  depend on the id e as  e tc . of 
human beings w h ic h , as we have seen , cannot be p re d ic te d .  
In  f a c t ,  the v e ry  " p re d ic t io n "  th a t co n d itio n s in  the fu tu re  
econom y w i l l  tend m ore to w ard s  the m o n o p o lis tic  m odel 
than tow ards the c o m p e titiv e  m odel m igh t have the e ffe c t  
of encourag ing  the opposite to  a c tu a lly  happen.*21  ^ Th is  
m ig h t be c a lle d  a s e lf - f r u s tr a t in g  prophesy.
4 . K nowledge of the M ind of O ther In d iv id u als
Ila yo k  has o ften  em ph a sized  the im p o rta n c e  of 
in tro s p e c tio n  in the s o c ia l sc ie n c e s . T h is  fo llo w s  
lo g ic a l ly  fro m  the fa c t th a t the s o c ia l phenomena w hich  
c o n s titu te  the o b jo e ta  of e n q u iry  of the s o c ia l sc iences  
are  the r e s u lt s , both in ten d ed  and u n in to ie d , of human 
a c tio n . The ac tio n s o f in d iv id u a ls  a re  gu ided by th e ir  
id e a s , va lues and purposes w hich a re  em bodied in  th e ir  
p la n s . S ince i t  is  o fte n  n o t p o ss ib le  to  d ir e c t ly  observe  
the p la ns  o f in d iv id u a ls  i t  becom es n e c e s s a ry , at le a s t  
in  these ca se s , to u n d ers tand  them  by in tro s p e c tio n . As 
R ayek has put i t :  " . . .  w here we t r y  to understand
human b e in g s , and w h e re  th is  unders ta n d in g  is  made 
po ss ib le  by the fa c t th a t we have a m ind lik e  t h e i r s , 
and th a t fro m  the m e n ta l c a te g o rie s  we h a v  in  common 
w ith  them  we can re c o n s tru c t  the s o c ia l com plexes which
the fu tu re  econom y w i l l  tend  to be e i th e r  c o m p e titiv e  or
rT h is  su b je c tiv e  knowledge is  in c o rp o ra te d  in to  the m odels  
used in  the s o c ia l sc ie n c e s . " . . .  we can d e r iv e  fro in  
the knowledge of our own m ind in  an 'a  p r io r i*  or 
•d e d u c tiv e ’ or •a n a ly tic *  fa s h io n , an (a t le a s t in 
p r in c ip le )  exhau s tiv e  c la s s if ic a t io n  of a l l  the p o ss ib le  
fo rm s  of in t e l l ig ib le  b eh a v io u r . . . we{thor&uee the 
d if fe re n t  kinds o f in d iv id u a l b eh a v io u r thus c la s s if ie d  
as e lem e n ts  fro m  w hich  we co n s tru c t h y p o th e tic a l m odels  
in  an a tte m p t to re prod u c e  tho p a tte rn s  of s o c ia l r e la t io n ­
sh ips which we know in  the w o rld  around us. " 2^ ‘1^
M any w r i te r s  have used tho above argum ent to  po in t 
to  an e s s e n tia l d if fe re n c e  between" the n a tu ra l and s o c ia l 
s c ie n c e s . I t  is  thus argued  th a t the n a tu ra l s c ie n tis t  
cannot 'u n d e rs ta n d1 the w o rk in g s  of an atom in  the same 
w ay th at the s o c ia l s c ie n tis t  can ’ u n d ers ta n d ' the action  
of the in d iv id u a ls  he s tu d ie s . The s o c ia l s c ie n tis t  can 
u n d ers tand  the m eaning  th a t ac tin g  in d iv id u a ls  a tt r ib u te  
to th e ir  ac tion  because h e /s h e  too ( i . e .  the s o c ia l 
s c ie n tis t )  is  an ac tin g  human b e in g . W h ile  the co m p a ra tiv e  
study of p lans and re s u lts  is  fu nd a m en ta l fo r  the s o c ia l 
s c ie n c e s , ' t is  not p o s s ib le  fo r  the n a tu ra l sc ie n c e s . In  
n a tu re  th e re  a re  no p la n s . Popper acknow ledges th is  
d if fe re n c e  but c la im s  th a t i t  does not in d ic a te  a d if fe re n c e  
in  m ethod between the n a tu ra l and s o c ia l sc ie n c e s . " It  
is  undoubted ly t ru e  th a t we have a m ere d ire c t  knowledge  
o f the 'in s id e  o f the human a to m ' than v e  have o f p h y s ic a l 
atom s; but th is  know ledge is  in t u i t iv e .  In o th e r  w o rd s , 
we c e r ta in ly  use our knowledge of o u rs e lv e s  in  o rd e r  to 
f ra m e  hypotheses about some o th e r p e o p le , or about a l l
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rpeo p le . But theee hypotheses m ust be te s te d , th ey  m ust 
be su bm itted  to  the m ethod of s e le c tio n  by e l im in a tio n ." ^ 2 6  ^
W h ile  re je c t in g  th a t the d iffe re n c e  is  im p o rta n t as re ga rd s  
the a p p ro p ria te  m ethod fo r  the n a tu ra l and s o c ia l sc ie n ce s . 
Popper n e v e rth e le s s  accepts th a t 'u n d e rs ta n d in g ' p lays  
an im p o rta n t p a r t  in  the s o c ia l sc ie n ce s .
THe d if f i c u lt ie s  o f the in tro s p e c tiv e  m ethod are  
w e ll re c o g n ize d  by the au thors who support i t  as an 
im p o rta n t m ethod of the s o c ia l sc ie n ce s . One of the  
obvious p ro b lem s is  th a t wo can n e v e r be s u re , by 
in tro s p e c tio n  a lo n e , w h e th e r our u n d ers ta nd ing  of the 
s itu a tio n  is  c o r r e c t  or n o t. F u r th e rm o re , to the ex ten t  
to  w hich the in d iv id u a ls  whoso a c tio n s  a re  the ob jec t of 
study of the s o c ia l s c ie n t is t ,  are  "cu .Uuca.lly" d if fe re n t  
fro m  the s o c ia l s c ie n t is t ,  the m a rg in  o f e r r o r  is  l ik e ly  
to  be g r e a t e r .  H ow ever i t  is  not c o r r e c t  to suggest, 
as has so m e tim es  been s a id , th a t the in tro s p e c tiv e  
approach supposes th a t the s c ie n tis t  m ust be in  some 
ways s im ila r  to the people h e /s h e  s tud ies so th a t ,  fo r  
e x a m p le , on ly  a s c ie n tis t  o f " f ie r y "  tem p e ram e n t is  
capable o f un d ers ta n d in g  the ac tio n s o f a r io t in g  m ob.
I t  Is  p o ss ib le  to  unders ta n d  the ac tio n s  of a m u rd e re r  
by unders ta n d in g  the purposes th a t le d  h im  to murdsr 
w ith o u t condoni ng the act i t s e l f .  O f the d i f f ic u lt ie s  
in h e re n t in  th e  in tro s p e c t iv e  m ethod H ayek has sa id  th a t  
" . to  re c o g n ize  som ething  as m ind is  to re co g n ize
U  as som ething  s im ila r  to o ur own m iud . . .  T h is  k ind  
of in te rp re ta t io n  o f human a c tio n s  m ay not be a lw ays  
su c ce ss fu l,an d , w hat is  even m ore e m b a rra s s in g , wo
rm ay nev er be a b s o lu te ly  c e r ta in  th a t I t  1b c o r r e c t  in  
any p a r t ic u la r  case ; a l l  we know ie  th at I t  w orks In  
the o v e rw h e lm in g  num ber o f ca se s. Y e t I t  is  th e  on ly  
b a s is  on w hich  we e v e r unders tand  w hat we c a ll  o ther 
p e o p le 's  in te n t io n s , o r the m eaning of th e ir  actions  
As we pass fro m  men of our k ind  to  d if fe re n t  types  
of beings we m a y , o f course fin d  th at what we can 
thus unders tand  becom es le s s  and le s s . ' 1^ 26^
W hat has been r e fe r r e d  to h ere  as the in tro s p e c tiv e  
m ethod ra is e s  the fo llo w in g  Im p o rta n t question'. A re  
the d is tin c tio n s  re q u ire d  fo r  ex p lo r in g  the s u b je c t-  
m a tte r  of the s o c ia l s c ie n ce s  e x c lu s iv e ly  " s u b je c t iv e ” ? 
The opin ions of one w e ll-k n o w n  w r i te r  who answ ers
th is  question  in  the n e g a tiv e , w i l l  be exam ined  h e re ,
N ag e l c r i t i c iz e s  the v iew  e x p re s s e d , fo r  exam ple, 
by H a y e k , tlxa.t iu  e x p la in in g  p u rp o s iv e  ac tion  the 'th in g s *  
th a t are  the moans or ends of those ac tio n s  m ust be 
e x p la in e d  in  to rm s  oC the m eaning  th a t the a c to rs  them  -  
s e lv e s a tta c h  to these th in gs  ra th e r  than  what can be 
e a ld  about thom  by the n a tu ra l s c ie n ce s . Thus N agel 
c r i t i c iz e s  the fo llo w in g  s ta te m en t fro m  H ayek w h ich  
c la im s  th a t fo r  the purposes of s o c ia l s tu d y , a m e dic in e  
is  not what eu ro s  an a ilm e n t but ra th e r  what people  
b e l ie v e  w i l l  produce th a t e f fe c t:  "A ny know ledge which
wo m ay happen to possess about the t ru e  n a tu re  o f the 
m a te r ia l th in g  j j , e .  the a lle g e d  m e d ic in e ] but w hich the 
p eop le  whose ac tio n s  we want, to e x p la in  do not possess, 
is  as l i t t l e  re le v a n t t.o the ex p la n a tio n  o f t h e ir  actions  
as our p r iv a te  d is b e lie f  in  th e  e f f ic a c y  of a m agic charm
rw i l l  he lp  us to unders tand  the beh a v io u r o f the 
savage who b e lie v e s  in  i t . "
In  c r i t i c iz in g  th e  view  h e ld  by H a y e k , N agel 
argues th a t "even when the b eh a v io u rs  s tud ied  by 
the s o c ia l sc ie n ce s are  in d is p u te d ly  d ire c te d  
tow ard  some co n s cio u s ly  e n te r ta in e d  en d s , the 
s o c ia l s c ie n ce s  do not co n fin e th em s e lv es  to  using  
only d is tin c tio n s  th a t y e fe r  to p sy ch o lo g ic a l s ta te s  
e x c lu s iv e ly ;  nor Is  i t  c le a r  m o re o v e r , why these  
d is c ip lin e s  should p la ce  re s t r ic t io n s  upon th em s e lv es . 
F o re x a m p le  in o rd e r  to account fo r  the adoption of 
c e r ta in  ru le s  o f conduct by a g iven  co m m un ity , i t  
m ay be re le v a n t  to in q u ire  in to  the w ays in  which  
m em bers of the com m unity  c u lt iv a te  the s o i l ,  co n s tru c t  
s h e lte rs , o r p re s e rv e  food fo r  fu tu re  u s e , and the 
o v e rt  b e h a v io u rs  these in d iv id u a ls  e x h ib it  in  pursu ing  
these ta s k s  cannot be d e s c rib e d  in  p u re ly  ’ su b je c tiv e *  ""
In  ex am in in g  N a g e l’ s c r i t i c is m  two pointem ust 
be m ade. In  the f i r s t  p la c e , although N age l h im s e lf  
does not confuse th is ,  i t  m ust be em phasized  th at a 
d is tin c tio n  m ust be draw n betw een w hat has been  
c a lle d  the in tro s p e c tiv e  or p ra x e o lo g ic a l approach  
h e re , and the "p s y c h o lo g ic a l ap p ro a ch " . W h ile  the 
l a t t e r  asks why people behave as they do , th at is ,  
d ea ls  w ith  m o tiv e s , the fo rm e r  exam ines the p lans  
w hich  p eop le  pursue In  a ttem p tin g  to a tta in  th e ir  
g o a ls , th a t Is ,  d ea ls  w ith  pu rp o se s .
S e cond ly , w h ile  i t  is  accep ted  th at in  o rd e r to
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rc o n s id e r the adopted ru le s  o f conduct o f a com m unity  
i t  m igh t be n e c e s s a ry  to  exam ine o th e r a c t iv i t ie s  
of th is  co m m un ity , th e  p re s e n t au th o r fin d s  i t  ra th e r  
u n c le a r  how these o th e r a c t iv i t ie s  th em s e lv es  are  
to  be unders tood  w ith o u t the use o f the in tro s p e c tiv e  
ap p ro a ch . Can the ac tio n s  o f a man who is  p la c in g  
la y e rs  o f g ra s s  on a s u b s tru c tu re  o f tw ig s  be u n d e r­
stood w ith o u t a " s u b je c tiv e "  r e a liz a t io n  of the 
in te n tio n s  o f the m an? Is the end re s u lt  o f the 
a c t iv i ty  to be seen as la y e rs  o f g ras s  on a s tru c tu re  
of tw ig s , o r is  i t  to  be seen as a s h e lte r  a g a in s t the 
e le m e n ts , a p lace to  s to re  p o ss es s io n s , e tc?  I f  the 
l a t t e r ,  then i t  is  d i f f ic u lt  to see how the ac tio n s are  
to  ho exp la ined  w ith o u t ta k in g  these "p u re ly  su b je c tiv e "  
aspects  in to  account. Of course the s c ie n tis t  must 
take the o v e r t  (o b s e rv a b le )  ac tio n s  of the man in to  
account but these a c tio n s  o n ly  become m e an in g fu l 
when in te rp re te d  in  te rm s  of the goals  being  pursued  
by the man in  qu es tion .
Itay ek  has sa id  th is  when he p o in ts  out th a t  
" a l l  p ro p o s it io n s  of econom ic th e o ry  r e fe r  to th ings  
w hich  are  d e fin e d  in  te rm s  of humai a tt itu d e s  tow ard  
th e m , . . .  by the fa c t th at people b e lie v e  th a t i t  w i l l  
s e rv e  c e r ta in  needs o f t h e irs  in  a c e r ta in  way . . . "
A co n s is te n t "o b je c tiv e "  ex p la n a tio n  would " im p ly  
th a t the p ro p o s it io n s  of the th e o ry  o f money w ould  
have to  r e f e r  e x c lu s iv e ly  to , s a y , ’ round d is cs  of 
m e ta l,  b e a r in g  a c e r ta in  s ta m p ,' o r some s im i’ a r ly  
d efin e d  p h y s ic a l o b je c t or group of o b je c ts .”
rIn  o rd e r to  i l lu s t r a t e  the c la r i ty  re s u lt in g  fro m  
a s u b je c t iv is t  e x p la n a tio n , an o tae r c r it ic is m  of N agel* 
w i l l  be ex am in ed . N ag e l suggests th a t "es ea  though 
pu rp o s iv e  ac tio n  is  som etim es p a r t ly  e x p la in ed  w ith  
the help o f assum ptions concern ing  d is p o s it io n s , 
in te n t io n s , 01 b e l ie fs  of the a c to r s , o the r assum ptions  
co n c ern ing  m a tte rs  w ith  w hich  the ac to rs  a re  a lto g e th e r  
u n fa m ilia r  may a lso  c o n tr ib u te  to the e x p la na tio n  o f 
t h e ir  a c t io n ,"  He tak es  as an exam ple the case
of southern  cotton  p la n te rs  in  the U nited  S tates be fo re  
th e  C iv i l  W a r. These p la n te rs  m is ta k e n ly  b e lie v e d  
th a t the use of a n im a l m anure w ould in d e f in ite ly  
p re s e rv e  the f e r t i l i t y  of t h e ir  p la n ta tio n s . N age l 
argues th a t know ledge of th e  law s of s o il c h e m is try  
w i l l  e x p la in  why "the s o i l upon w hich  cotton  was grown  
g ra d u a lly  d e te r io ra te d , and why in  consequence th e re  
w as an in c re a s in g  need to r  v irg in  la n d  to  ra is e  cotton  
i t  the n o rm a l cotton  orop was not to  d e c re a s e . " *3 2 *
An " o b je c tiv e "  e x p la n a tio n  o f the d e te r io ra t io n  of 
th e  s o il and of the in c re a s e d  demand fo r  v irg in  land  
is  thus p ro v id e d , th a t I s ,  w ith o u t re fe re n c e  to  the 
s u b je c tiv e  s ta te s  o f the people co n c ern e d . B e fo re  
c r i t i c iz in g  the approach suggested by N a g e l, i t  is  
ne c e s s a ry  f i r s t  to  exam ine the s u b je c t iv is t  e x p la na tio n  
o f the sam e phenom enon.
By u n d ers ta n d in g  the m eaning th a t the people  
concerned a ttac h  to  t h e ir  a c t io n s , th a t I s ,  by u n d e r­
standing the in te n tio n s  and purposes w hich guide  
t h e ir  ac tio n s  as w e ll as the consequences of these
ra c tio n s , i t  s p o ss ib le  to  p ro v id e  a eo no is te n t 
e x p la na tio n  of the phenomenon u n der d is cuss ion .
I t  is  ev id e n t th a t the im m e d ia te  goal o f the p la n te rs  
is  to  produce an output o f co tto n . The means w hich  
are  a v a ila b le  to  ac h ie ve  th is  a im  in c lu d e , am ongst 
o th e rs , (such as the c o -o p e ra tio n  o f la b o u r ) ,  the 
s o il and the f e r t i l i t y  th e re o f. The p la n te rs  r e a liz e  
th a t the f e r t i l i t y  o f the s o il is  d im in is h e d  as a re s u lt  
of the grow ing  of cotton  cror-s but they n e v e rth e le s s  
b e lie v e  th a t by using a n im a l m anure the f e r t i l i t y  of 
the s o il w i l l  be m a in ta in e d . H o w e v e r, o v e r  tim e  
the p la n te rs  f in d  th a t the q u a li ty  o f the so il 
d e te r io ra te s  and th a t t h e ir  output p e r  ac re  a c c o rd in g ly  
d e c lin e s . I t  is  not im p o rta n t w h j the f e r t i l i t y  of the 
s o il d e c lin e s . W hat is  im p o rta n t is  how the p la n te r  
sees th is  phenomenon and i t  is  th is  w hich  w i l l  in flu en c e  
h is  fu tu re  a c tio n s . I f  he sees the d ec rea se in  
f e r t i l i t y  as the re s u lt  of a cu rs e  upon h is  f a m ily , h is  
fu tu re  a c tio n s  may be e n t ir e ly  d if fe re n t  to the case 
w h e re  he sees i t  as the re s u lt  o f a la c k  o f a ch e m ic a l 
com ponent. But i t  is  p re c is e ly  th ese  fu tu re  ac tio n s  
w hich  in te re s t  the s o c ia l s c ie n t is t .  In the exam ple  
chosen by N age l i t  is  p o ss ib le  th a t the p la n te rs  fe l t  
t h a t ,  in  the face of th e  d ec rea se  in  o u tp u t, g iven  a 
constan t o r in c re a s in g  demand fo r  cotton as w e ll as 
the a v a i la b i l i t y  o f unused v i r g in  f o r e s t ,  the cost 
in v o lv e d  in  buying a n d /o r  c le a r in g  th is  land  seemed  
ju s t if ie d  by the re tu rn s  ex pected  fro m  s e llin g  the 
cotton  grown fro m  the la n d.
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rI t  is  now p o ss ib le  to  c r i t i c iz e  the " o b je c tiv e "  
approach put fo rw a rd  by N a g e l. Oa c lo s e r  
ex am in atio n  i t  becom es c le a r  th a t th is  approach  
alone does not e x p la in  the phenomenon under  
co n s id e ra t io n  and th a t a co m plete  ex p la na tio n  
assum es a su b je c tiv e  In te rp re ta t io n . A l l  th at  
the la w s  of s o i l c h e m is try  t e l i  us in  th is  case is  
th a t s o i l w h ic .i is  used to  grow cotton  and w hich is  
only re p le n is h e d  w ith  a n im a l m anure w i l l  o ve r t im e ,  
d e te r io r a te . The jaw s th e re fo re  t e l l  us the con­
sequences th a t w i l l  fo llo w  fro m  a p la n te r  op era tin g  
under the co n d itio n s d e s c rib e d  by the la w s . They  
do not t e l l  us how the p la n te rs  w i l l  re a c t to  these  
oonsofluenoos. Y e t i f  we are  to  unders tand  the  
fa c t  th a t v irg in  land is  now b ro u g ht under c u ltiv a t io n  
i t  is  e s s e n tia l th at som ething  is  known about these  
re a c tio n s . A rd  i t  is  ev id e n t th a t o n ly  a s u b je c t iv is t  
approach can p ro v id e  th is  in fo rm a t io n . I t  ig  th e re fo re  
c “ ncluded th a t knowledge of the "o b je c tiv e "  law s of 
s o i l  c h e m is try  m ust be supplem ented by " s u b je c tiv e "  
know ledge in  o rd e r to  e x p la in  the g iv en  phenom enon.
On the o the r hand, h o w e v e r , a p u re  s u b je c t iv is t  
e x p la n a tio n  is  e n t ir e ly  adequate fo r  an u n d ers ta nd ing  
of these phenom ena.
6 . Two F u r th e r  C onsequences o f H e y e k 's  Th eo ry  
of Com p le x  P henom ena.________________________
Two f u r th e r  consequences of the th e o ry  of com plex  
phenom ena m entioned  by H ayek w i l l  be m entioned  h ere  
because of t h e ir  re le v a n c e  to  la te r  s e c tio n s . The f i r s t
rd ea ls  w ith  the concept o f re du c tio n  w h ile  the second 
dea ls  w ith  " la w s "  in econom ics ,
The c la im  has been made th a t so c io lo g y can be 
reduced  to  psychology and o th e rs  have c la im ed  that 
the la t t e r  can be re du c ed  fo p h ys io lo g y . The 
im p o rtan c e  of w hat H ayek c a lls  " re d u c tio n is m "  w ith  
re g a rd  to  econom ic th e o ry  l ie s  in  the c la im  th a t a l t  
econom ic phenom ena m ust be seen as the consequences 
of th e  ac tio n s o f in d iv id u a ls  based on th e ir  p la ns . T h is  
has been r e fe r r e d  to as m e th o d o lo g ica l in d iv id i a lis m .
In  C h ap ter 2 some of the advances made as a re s u lt  of 
a c o n s is te n t a p p lic a tio n  o f th is  approach w e re  i l lu s t r a t e d .
H ayek dea ls  w ith  the a s s e rt io n  th a t "m e n ta l phenomena 
are  'n o th in g  b u t' { i . e .  can be re du c ed  to ]  c e r ta in  
com plexes of p h y s ic a l e v e n ts ."  I-3 4  ^ The im portanc e  
of th is  a s s e rt io n  cannot be u n d e rra te d . I f  the p h y s ic a l 
law s d e te rm in g  "m e n ta l"  phenom ena a re  known, then  
the th ou g h ts , id e as  and v a lu a tio n s  of in d iv id u a ls  can 
be p re d ic te d  and c o u tro lls d  and, since they gu ide  
a c tio n s , so can the la t t e r .  H o w e v e r, even accepting  
such a re d u c tio n , "m e n ta l"  phenom ena a re  to be seen  
as the re s u lt  o f a com plex in te r re la t io n s h ip  o f a la rg e  
num ber of v a r ia b le s . "A  f u l l  re d u c tio n  w ould be 
ac h ie ve d  on ly i f  we w e re  ab le to  s u b s titu te  fo r  a 
d e s c r ip tio n  of ev en ts  in  . . . m e n ta l te rm s  a d e s c rip tio n  
in  p h y s ic a l te rm s  w hich  in c lu d ed  an exh au s tive  en u m e ra tio n  
of a l l  the p h y s ic a l c ircu m s ta n ce s  w hich c o n s titu te  a 
n ec e s s a ry  and s u f f ic ie n t  co n d itio n  o f th e  . . .  r .^ f ita l  
phenom ena in  q u es tion . B ecause of the com plex
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t ia tu te  o f th is  ta s k  H ayek concludes th a t the fu l l  
re d u c tio n  is  not p o s s ib le .
H ayek a lso  re je c ts  th a t " la w s "  p e rta in in g  to 
com plex phenom ena can be e s ta b lis h e d  i f  a s c ie n tif ic  
law  is  d e fin e d  as "the ru le  by w hich  two phenomena 
are  connected w ith  each o the r ac cord ing  to  the 
p r in c ip le  o f c a u s a lity ,  that is  to  s a y ,  as cause and 
e f fe c t.  The th e o ry  of com plex phenomena can
y ie ld  " the  sta te m en t th a t a c e r ta in  s tru c tu re  can 
assume on ly  one of the ( s t i l l  in f in i t e )  num ber of 
s ta te s  d e fin e d  by a system  of m any sim u ltaneous  
eq u a tion s . " but i t  w ould do v io le n c e  to  language
to c a ll  such a sta te m en t a " la w " . H ayek th e re fo re  
concludes th a t i t  w ould  "ap p e ar th a t the se arch  fo r  
the d is c o v e ry  o f law s is  not an a p p ro p ria te  h a l lm a r k  
of s c ie n tif ic  p ro ce d u re  but m e re ly  a c h a ra c te r is t ic  
of the th e o r ie s  o f s im p le  phenom ena . .  . and th a t in  
the f ie ld  of co m plex phenom ena the te rm  " la w "  as 
w e ll as the concepts o f cause and e f fe c t  are  not 
a p p lic a b le  w ith o u t such m o d if ic a t io n  as to  d ep rive  







S C H A P TE R  6
TH E B ASIC P O S TU LA TE S  OF S U B JE C T IV IS M  i
Up to th is  p o in t a te n ta t iv e  d e fin it io n  o f I
eu b je o tlv is m  has been used w hich  sta te d  th a t accord ing  
to  the s u b je c t iv is t  ap proach , s o c ia l phenomena must 
be ex p la in e d  by being  deduced fro m  the p lans and 
ac tio n s o f in d iv id u a ls . Using th is  d e f in it io n  i t  was 
' shown th a t many of the im p o rta n t advances in the
h is to ry  o f econom ic thought re s u lte d  fro m  the  
a p p lic a tio n  o f s u b je c t iv is t  p r in c ip le s . Then the 
| w r i t in g s  of several e c o nom ists  o f the A u s tr ia n  School
w e re e x am in ed . I t  is  now n ec e s s a ry  to  d iscuss in  I
g re a te r  d e ta i l  the b a s ic  p o stu la te s  o f s u b je c tiv is m . t
T h is  w i l l  be done In  th is  c h a p te r , and in  the fo llo w in g  
c h a p te rs  e,ome consequences of th is  conception  w i l l  \
be exam ined  and the im p lic a tio n p  fo r  econom ic th eo ry  
j d is cu ss ed . j
The b as ic  p o s tu la te s  o f s u b je c tiv is m  w i l l  be <
d iscussed  in  the fo llo w in g  w ay: f i r s t  we w i l l  exam ine '
how two s u b je c t i- 'is t  w r i te r s  (M is e e  and K n ig h t)  i
conceive the b as ic  p o stu la te s  of s u b je c tiv is m  and 
then we w i l l  exam ine an opposing po in t o f view  which  
re g a rd s  th is  conception  as in a de q u ate . We w i l l  \
. f in a l ly  exam ine how some s u b je c t iv is t  w r i te r s  have
o vercom e the c r i t ic is m s  of the s u b je c t iv is t  ap proach . :
r1 . M is e s  and K n ight on the P o s tu la te s  o f S u b je c tiv ism
M is e s  has held  th a t human ac tio n  is  esaenU alV y  
pu rp o s iv e  conduct. " I t  is  not s im p ly  b e h a v io u r, 
b ut b eh a v io u r begot b y judgem ents o f v a lu e , aim ing  
at a d e f in ite  end and gu ided by id e as  concern ing  
the s u i ta b il i ty  o r u n s u ita b i l i ty  o f d e f in ite  means.
I t  is  im p o s s ib le  to  d e a l w ith  i t  w ith o u t the ca teg o rie s  
of c a u s a lity  and f in a l i ty .  I t  is  conscious b e h a v io u r.
I t  is  choosing . I t  is  v o l it io n ;  i t  is  a d is p la y  of 
*'111 ." ^  M is e s  is  v e ry  p re c is e  as re g a rd s  the 
source o f knowledge of the p o s tu la te  of p u rposive  
human ac tio n : " N e ith e r  can we in te r p r e t  our concept
o f ac tio n  as a p re c ip ita te  o f ex p e rie n c e  . . . E x p e rie n c e  
t e l ls  us som ething we d id  not know b e fo re  and could  
not le a rn  but fo r  having  the e x p e rie n c e . But the 
c h a ra c te r is t ic  fe a tu re  of a prior? know ledge is  th at 
we cannot th in k  o f the tru th  o f its  n e g a tio n , or of 
som ething  th a t w ould be at v a r ia n c e  w ith  i t  . . .  I f  
we q u a lify  a concept o r a p ro p o s itio n  as a p r io r i ,  
we want to say: f i r s t ,  th a t the negation  o f what i t
a s s e rts  is  un th in k ab le  fo r  the human m ind and appears  
to  i t  as nonsense; s e co n d ly , th a t th is  a p r io r i  concept 
o r p ro p o s itio n  is  n e c e s s a r ily  im p lie d  in our m e nta l 
approach to a l l  the p ro b lem s c o n c ern e d , i . e .  in  our 
th in k in g  and ac tin g  oonoern ing  these p ro b le m s . The 
a p r io r i  c a te g o rie s  a re  the m e n ta l equ ipm ent by d in t 
o f w hich man is  ab le to  th in k  and to e x p e rie n c e  and 
th u s  to  a c q u ire  kn o w ledge. T h e ir  tru th  o r v a lid i ty  
c a n n o fb e  p ro ve d  o r re fu te d  as can those of a
rp o s te r io r i  p ro p o s it io n s , because they a re  p re c is e ly  
the in s tru m e n t th a t enables us to d is tin g u is h  what 
le  t$ue o r v a lid  Iro m  w hat 1b n o t . ' '  ^
A cc o rd in g  to  M is e s , t h e re fo re , man is  
homo a g e n s . the p u rposive a n im a l. I t  is  not 
p o ss ib le  to re fu te  th is  p o stu la te  s ince the v e ry  
pro ce ss  of th in k in g  is  based on i ts  tru th . M ise s  
has thus ra is e d  the sta tus o f h is  b as ic  po stu la te  to 
u n a s s a ila b le  h e ig h ts . I t  is  not p o ss ib le  to c r i t i c iz e  
h is  p o s itio n  w ith in  the fra m e w o rk  of h is  assum ptions  
and thus a l l  f u r th e r  d iscuss ion  on the tru th  o f the  
b as ic  p o stu la te s  is  p o in tle s s . "
K n ig h t is  in  fund a m en ta l ag re em en t w ith  M ises.
As K n igh t puts i t :  "The w hole su b je ct m a tte r  of
conduct -  in te re s ts  and m o tiv a tio n  « c o n s titu te s  a 
d if ie r e n t  re a lm  of r e a l i t y  fro m  the e x te rn a l w o r ld ,  
and th is  fa c t g iv es  to  i ts  p ro b lem s a d if fe re n t  o rd e r  
of s u b tle ty  and c o m p le x ity  than  those of the sciences  
of (unconse io tta) n a tu re . The f i r s t  fa c t  to  be re c o rd e d  
is  th at th is  re a lm  of r e a l i t y  e x is ts , or * is  th e r e .*
T h is  fa c t cannot be p roved  or argued  or ’ te s te d *.
I f  anyone denies th a t men have in te re s ts  o r th a t 'w e* 
havs a c o n s id e ra b le  amount of v a lid  knowledge about 
th e m , econom ics and a i l  i t s  w o rk s  w i l l  s im p ly  be 
to  such a le rs o n  w hat the w o r ld  o f co lou r is  to  the 
b lin d  m an. But th e re  w ould  s t i l l  be one d if fe re n c e :  
a man who is  p h y s ic a lly ,  o c u la r ly  b lin d  m ay s t i l l  be 
ra te d  of n o rm a l in te ll ig e n c e  and in  h is  r ig h t  m ind, 
Second, as to  the m anner o f our kn ow ing, o r the source  
of know ledge, i t  is  obvious th a t w h ile  our knowledge
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r( • c o r r e c t '  o b s e rv a tio n ) o f p h y s ic a l human b ehaviour ;
and of c o rre la te d  changes in  the p h y s ic a l o b jec ts  of 
non-hum an n atu re  p la ys  a n ec e s s a ry  p a r t  in  our ,
knowledge ot m en ’ s in t e r e s t s ,  the m ain  s o u rc e , \
f a r  m ore im p o rta n t than in our knowledge of p h y s ic a l I
r e a l i t y ,  is  the same g e n e ra l p ro ce ss of in te rc o m m u n ic a tio n  i 
in  s o c ia l in te rc o u rs e , w h ir u has no im p o rta n t d ire c t  '
re la t io n  to any ’ p ro b le m ', e i th e r  o f know ledge or of 
ac tio n  -  w hich has been found to p la y  a ro le  in  our !
knowing of the p h y s ic a l w o r ld ."  ^  '
A cc o rd in g  to K n ig h t, th e r e fo r e , although we j
cannot prove th a t the s u b je c t m a tte r  o f conduct, th a t 1
is  in te re s ts  and m o t iv a tio n , r e a l ly  e x is ts , wo do, 
n e v e r th e le s s , have a "c o n s id e ra b le  am ount o f v a lid  
know ledge" about the m o tiv a tio n s  and in te re s ts  of 
o th e rs . T h is  knowledge is  d e r iv e d  fro m  the "g e n e ra l 
p ro ce ss  of in te rc o m m u n ic a tio n  ic  s o d a )  in te rc o u rs e . " I
M o re o v e r , anyone who den ies th a t th is  is  so i i  ra te d  j
by K n ig h t a.6 not in  M s  r ig h t  m in d .
Both K n ig h t and M is e s  ho ld  th a t human ac tion  is  ,
p u rp o s iv e . T h is  is  an ir r e f u t a b le  (s in c e  i t  cannot j
be te s te d )  p o s tu la te  o f s u b je c t iv is m . Econom ic I
th e o ry  is  ac c o rd in g ly  seen as a p ro ce ss  o f deduction  I
fro m  th is  b as ic  p o s tu la te . j
H o w ev er, i t  does not seem  w is e  to  accept the i
co n ten tio n  of M is e s  and K n ig h t and to  p ro ce ed  I
im m e d ia te ly  fro m  th e re . T h is  does not seem  w ise  
because th e re  a re  m any p h ilo s o p h e rs  and s o c ia l 
s c ie n tis ts  who have re je c te d  th is  p o stu la te  and have 
p re fe r r e d  to search  in  o th e r d ire c t io n s  fo r  an u n d e r -  j
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rstanding of human b e h a v io u r. I t  is  a c co rd ing ly  
n ec e s s a ry  to  at le a s t exam ine b r i e f l y the po int 
o f view  of those who do n o t accept th a t purposive  
human ac tio n  can be the s ta r t in g  po in t o f the so c ia l 
sc ie n ce s .
T h ere  is  no need to p a ir a t th a t ju s tic e  can 
h a rd ly  be done to  th is  p ro b lem  w ith in  the confines  
of th is  th e s is . The p ro b lem  has been the concern  
of many d is c ip lin e s  and has s t i l l  not been ad equate ly  
re s o lv e d . T h u s , in  the even t of not being  ab le to  
ad e q u ate ly  co v er a l l  the re le v a n t  ground h ere  and 
not having  a g e n e ra l ly  accep ted  concensus of opinion  
to  f a l l  b a d : upon, i t  is  in tended m e re ly  to exam ine  
how some s u b je c t iv is t  w r i te r s  have overcom e the 
o b jec tio n s  to  the p o s tu la te  o f pu rp o s iv e  human a c tio n .
2 . The N a tu re  of Human Action
How is  i t  p o ss ib le  to  d is tin g u is h  betw een an eye 
b lin k  r e f le x  th a t re s u lts  fro m  a beam  of lig h t  being  
shone in to  the eye and the a c t iv i ty  o f a man who is  
t i l l i n g  the s o il?  Can anyth ing  be sa id  about the 
d if fe re n c e  betw een a man jum ping  and a man fa ll in g ?  
W hat do we mean when we say th a t an in d iv id u a l is  
re s p o n s ib le  fo r  h is  a c tio n s ?  I t  is  in  answ ering  
q u es tions l ik e  these th a t the n a tu re  o f human ac tion  
b ecom es c le a r  and u n d ers ta n d ab le .
One way of an s w e rin g  th e  above questions is  to 
draw  a d is tin c tio n  betw een b eh a v io u r and a c tio n . 
B e h a v io u r m ay be taken  to r e fe r  to  any change or
rtendency to  change in  liv in g  th in g s . I t  thus Inc ludes  
such d iv e rs e  ev en ts  as the n e s t-b u ild in g  a o t lv ite s  of 
d if fe re n t  species o f b ird s , the k n e e - je rk  r e f le x  and 
the  p ro ce ss  of th in k in g . A c tio n , on the o the r hand, 
r e fe r s  to  b eh a v io u r to  w h ic h , fo llo w in g  W e b e r, the 
agent a ttaches s u b je c tiv e  m e an ing . Thus ac tio n  is  
p u rp o s iv e  and does not c o n s titu te  m ere re a c tio n  to 
s tim u lu s ; i t  is  d ire c te d  to  ends r a th e r  than caused  
by e x te rn a l ev en ts . Since ac tio n  is  d ire c te d  tow ards  
ends its  a n a ly s is  i s ,  in  th is  se nse , te le o lo g ie s ! and 
not m e c h a n is t ic .
An ac t th e re fo re  im p lie s  the e x is te n c e  of an 
agent or a c to r . The a c tio n s  o f the ac to r a re  d ire c te d  
to w ard s chosen ends o r d e s ire d  fu tu re  s ta te s  of 
a f f a ir s .  The a c to r  acts because he p re fe rs  th a t s ta te  
of a f f a ir s  w hich he expects  w i l l  r e s u lt  fro m  h is  
ac tio n s  to  th a t which he expects  w i l l  r e s u lt  from  
h is  in a c t iv i ty .  An fic tion  can thus be o v e rt  or c o v e rt .  
The r e fra in in g  fro m  an o v e rt  ac t is  thus s t i l l  c la s s if ie d  
as an a c t. In th is  case the a c to r  p re fe rs  th a t sta te  
of a f f a ir s  th a t he expects w i l l  fo llo w  h is not ac ting  
to th a t w hich  ho expects  w i l l  fo llo w  c e r ta in  o ther  
a c tio n s . An in d iv id u a l ac ts  w ith in  a given s itu a tion  
w hich ca n , to  some e x te n t , be changed by h is  a c tio n s . 
T h is  s itu a tio n  p ro v id e s  h im  w ith  o b stac le s  as w e ll as 
means to the a tta in m e n t o f th e  ends to w ard s  which  
h is  ac tio n s  are  o r ie n te d . Thus w h ile  m achines may 
aid  h im  in  a c h ie v in g  h is  ends , the ac tio n s  o f o the rs  
m ay h in d e r h is  a tte m p ts . The a c to r  thus tak es  in to  
account a lso  the a - t io n s  and ex pected  ac tions of o the r
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rp eo p le . He is  aw are too th a t he o ften  m akes m is ta ke s  
and th a t th e re  is  at t im e s  a d iv erg e nc e  between the 
a n tic ip a te d  and a c tu a l consequences of h is  a c tio n s .
The d is tin c tio n  th a t has been draw n between  
b eh a v io u r and ac tion  enab les the ans w e rin g  of the 
above qu es tion s . The a c t iv i t ie s  o f the man t i l l i a g  
the s o il a rc  thus q u a li ta t iv e ly  d if fe re n t  fro m  the 
k n e e - je r k  r e f le x .  The fo rm e r  can be unders tood  in  
te rm s  of concepts such as purpose and in te n tio n  
w h ile  the la t t e r  can be unders tood in  te rm s  of the 
p h y s ic a l n a tu re  o f the events noted: the in te n s ity
of the blow  with th e  ru b b e r in s tru m e n t, the p o te n tia l 
conducted by the n e rv e s , the observed  je r k ,  e tc .
The a c t iv i t ie s  o f a man t i l l i n g  g o il oannot be u n d e r­
stood In these te rm s . F o r then  i t  w ould  not be p o ss ib le  
to  d is tin g u is h  between a man t i l l i n g  s o il and a man 
m aking p sy ch o tic  g es tu re s  in  a f ie ld  w ith  an in s tru m e n t  
in  h is  hands. S im ila r ly  i t  would not be p o ss ib le  to  
d i l ie r e n t ia t e  betw een  an eye b lin k  th a t occurs when 
a l ig h t  is  shone in to  the eye and a w in k .
I t  is  now n e c e s s a ry  to in q u ire  about the re lev an c e  
of the d is tin c tio n  betw een ac tio n  and b eh a v io u r fo r  
the s o c ia l s c ie n ce s .
On the one hand , i t  has been seen th a t b eh a v io u rs  
w hich  do not f a l l  in to  the c a te g o ry  d e fin e d  as a c tio n ,  
can b f tre a te d  as n a tu ra l phenom ena. The m ethod  
ap p ro p ria te  to the s tud ies o f the n a tu ra l sc iences  
a re  e n t ir e ly  adequate in  th is  ca se . H o w e v e r, the 
sc ie n ce s o f human ac tio n  c a l l  fo r  a d if fe re n t  tre a tm e n t .
rI t  is  ob vio u s ly  not p o ss ib le  to  d ea l w ith  concepts 
such as p u rp o se , in te n tio n  and the l ik e  w ith  the 
to o ls  at the d is po s a l of the n a tu ra l sc ie n c e s . W hat 
a re  some o f the s p e c ific  p ro b lem s th a t a r is e  In  
connection w ith  the study of human ac tion?
In  the f i r s t  in s ta n ce  i t  is  n e c e s s a ry  to  aek 
w h e th e r an adequate ex p la n a tio n  of the b eh aviour  
th a t has been d efined  as ac tion  can be g iven  since  
some of the fu nd a m en ta l concepts used r e fe r  to 
u n o bs erva ble  e v en ts . W hat e x a c tly  is  m eant when 
i t  is  sa id  th a t the "p u rp o se " o f an ac tio n  was to 
a tta in  such and such an end? The t r a d it io n a l answ er 
th a t has been g iven  in  o rd e r to  d is tin g u is h  between  
such events as *1 ju m p ' and such ’happenings' as ' I  f a l l *  
has been couched in  te rm s  of the w i l l  of th e  a c to r .
B u t what p re c is e ly  is  m eant when i t  is  sa id  th a t he 
w il le d  h im s e lf  to jum p over the fence?  And how can 
th e  event w hich  hc.j been re fe r r e d  to as ’w il l in g *  be 
e x p la in ed ?  Does the a c to r  w i l l  h is  w il lin g ?  And i f  
he does , then we a re  le d  in to  an in f in i t e  re g re s s  
which does not p ro v id e  any s o lu tio n . I t  is  p ro b lem s  
such as these th a t have le d  one w r i te r  to conclude  
th a t " s u re l;  i t  is  an u n d ers ta te m e nt to say th a t the  
p h ilo s o p h ic a l ta lk  about ac ts  o f v o l it io n  in v o lve s  
a m a re 's  n es t of e o n fu e io n c ."  ^
Faced w ith  p ro b le m s  such as th is  some p h ilo ­
sophers and s o c ia l s c ie n tis ts  have argued  th a t concepts  
such as w i l l in g ,  in te n t io n , e tc . should be o m itted  fto m  




b eh a v io u r should be reduced to  ob se rva b le  v a r ia b le s .  
T h is  argum ent can be ex p res se d  In  the fo llo w in g  w ay. 
A cc o rd in g  to  the te le o lo g io a l e x p la na tio n  o f human 
a c t io n , an ac tion  X depends upon the purpose of 
th e  a c to r ,  P . T h at i s ,  X  » f (P ) .  But w we can 
show th a t th e  "p u rp o s e 1' of the ac to r depends on o the r  
o b se rva b le  v a r ia b le s , c o l i t ' - t iv e ly  c a lle d  A ,
.(that is  P = f ( A ) ]  then purpose can be o m itted
say that
X  = f  (A ). The ac tio n  thus depends upon o b servab le  
v a r ia b le s  and i t  re m a in s  to  fin d  the 'la w s ' which  
govern  th is  dependence. ^  ( I t  Is  a d m itte d  by these  
s o c ia l s c ie n tis ts  th a t th is  is  an e x tre m e ly  d i f f ic u l t  
ta s k  and th at much w ork w i l l  be re q u ire d  b e fo re  the 
la w s  can be fo rm u la te d .)
F u r th e rm o re , I t  is  not d i f f ic u l t  to  see why many 
s o c ia l s c ie n tis ts  have chosen to  pursue an a lte rn a t iv e  
path to  th a t o f M is e e  and K n ig h t.
I f  the v o lu n ta r is t ic  p o stu la te  o f human ac tio n  is  
acceptod, then a l l  s o c ia l phenom ena and p rocesses  
m ust be reduced  to  the thoughts and id e as  of the 
in d iv id u a ls  concerned . But i t  is  not p o ss ib le  to 
reduce id e a s  and thoughts any fu r th e r  ( fo r  ex a m p le ,  
to  o b s e rv a b le  p h y s ic a l phenom ena). Thoughts and 
Id e as  thus c o n s titu te  the "fu n d a m e n ta ls "  o f human 
ac tio n  and, since th e ir  fu tu re  con ten t cannot be 
p re d ic te d , th e re  a re  e s s e n tia l l im ita t io n s  p laced  
on the endeavours o f s o c ia l s c ie n tis ts ;  the s o c ia l 
s c ie n tis t  m ust accep t th a t p re d ic t io n , in  th is  se nse ,
u
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riB not p o ss ib le  in  dea lin g  w ith  human a c tio n . Paced  
w ith  th is  and o the r p ro b le m s , and im p re ss ed  w ith  
th e  m ethods of the n a tu ra l sc ie n c e s , these soc ia l 
s c ie n tis ts  have ac c o rd in g ly  attem p ted  to reduce  
thoughts and id e as  to  o b se rva b le  phenom ena and 
to  e s ta b lis h  law s d ea lin g  w ith  the in te r re la t io n s h ip  
of these p h y s ic a l v a r ia b le s . "Th o ug h ts” and " id e as "  
a re  thus, fo llo w in g  the su c ce ss fu l e s ta b lis h m e n t of 
the re le v a n t la w s , ex p la in ed  in  te rm s  of the e x is tin g  
p a tte rn  of o b se rva b le  v a r ia b le s  as w e ll as unobservable  
v a r ia b le s  th a t a re  o p e ra tio n a lly  d e fin e d . The concept 
of "m in d " in  the s o c ia l sc ie nce s is  then seen as akin  
to s e v e ra l p re -N e w to n ia n  concepts In  the f ie ld  of 
n a tu ra l phenom ena.
H o w ev er, i t  is  not p o s s ib le  to exam ine th is  
opposing v ie w p o in t e n t ir e ly  ad e q u ate ly  fo r  th is  would  
take us beyond the scope of th is  th e s is . A c c o rd in g ly  
we m ust content o u rs e lv e s  w ith  a b r ie f  look at how 
some c’lh je c t iv ie t  ec onom ists  have approached the  
argu m e n t a g a in s t the v o lu n ta r is t ic  p o s tu la te . The 
w r i te r s  ohosen  a re  M ie e s , H ayek and S h a ck le .
M is e s  acknow ledges th e  in flu e n c e  o f e n v iro n ­
m e n ta l and h e re d ita ry  fa c to rs  in  human ac tio n  but 
ho lds th a t the ex a c t n a tu re  o f th is  In f lu e n c e  is  not 
know n. The re s u lt  is  th at th e  thoughts and ac tions  
of a pers o n  m ust be a s c r ib e d  to h is  in d iv id u a li ty .
As M is e s  puts I t :  "w hat the te rm  'fre e d o m  of the
w i l l ' r e fe r s  to  is  the fa c t  th a t the Id e as  th a t Induce  
a man to make a d ec is io n  (a c h o ic e ) a r e ,  l ik e  a l l
L
ro th e r Id e a s , not 'p roduced* by e x te rn a l ’ fa c ts 1, do 
not ‘ m ir r o r *  the c o n d itio n s  of r e a l i t y ,  and are  not 
•u n iq u e ly  d e te rm in e d ’  by atiZ a so e rta io ab le  e x te rn a l  
fa c to r  to  w hich  we oould im pute them  in  the w ay in  
which we im pute  In  a i l  o th e r occurences an e ffe c t  
to  a d e f in ite  ca use . T h e re  is  noth ing  e ls e  th a t could  
be sa id  about a d e f in ite  in s ta n ce  o f a m an’ s ac ting  
and choosing than to a s c r ib e  i t  to  th is  m an's  
in d iv id u a li ty .  We do not know hov» out of the 
en c o u nte r a human in d iv id u a l i ty ,  i . e .  , a man as 
he has been fo rm ed  by a l l  he has in h e r ite d  and by 
a l l  he has e x p e rie n c e d , and a hew experien c e  
d e f in ite  id e as  re s u lt  and d e te rm in e  the in d iv id u a l’ s 
conduct. We do not even have any s u rm ise  how such 
know ledge could be ac q u ire d  . . . .  I t  is  p re c is e ly  the 
la c k  of such know ledge th a t g e n e ra te s  the fundam ental 
d if fe re n c e  b etw een  the n a tu ra l sc ie n ce s and the sc iences  
of human a c t io n ."  ^
H a y e k 's  approach to  the p ro b lem  has been 
m entioned  above ^  and th e re fo re  h is  view s w i l l  
be o n ly  su m m a rize d  h e re . H a y e k ’ s th e o ry  o f com plex  
phenom ena enab les h im  to  s id e -s te p  the p ro b lem  
w h e th e r human b eh a v io u r is  o r is  not In  f act d e te rm in e d .  
The e s s e n tia l d if fe re n c e  betw een phys ios and the s o c ia l 
s c ie n ce s  ( in c lu d in g  some of the o th e r n a tu ra l sc ie nce s  
■Witili the s o c ia l sc ie n ce s) is  th a t w h ile  the fo rm e r  dea ls  
w ith  the in te ra c t io n s  betw een  a r e la t iv e ly  s m a ll num ber  
o f v a r ia b le s , the la t t e r  d e a l w ith  com plex phenom ena.
I t  is  th e re fo re  no t c o r r e c t  to  suggest th a t the m ethod
ra p p ro p ria te  in  the study o l physios ahottld be used 
in  the study of o ther m ore com plex phenom ena. The 
main. cortBequence of the d if fe re n c e  between the 
phenom ena s tud ied  is  th at w h ile  in the case o f the 
study of s im p le  phenom ena s p e c ific  p re d ic t io n s  
can be m&de, in  the case of com plex phenomena 
only g e n e ra l p re d ic t io n s  can be made and f a ls if ie d .
T h is  le a d s  H ayek to conclude th a t even t£ hu m **  
b eh a v io u r is  d e te rm in e d  i t  is  not p o ss ib le  to b .-p u la te  
w hat a p a r t ic u la r  in d iv id u a l 'w il l th in k  at a p a r t ic u la r  
t im e  vecause o f the com plex n a tu re  o f th is  d e te rm in a tio n .  
The s o c ia l sc ie nce s m ust th e re fo re  proceed  as i f  cho ice  
does e x is t  and accept th at th e  fu tu re  thoughts and 
ac tio n s o f in d iv id u a ls  cannot be p re d ic te d .
ShacKle o vercom es the argum ent th a t a l l  human  
beh a v io u r is  d e te rm in e d  by p o s tu la tin g  "an act of 
o r ig in a l c r e a t io n ," th a t  i s ,  " the  su6den p resence in  
a m an's  thoughts o f som eth ing  e s s e n tia lly  n o v e l,  
som ething  not a r is in g  in  it s  co m pleteness and esseneo , 
m e rd ly  fro m  some • .a te r ia ls  o r a rran g em en t of 
m a te r ia ls  th a t w e re  In  h is  m ind b e fo re , but m a n ife s tin g  
. . .  ' In s p i r a t io n '.  ^  S ince th is  e le m e n t of in s p ira t io n  
is  p re s e n t In  each " m o m e n t- in -b e in g "  d u ring  which  
dec is io n  la ke s  p la c e , and s in ce  th is  in s p ira t io n  is  
not a fu nc tio n  o f anyth ing  e ls e , i t  is  not p o ss ib le  to 
p re d ic t  fu tu re  thoughts aud a c tio n s .
The argum ent o f the above w r i te r s  th a t the 
thoughts and a c tio n s  o f in d iv id u a l a c to rs  must 
at p re s e n t be co n s id ere d  as u n d eterm in ed  is
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accep ted  u n re s e rv e d ly . H o w ev er, i t  is  not p o ss ib le  
to  c la im  th a t th is  s ta te  o f a f fa ir s  w i l l  continue  
in d e f in ite ly . S ince fu tu re  knowledge ca nnot, g iven  
our p re s e n t kn o w ledge, be s t ip u la te d , i t  is  cot 
p o ss ib le  to  fo re s e e  th a t an e n t ir e ly  ac cep tab le  
account o f the d e te rm in a tio n  of human b eh a v io u r  
w i l l  not a t some stage be g iv en . But at p res en t 
t h is  p o s s ib il i ty  seem s re m o te , to  say the le a s t , 
and the s o c ia l sc ie n ce s m ust th e re fo re  proceed  
ac cep ting  the v o lu n ta r is t ic  po stu la te  o f human
Thus although i t  is  not at p re s e n t p o ss ib le  to 
p ro ve th a t human ac tio n  is  of the c h a ra c te r  po stu la te d  
by v o lu n ta r is m , i t  is  n o n eth ele ss concluded th a t , in  
o rd e r  to  e x p la in  a d e q u ate ly  s o c ia l phenomena i t  is  
n e c e s s a ry  to  p ro ce ed  as i f  th iu  w e re  t r u e .  No o the r  
e x p la n a tio n  w hich  does not take th is  p o stu la te  in to  
account is  a c c e p ta b le . In  the n ex t ch a p te r the  
re le v a n c e  of some consequences of th is  postu la te  
f o r  the s o c ia l sc ie n ce s is  d iscussed .
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SOME CONSEQ UENCES OP TH E BASIC PO STU LA TES  
___________________OP SU B JE C TIV IS M ___________________
1 . i n tro d u c tion
I t  has been concluded th a t the p- - in i  sc iences  
must p ro ce ed  as I f human ac tion  w o r . v f  the c h a ra c te r  
po stu la te d  by v o lu n ta r is m . W hat a re  some Im m e d ia te  
consequences of th is  p o stu la te  ? T h is  question  w i l l  be 
discussed  under the fo llo w in g  headings? knowledge and 
ac tio n ; d e c is io n -m a k in g ; the consequences of human  
ac tio n ; p re d ic t io n  and the s o c ia l sc ie n ce s .
2 . Knowle dge and A ctio n
A ctio n  has been d e fined  as pu rp o s iv e  or en d -  
d ire c te d  b e h a v io u r. A c tio n s  a re  aim ed at producing  
changes in  the w o rld  and a c c o rd in g ly  have oonsequoncea  
in  the w o rld . The a c to r  acts because he p re fe rs  the 
s itu a tio n  w hich he ex p ec ts  w i l l  fo llo w  fro m  h is  ac tions  
to th a t s itu a tio n  w hich  he expects  w i l l  fo llo w  fro m  
h is  in a c t iv i ty .  I t  has been s tre s s e d  th a t the ac to r  
w i l l  choose th a t a c t io n , out o f the a v a ila b le  a c tio n s ,  
which be exp ects  w i l l  produce the d e s ire d  re s u lts .
The ac to r  oar o t be su re  th a t the ac tion  w i l l ,  th a t  
is  in  the fu tu re , produce the consequences he d e s ire s .
He has e x p e rie n c e d  ca se s o f a d iv e rg e n c e  between the  
an tic ip a te d  and a c tu a l re s u lts  of h is  a c t io n . N e v e rth e le s s
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r• in  the face of th is  u n c e r ta in ty , he fe e ls ,  a t the po int 
of having  dec ided  betw een the a l te rn a t iv e  a v a ila b le  
a c t io n s , th a t the chosen ac tion  is  bes t su ite d  to  the 
atta in m e n t o f h is  ends. He knows th a t tim e  m ight 
w e ll p ro ve  h im  w rong .
Human no tion  a im ed  a t p roducing  a d e s ire d  
s ta te  o f a f fa ir s  in  the w o rld  w i l l  be based upon the 
stock o f know ledge th a t the a c to r  possesses. As 
h is  stock of knowledge changes , as i t  w i l l  over t im e ,  
so h is  ex p ec ta tio n s  w i l l  change. K nowledge must 
thus be looked at as a stock oonocpt th a t is  e x is tin g  
at a p o in t o f t im e .
W hat can be sa id  about the im p o rtan c e  of 
knowledge and it s  a c q u is itio n  fo r  human action?
The f i r s t  p o in t to note is  th a t i t  is  not p oss ib le  
to  say anyth ing  about the s p e c ific  s tock o f knowledge 
w hich  w i l l  in  the fu tu re  be possessed by a s p e c ific  
in d iv id u a l. K nowledge ca n n o t, fo llo w in g  the above 
argu m e n t re la t in g  to the f e a s ib i l i t y  of a d e te r m in is t ic  
e x p la na tio n  of human b e h a v io u r, be looked at as a 
response to  a p a r t ic u la r  s tim u lu s  s itu a tio n . I t  is  
thus not p o s s ib le  to ta lk  about the know ledge which  
w i l l  be g ained  in  a p a r t ic u la r  s i tu a tio n . Knowledge  
must th e re fo re  be looked at s u b je c t iv e ly , th a t is ,  
fro m  the p o in t of view  of the ac tin g  in d iv id u a l.  
Know ledge does not e x is t  "out th e re "  but in s id e  the 
m ind of the in d iv id u a l.  K now ledge w hich " is  
a v a i la b le "  but not known to the a c to r  w i l l  not a ffe c t  
h is  Im m e d ia te  d e c is io n  betw een a l te rn a t iv e  a c tio n s ,  
although i t  w i l l  c e r ta in ly  be im p o rta n t w hen, having
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rla te r  ac q u ire d  th is  kno w led g e , he re v ie w s  h ie  past 
d e c is io n . H o w ev er, a lthough i t  is  not p o ss ib le  to  
ta lk  o f the s p e c ific  knowledge th a t w i l l  be gained  
by an in d iv id u a l i t  is  n o n eth ele ss f r u i t fu l  to exam ine  
some g e n e ra l aspects o f knowledge a c q u is itio n  and 
the im p o rtan c e  o f knowledge in  human ac tio n .
K nowledge is  a c q u ire d  by the in d iv id u a l as 
h is  m ind a p p ra is e s  e lem e n ts  of h is  ex p e rie n c e .
The m ind w i l l  s e le c t those e le ffle n ts  w hich are, of
in te re s t  to  the s u b je c t. ^  I t  iis not p o ss ib le to
s t ip u la te  in advance the p re c is t I events w hl ch the
in d iv id u a l w i l l  f in d  o f in t e r e s t . fo r  h is  in i;ere
w i l l  change o ve r tim e  and w i l l  :ro t be d e te rm iiled
in  an a s c e rta in a b le  way by anyth ing  e ls e .
I t  is  p o ss ib le  fo r  the in d iv id u a l to  ac q u ire  
w hat m ay be te rm e d  " in c o r r e c t  k n o w led g e". In  
th is  case the in d iv id u a l's  b e l ie fs  about c e r ta in  aspects  
o f the w o r ld  d i f fe r  fro m  th e  a c tu a l s ta te  ot a f f a ir s .
I t  is  not n ec es sa ry  to  in q u ire  h e re  in to  the num erous  
w ays in  w hich  such in c o r r e c t  b e l ie fs  m ay be e s ta b lis h e d . 
But i t  is  im p o rta n t to note th at the in d iv id u a l's  ac tio n s  
w i l l  be based on th is  ( In c o r re c t )  know ledge w ith  the 
re s u lt  th a t the consequences of h is  ac tio n s  m ight  
d if fe r  fro m  those that he had a n tic ip a te d .
The a c q u is itio n  o f knowledge m ust be seen no 
a continuous p ro ce ss o f becom ing. As e x p erien c e  
co n tin u es over t im e , so th ore  o ccurs a constan t 
re v is io n  and m o d if ic a tio n  of pas t know ledge. In  
dec id in g  upon a p a r t ic u la r  ac tio n  schem e, the ac to r  
w i l l  p ro je c t  h is  a v a ila b le  a c tio n s  in to  the fu tu re  and
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rt r y  to  aBsess the e ffe c ts  th a t w i l l  fo llo w . But the 
p ro je c tio n  and the assessm ent a re  based on h is  
p re s e n t know ledge. O v er t im e , h o w ev er, he w i l l  
"grow  o ld e r"  so th a t even i f  noth ing  e lse  has 
changed when the ac tio n  is  a c tu a lly  p e rfo rm e d , 
the a c to r  n e v e rth e le s s  has ex p e rie n c e d  the c a rry in g  
out o f the a c tio n . He thus possesses a d d itio n a l  
e x p e rie n c e . Sohutz has ex p res se d  th is  in  a b r i l l ia n t  
passage: The " t im e  p e rs p e c tiv e  p e c u lia r  to the
p ro je c t  has r a th e r  im p o rta n t consequences. F i r s t ,
I  base my p ro je c tin g  of m y fo rth c o m in g  act . . .  upon 
m y knowledge of p re v io u s ly  p e rfo rm e d  acts which  
a re  t y p ic a lly  s im ila r  to  the p re s c r ib e d  one, upon my 
know ledge of ty p ic a lly  re le v a n t  fe a tu re s  o f the 
S itu a tio n  in w hich  th is  p ro je c te d  ac tio n  w i l l  o cc u r, 
in c lu d in g  my p e rs o n a l b io g ra p h ic a l ly  d e term in ed  
s itu a tio n . But th is  know ledge is  m y knowledge now 
a t hand , now at the t im e  o f p ro je c t in g , and must 
n e c e s s a r ily  be d if fe r e n t  fro m  th a t w hich I  s h a ll have 
when th e  now m e re ly  p ro je c te d  act w i l l  have 
m a te r ia liz e d . U n ti l  then I  s h a ll have grown o ld er  
and i f  noth ing  e lse  has changed, at le as t the 
e x p e rie n c e s ! s h a ll have had w h ile  c a rry in g  out my 
p ro je c t  w i l l  have en la rg e d  my know ledge. In  o the r  
w o rd s , p ro je c tin g  l ik e  any o the r a n tic ip a tio n  c a r r ie s  
along i ts  em pty h o rizo n s  w hich  w i l l  be f i l le d  in  m e re ly  
by the m a te r ia liz a t io n  o f the a n tic ip a te d  ev en t. T h is  
c o n s titu te s  the in t r in s ic  u n c e rta in ty  o f a l l  fo rm s of 
p r o je c t in g ." ^
•The re la t io n s h ip  between knowledge and ac tion
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ris  dynam ic and not m e re ly  one o f u n ila te r a l in flu en c e  
w here the a c to r ’ s stock of knowledge in flu e n c e s  h is  
p la n e . T h e  v e ry  ac tio n  th a t the ac to r  u n d ertak es , 
o r even the p ro ce ss o f c o n s id e rin g  a l te rn a t iv e  
a v a ila b le  a c t io n s , m o d ifie s  the knowledge of the 
a c to r  and th e re fo re  in flu e n c e s  h is  fu tu re  a c tio n s .
I t  is  th e re fo re  u n s a tis fa c to ry  to  la b e l the stock of 
know ledge as an independent v a r ia b le  and the actions  
of the agent as the dependent v a r ia b le .  A t each po int 
in  t im e  knowledge and ac tio n  e x e r t  a m utual in flu en c e  
upon one an o th er.
The d is cu ss io n  th is  f a r  has exam ined  the r e la t io n ­
sh ip  b e tw e en  the know ledge and ac tio n s  o f the in d iv id u a l 
and i t  has been s tre s s e d  th a t th is  re la t io n s h ip  is  a 
su b je c tiv e  phenom enon. T h e re  i s ,  h o w ev er, a 
re la te d  m a tte r  w hich  w i l l  be ra is e d  h ere  in  connection  
w ith  the p ro b lem  of knowledge but w hich  w i l l  be 
d iscusscd  in  m ore d e ta i l  la t e r ,  in  ex am in in g  its  
im p o rta n c e  fo r  econom ic th e o ry . I  am r e fe r r in g  to 
the assum ptions r e g a rd in g  the re la t io n s h ip  between  
e x p e rie n c e  and knowledge w hich a re  made in  e q u i­
l ib r iu m  a n a ly s is . S e ttin g  as id e  fo r  th is  la te r  
d is cu ss io n  the concept o f the e q u il ib r iu m  o f the 
s in g le  ac tin g  in d iv id u a l,  some of the assum ptions  
re g a rd in g  k n o w led g e  made in  e q u il ib r iu m  a n a ly s is  
in v o lv in g  m ore than one person  w i l l  now be exam ined . 
B ut i t  is  n e c e s s a ry  to po in t out th a t the in d iv id u a ls  
m ust be ac tin g  in d ep e n d en tly  o f one an o th e r. The 
m a tte r  w i l l  be som ewhat d if fe re n t  i f  the in d iv id u a ls  
a re  ac tin g  in  c o n c e r t , fo r  e x a m p le , as in the case
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rof a b o ard  of d ire c to rs  o f a f i r m .  ^
As has te e n  shown above, in  aa u n c e rta in  w o rld  
the fu tu re  cannot be known. T h e re fo re , a l l  knowledge 
ie  im p e r fe c t*  F ro m  th is  i t  fo llow B  th a t th e  ex p es ta tio n s  
of d if fe r e n t  people w i l l  d iv e rg e . B ut i f  the ex p ec ta tio n s  
of in d iv id u a ls  a re  In c o n s is te n t then  a f te r  s u ff ic ie n t  
t im e  has pas se d , at le a s t  one in d iv id u a l w i l l  r e a liz e  
th a t h is ex p e c ta tio n s  wave in c o r r e c t .  ( I t  is ,  o f co u rs e , 
p o ss ib le  £ot the e x p e c ta tio n s  o£ a l l  in d iv id u a ls  to  be 
proved  i c o r r e c t  w hen, fo r  e x a m p le , some e n t ir e ly  
unforeseeable even t o cc u rs . ) B ut i f  ex p ec ta tio n s  are  
in c o n s is te n t to beg in  w ith , it 'c a n  n e v e r be p o ss ib le  
fo r  a l l  in d iv id u a ls  to  avo id  e v e n tu a l re fu ta t io n  of 
the hyp o th es is  upon w hich  t h e ir  ex p ec ta tio n s  w e re  
b ased. ^  The r e a liz a t io n  th a t  ex p ec ta tio n s  held  
a t an e a r l i e r  t im e  have been, proved  in c o r re c t  by the 
p assing  of  t im e  w i l l  c o n s titu te  an a d d it io n a l u n it  of 
in fo rm a tio n  of the a c to r  and w i l l  le ad  h im  to re v is e  
h is  e x p e c ta tio n s . The in d iv id u a l thus r e a l i z e s ,  looking  
a t t im e  t^ fro m  the b e n e fit  o f h in d s igh t at tg , that 
he v a s  Yiot in  e q u il ib r iu m  at . In  o th e r  w ords i f  
he could once m ore be at t im e  w ith  the ad d it io n a l 
Knowledge th a t he g ained  betw een and t^  , he
w ould  now ac t d if fe r e n t ly .  T h e re fo re  at t^ he was 
not in  " e q u il ib r iu m "  when looked a t  fro m  the vantage  
p o in t o f t g . I t  m ust be re a liz e d  th a t i t  is  not p o ss ib le  
to foresee the s p e c ific  fe a tu re s  of the re v is e d  
e x p e c ta t io n s . H&vi&g aeea w ith  th e  passing  of tim e  
th a t th e ir  p as t ex p e c ta tio n s  w e re  in c o r r e c t ,  two  
in d '.v fd u a ls  who e n te r ta in e d  the same s x p ec ta tio n s
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ra t m ig h t n e v e rth e le s s  re v is e  th e ir  expectations 
in  d if fe re n t  ways at tg . T h ere  i s ,  th e re fo re , no 
lo g ic a l ground fo r  assum ing th a t th e re  w i l l  be a
t im e . T h e re  a re  no re as on s w hy , over t im e , p lans  
should becom e c o n s is te n t so th a t they w i l l  e v e n tu a lly  
" d o v e ta il"  m aking  e q u il ib r iu m  p o s s ib le . The 
u n re a lis t ic  n a tu re  o f the assum ptions made in  
assum ing a tendency to w ard s  e q u il ib r iu m , n am e ly  
th a t the re la t io n s h ip  betw een the e x p erien c e  and 
know ledge of d if fe re n t  in d iv id u a ls  w i l l  be such th at 
o ve r t im e  th e ir  ex p e c ta tio n s  w i l l  becom e c o n s is te n t, 
a re  thus c le a r ly  seen . ^
A r e a l i s t ic  in te rp re ta t io n  o f the m a tte r  would  
have to take account o f the t ra n s m is s io n  of knowledge 
between m inds as w e ll  as the p ro ce ss w h ereby the 
In d iv id u a l a c q u ire s  know ledge fro m  s^ i^ o e s o the r  
than fe llo w  in d iv id u a ls . The in te rp re ta t io n  would  
re q u ire  a co m plete  s o c io lo g y  of know ledge and would  
have to ta k e  account o f w hat has been te rm e d  s o c ia lly  
d e riv e d  k n o w led g e , th a t  is ,  know ledge w hich  "co n s is ts  
in  ex p erien c es  w hich n o t we but out fe llo w m e n , 
c o n te m p o ra r ie s , o r p re d e c e s s o rs , have h ad , and 
w hich th ey  have com m unica ted  o r handed down to 
u s ."  ^  The ro le  p la y e d  by language and other 
in s titu t io n s  in m aking  human in te ra c t io n  p oss ib le  
w i l l  have to  be taken  in to  account in  any r e a l is t ic  
in te rp re ta t io n  of the a c tio n s  of m any In d iv id u a ls .
In  the face of the above com m ents, i t  is  not 
d if f ic u lt  to  re c o g n ize  the ap peal o f the assum ptions
tendency to w ard s  e q u il ib r iu m  w ith  the passing  of
ro f the s ta tio n a ry  s ta te . F o r in  a w o rld  w here  
ev eryone knows fo r  c e r ta in  th a t to m o rro w  w il l  
be lik e  today (w hich is  in  a l l  re s p e c ts  e x a c tly  
th e  same as y e s te rd a y ) , i t  can be assumed th a t 
people w i l l  le a rn  fro m  t h e ir  m is ta k e s  and th a t  
t h e ir  p lans w i l l  a c c o rd in g ly  becom e co n s iste nt 
w ith  the passage of t im e . G iven  the assum ptions  
of the s ta tio n a ry  s ta te  i t  is  not n e c e s s a ry  to assume 
th a t the ex p ec ta tio n s  o f ac tin g  human beings are  
d e te rm in e d  by the e x is tin g  co n d itio n s as a response  
is  d e term in ed  by a s t im u lu s . E x p e c ta tio n s  a re  f re e  
to change but since the en v iro n m e n t w ith in  which  
human ac tio n  tak es  p la ce  is ,  by d e f in it io n , kept 
c o n s ta n t, the ex p ec ta tio n s  o f d if fe re n t  people W ill 
u lt im a te ly  becom e c o n s is te n t. But such a w o rld  is  
as fa r  rem oved  fro m  the r e a l i t y  of our w o rld  as are  
the assum ptions on w hich  the n o tion  of a f r io t io n le s s  
m achine is  b u ilt .  O ur w o rld  is  c h a ra c te r iz e d  by 
u n c e rta in  change, some of the consequences of w hich  
have been exam ined  in  th is  c h a p te r . In  such a w o rld  
oonceptii such as "g ro w th  e q u il ib r iu m "  and "ste ad y  
gro w th " a r e ,  to say the le a s t ,  fa r - fe tc h e d .
3. D e c is io n -M a k in g
A t any po in t in  t im e  the a c to r  fin d s  h im s e lf  in  
a b io g ra p h ic a l ly  d e te rm in e d  s itu a tio n . In  o th e r w ords  
he has h is  p as t h is to r y , h ie  pas t e x p e rie n c e s , which  
w i l l  in flu e n c e  the way in  w hich  he l iv e s  and acts in  
the w o rld . H is  s itu a tio n  in c lu d es  both o th e r people
rand p h y s ic a l fe a tu re s . P a r t  of th is  s itu a tio n  can 
be m a n ip u la ted  in  o rd e r  to s u it  h is ends; o ther  
aspects are  beyond h is  re a c h .
Human ac tion  is  d ire c te d  to w ard s en d s , that 
is ,  to w ard s  a fu tu re  d e s ire d  s ta te  of a f f a ir s .  The  
ends a re  in te g ra te d  in to  a g e n e ra l e n d a -p a tte rn ,  
the a tta in m e n t o f some ends p re c lu d in g  the a t ta in ­
m ent o f o th e rs . These ends w i l l  in flu e n c e  what the 
a c to r  fin d s  o f re lev an c e  in. h is  s itu a tio n .
In  o rd e r to  ach ieve h is  ends , the a c to r  w i l l  
form ulate a l te rn a t iv e  ac tion  schem es o r p ro je c ts .
T h e re  a re  at le a s t two a l te rn a t iv e s  attached  to  
each ac tio n  schem e: to  p e rfo rm  the ac tion  or to
r e fr a in  fro m  a c tin g . T h is  fo rm u la t io n  w i l l  depend 
upon h is  stock of know ledge. H is  knowledge w i l l  
change o ve r tim e  and the ac to r  may becom e aw are  
of new p o s s ib il i t ie s  and m ay d is c a rd  some a l te rn a t iv e s  
as being  "out of d a te . "
In  dec id ing  betw een the fo rm u la te d  ac tio n  schem es  
the a c to r  w i l l  p ro je c t  in to  the fu tu re  the consequences  
th a t he im a g in es  w i l l  fo llo w  the ac tio n . Fo llo w ing  
S h a c k le , th e re  are  s e v e ra l p o in ts  to be no ted  in 
connection  w ith  th is  p ro je c t io n . F i r s t ,  we are  not 
dea lin g  w ith  a c t iv i t ie s  w hich  m ay be te rm e d  "d a y ­
d re a m in g " . The consequences w hich would fo llo w  
i f  the in d iv id u a l w e re  o m n is c ie n t and the a c t iv i t ie s  
of the in d iv id u a l in v o lv e d  in  im a g in in g  these con­
sequences , a re  thus excluded  fro ri the d iscuss ion  
of p ro je c t io n . S e cond ly , She a c to r  does not know 
fo r  c d r ta in  the consequences th a t w i l l  fo llo w  each
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a v a ila b le  ac tio n  schem e. F o r i f  he did possess 
th is  know ledge then  h is  dec is io n  w ould be "em pty . "
He w ould choose th a t consequence deemed most 
d e s ira b le  in  te rm s  of h is  ends. "D ec is io n -m a k in g "  
w ould in th is  case be a p u re ly  fo rm a l c a lc u la t io n  
of the consequences fo llo w in g  .ch ac tion  scheme 
and, w ith  g iven  en d s , the "d e c is io n "  would fo llo w  
a u to m a t ic a lly . T h ir d ly ,  the a c to r  can m ake a deois ion  
because he does have sotn*. id e a  of the consequences  
w hich m ight fo llo w  h is  a l te rn a t iv e  ac tion  schem es.
He can thus attach  m easures of p o s s ib il i ty  to the  
p o ss ib le  outcom es fo llo w in g  a p a r t ic u la r  ac tio n . 
H o w e v e r, he is  n o t,  a m ost c a s e s , ^  c e rta in  
th at the outcom e w i l l  fo llo w .
I t  is  n e c e s s a ry  to  exam ine th is  la s t  po in t in  
some m ore d e t a i l .  M y ac tio n s a re  o r ie n te d  tow ards  
a c h ie v in g  a d e s ire d  s ta te  of a f f a ir s  " in  the w o r ld " .
M y ac tio n s  must th e re fo re  t ik e  in to  account my 
p h y s ic a l en v iro n m e n t w e ll as m y in te ra c t io n  w ith  
fe llo w  human b e in g s . M y  know ledge of the law s of 
n a tu re  ( even i f  th is  know ledge does not co n s titu te  
an ex p la n a tio n  but a m ere d e s c r ip tio n  o f the events  
c o n c e rn e d ), '10  ^ w i l l  a id  me in  ex p ec tin g  tne outcome  
of a c tio n s  at le a s t  p a r t ia l ly  dependent upon n a tu ra l  
phenom ena. How I  come to  know these law s is  a 
co m p lic a te d  q u es tion . I  m ight know e i th e r  by d ire c t  
ex p e rie n c e  of the p a r t ic u la r  ev en t o r th is  knowledge  
m ight be conveyed to me by o th e r p eop le , by te a c h e rs ,  
p a re n ts , language and so on.
'M u ch  o f my ac tio n  presupposes d e fin ite  ac tio n
on the p a r t  of o th e rs . M y ta s k  of co n s id erin g  the 
consequences of m y proposed a c tio n s  is  co n s id era b ly  
e a s ie r  to  the ex te n t to  w hich  the a n tic ip a te d  actions  
of o th e rs  a re  based on in s titu t io n a liz e d  fo rm s of 
b e h a v io u r. I  am not o v e rly  d is tra c te d , when I  w a it 
at the bus - s to p , th a t the bus w i l l  not a r r iv e  on t im e .
I  take i t  fo r  g ra n te d  th a t my ac tio n  of w a itin g  at the  
b u s -s to p  w i l l  le a d  the o the r (the bus d r iv e r )  to  p e r ­
fo rm  the re q u ire d  a c tio n s , ( a r r iv in g  on t im e , and 
stopping  fo r  m e) in  accordance w ith  h is own in ten tio n s  
(p e rfo rm in g  h is  d u tie s ). H o w e v e r, I  am not c e rta in  
th a t the bus w i l l  in  fa c t  a r r iv e .  I  cannot ru le  out 
the p o s s ib il i ty  th a t the bus d r iv e r  is  on s t r ik e  or 
' h > t he bus was in v o lve d  in  an acc id en t en rou te  
tv my b u c -s to p . A lthough I  cannot be c e r ta in , (and 
although I  a n tic ip a te  the a r r iv a l  o f the bu= w ith  a 
s m a lle r  degree o f c e r ta in ty  than I  a n tic ip a te  that 
w a te r  w i l l  b o il at one hundred  d eg re es C en tig rad e  
at sea le v e l) ,  I  am n o n eth e le ss  m ore c e r ta in  when 
such in s titu t io n a liz e d  ac tio n s  a re  in v o lve d  than  
w h e re  th is  is  not the case . I  am f a r  le s s  c e r ta in  
th a t m y c o m p e tito r  has not found out about the new 
pro d u ct I  in ten d  in tro d u c in g  on the m a rk e t, o r th at 
share p r ic e s  on t ’ ■> stock exchange w i l l  f a l l  to m o rro w .  
T h e re fo re  the m ore s ta n d a rd ize d  the ac tion  p a t te rn ,  
the le s s  the u n c e r ta in ty  attac h ed  to  its  outcom e.
In  d ec id in g  between d if fe r e n t  a v a ila b le  ac tions  
the a c to r  w i l l  p r o je c t ,  on the b a s is  o f h is  kn o w led g e , 
th e  expected  outcom e of each a c tio n . T h is  ex p ec ta tio n  
is  held  w ith  u n c e r ta in ty . The d ec is io n  is  made at th a t
rm om ent when the ac to r  com m its  h im s e lf  to  a 
p a r t ic u la r  ac tio n  th e re b y  fo reg o in g  the a l te rn a t iv e s .
-• The Consequen c es of Hum an A ctio n
As has been sta te d  above, human ac tio n  la  
in ten d ed  to b r in g  about a d e s ire d  sta te  of a f fa ir e  
in  the w o r ld . The ac tio n  i t s e l f  and It s  consequences  
m ight in flu e n c e  the p lans w hich gu ide the a c tio n .
T h is  is  i l lu s t r a t e d  by the w e ll-k n o w n  p r in c ip le  of 
le a r s in g -b y -  do ing . In  th is  s itu a tio n  the ac to r  
re c e iv e s  fe e d -b a c k  fro m  h is  ac tio n s  w hich  enables  
him  to  re p e a t the task w ith  g re a te r  e f f ic ie n c y .
H o w e v e r, ac tio n  m ay not have the e ffec ts  
in ten d ed  by th f  a c to r . Two d if fe re n t  s itu a tio n s  
m ust be d is tin g u is h e d . On the one hand , th a t  
s itu a tio n  m ust be d is tin g u is h e d  w h e re  the e ffe c t  of 
the ac tio n  is  u n d e s ire d , th a t i s ,  i t  does ac t enable  
the ac to r  to  ac h ie ve  h is  g o a ls . F o r e x a m p le , although  
the ac tio n  enab led  the a tta in m e n t f  the end to w ard  
w hich  i t  was a im e d , its  e ffe c ts  m ig h t n e v e r th e le s s , 
c o n tra r y  to  the ex p ec ta tio n s  of the a c to r ,  f r u s t r a te  
othe r g a ls . On the o th e r hand , i t  is  n ec es sa ry  to  
d is tin g u is h  th a t s itu a tio n  w here , in  a d d itio n  to  the 
d e s ire d  and in tended  e f fe c t  p a r t ic u la r  un in tended  
consequences a re  p ro duced. The p o llu t io n  o f the 
en v iro n m e n t w hich  has re s u lte d  fro m  pro d u ctio n  
a c t iv i t ie s  in  c e r ta in  a re a s  may be adduced in  o rd e r  
to  i l lu s t r a t e  th is  second ca se . E ach of the cases
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rd if fe re n t ia te d  w i l l  be exam ined .
I t  is  i l lu m in a t in g  to  in q u ire  how a d iv erg e nc e  
between a n tic ip a te d  and a c tu a l consequences is 
b rought about. T h is  in q u ir y , i t  w i l l  be shown, 
th row s much lig h t  onto the n a tu re  of human a c tio n . 
T h e re  a re  two re as on s w hich  m ay re s u lt  in  a 
"m is ta k e  being  m ade" by the a c to r . The m is ta ke  
m ight re s u lt  fro m  an in c o r re c t  a p p ra is a l (th a t is ,  
to  a la c k  o f know ledge) o f the p re s e n t s itu a tio n .
In  th is  c a s e , i f  the a c to r  possessed g re a te r  know­
ledge of the e x is tin g  s itu a tio n  w h ile  m aking h is  
d e c is io n , the m is ta k e  w ould  not have o c c u rre d .
O r the m is ta ke  m ig h t have re s u lte d  fro m  an 
u n fo re se ea b le  change in  the s i tu a tio n . H ere  although  
the a c to r  possessed adequate knowledge e.bout the 
p re s e n t s i tu a tio n , h is a c t io n , the consequences of 
w hich la y  in  the fu tu re , co n fro n te d  new co n d itio n s . 
These new c o n d itio n s  w e re  not fo re s e e a b le  at the  
m om ent o f dec id in g  upon a p a r t ic u la r  ac tio n  schem e.
In both these cases i t  m ay be yaid  th a t an 
" e r r o r "  was m ade. I t  is  i l lu m in a t in g  to re a l iz e  
th a t " e r r o i"  is  used in an ex  post sense. Louked  
at fro m  an ex ante p o in t o f view  th e re  an be no 
such th in g  as e r r o r ,  s in ce  i f  the ac to r  is  aw are  
of the m is ta k e  to  come he w i l l  r e v is e  h is  ex p ec ta tio n s  
and a c tio n s  a c c o rd in g ly . The freq u en c y  o f the use o f 
the w ord  ’ e r r o r '  and its  e s s e n tia l ex post n atu re  
p o in t to an im p o rta n ' fe a tu re  of human ac tio n  in s is te d  
th ro ug h o u t th is  th e s is :  th&t human ac tion  tak es  p lace
in  an" 'a tm o s p h e re 'o f  u n c e r ta in ty . E r r o r  is  non -
re x is te n t In  a c e r ta in  en v iro n m e n t.
We t v m  now to  the case w here human ac tion  
has consequences th a t arc  un intended by each of 
the in d iv id u a ls  co n c ern e d . T h is  s itu a tio n  has been 
noted by the e a r ly  c la s s ic a l econom ists such as 
M a n d e v ille  and Adam S m ith , in  oonneotion w ith  th e ir  
e x am in atio n  of the m a rk e t econom y. T h u s , to  g ive  
an e x a m p le , Adam Sm ith  c im m e n te d  on the p rocess  
of the d iv is io n  of la b ou r w hich  le ad s  to the in c re a s e  
in  the w e a lth  o f n a tio n s  but the s o c ia l consequences  
of which a re  not in tended  by any s in g le  in d iv id u a l:  
"T h is  d iv is io n  of labour, fro m  w h ich  so many 
advantages are  d e r iv e d , is  not o r ig in a lly  the e ffe c t  
of any human w ifd o m , w hich fo re s e e s  and in tends  
th a t g e n e ra l opulence to w hich  i t  g iv e s  occ as io n , i t  
ta the n e c e s s a ry , though v e ry  slow and g ra d u a l 
consequence of a c e r ta in  p ro p e n s ity  In  human  
n a tu re  w hich  has in  view  no suoh e x ten s ive  u t i l i t y ,  
the p ro p e n s ity  to t ru c k , b a r t e r ,  and exchange one
S im ila r ly  the e x am in atio n  o f the un intended  
consequences of human ac tio n  has been used to 
c h a ra c te r iz e  the w o rk in g s  of the m a rk e t econom y. 
Thus K n ig h t has sa id : "One of the m ost conspicuous
fe a tu re s  o f o rg a n ic  ‘ ion th rough  exchange and fre e  
e n te r p r is e , and one m ost o ften  com m ented upon, is  
the absence o f conscious design o r  c o n tro l. I t  is  
a s o c ia l o rd e r and one of u n fa thom ab le  c o m p le x ity ,  
ye t co n s tru c te d  and o p e ra te d  w ith o u t s o c ia l p lann ing
th ing  fo r  a n o th e r ."
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o r d ire c t io n , through s e lf is h  in d iv id u a l thought 
and m o tiv a tio n  a io ne . No one e v e r w orked  out a 
p la n  fo r  such a s y s te m , o r w il le d  it s  e x is te n c e ;  
tk e c e  ie  uo p la n  of i t  an y w h ere , e i th e r  on p ape r 
o r in anyb d y 's  m in d , and no one d ire c ts  it?  
o p e ra tio n s ;1^ 2  ^ The same p r in c ip le  has been used 
by o the r w r i te r s  to c h a ra c te r iz e  o the r fe a tu re s  of 
s o c ia l l i f e  fa r  beyond the w o rk in g s  of the m a rke t  
e c o n o m y . H o w e v e r  in  a l l  these cases the 
phenomenon n o te d , be i t  the w o rk in g s  of the p r ic e  
m echanism  or the o p e ra tio n  of the d iv is io n  o f la b o u r ,  
has re s u lte d  fro m  the p u rp o se fu l ac tions o f in d iv id u a ls  
the d is t in c tiv e  fe a tu re  beir'g  th a t the u lt im a te  con­
sequences w e re  not env isaged  by these in d iv id u a ls .
5 . P re d ic t io n  th e  S oc ia l Scipncos.
In  conc lud ing  th is  se ctio n  i t  is  n ec e s s a ry  to 
t ie  to g e th e r c e r ta in  th re a d s  Im p lie d  in the above 
a n a ly s is . I t  is  n ec e s s a ry  to show e x a c tly  why 
p re d ic t io n  is  not p o ss ib le  in  the s o c ia l s c ie n ce s .
The re le v a n c e  ' f  th is  co nc lusion  w i l l  then be fu r th e r  
e la b o ra te d  upon la te r .
The re as on s fo r  conc luding  th a t the p re d ic t io n  
of fu tu re  h-uman ac tio n  is  not p o s s ib le , can now be 
s u m m a rize d . IS has been shown th a t o v e r t im e  the 
know ledge of the in d iv id u a l changes as b is  m ind  
a p p ra is e s  new e x p e rie n c e s . The acquisition  of know ­
ledge is  not d e te rm in e d  by anyth ing  e ls e . Thus
J
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rd if fe re n t  people w i l l  a c q u ire  d if fe re n t  ’’ u n its "  of 
in fo rm a tio n  f r o v  the same s i tu a tio n . I t  is  con­
c lu d e d , t h e re fo re , th a t the fu tu re  knowledge of the  
in d iv id u a l cannot bo known b e fo reh a n d . Shackle  
has ex p res se d  th is  id e a  s u e c in tly :  "C om plete  
p re d ic t io n  w ould re q u ire  the p re d ic to r  to know 
in  co m plete  d e ta i l a t the moment o f m ak.ng  h is  
p re d ic t io n , f i r s t ,  a l l  ' f u t u r e 1 advances of know­
ledge and in v e n tio n s , and s e co n d ly , a l l  fu tu re  
d e c is io n s . But to know In  advance what an inven tion  
w il l  co n s is t o f is  e v id e n t ly  to m ake th a t invention  
in  a d v a n c e ."  S h a ck le  th e re fo re  concludes
th a t " p re d ic te d  man is  le s s  than hum an, p re d ic t in g  
uian_ is  m ore than human . . . M an  in  h is  t ru e  hum an ity  
can n e ith e r  p re d ic t  n or be p re d ic te d , " *15> „ u i  cince  
s o c ia l phenom ena a re  the consequences (both in tended  
and u n in tended ) o f human a c tio n , these phenomena 
cannot be p re d ic te d  e i th e r .
I t  m ust be re a lis e d  th at th is  co nc lusion  la  
not baaed  on the as sum ption  th a t knowledge w i l l  
change in an u n fo re se en  way w ith in  a g iven  p e rio d  
of t im e . A l l  th a i is  re q u ire d  f o r  the conclusion  
th at p re d ic t io n  Is  c o t p o ss ib le  is  the re a liz a t io n  
th a t know ledge m igh t change in  an undeterm ined  
way fro m  one moment to  the n e x t. A lthough some 
fo rm s of know ledge change ra p id ly  o ve r t im e , o th e rs ,  
fo r  exam ple  know ledge based on in s titu t io n a liz e d  
types o f b e h a v io u r, w i l l  change m ore s lo w ly  o ve r  
t im e . T h e re fo re  the lo n g e r the t im e  ln te rv -1  w hich
ris  to be c o n s id e re d , the g re a te r  is  the lik e lih o o d  
th a t the knowledge of the in d iv id u a l w i l l  change.
Thus a lthough the fu tu re  ac tio n s of in d iv id u a ls  
cannot be p re d ic te d  i t  oan be sa id  th a t if ,  the 
re le v a n t  know ledge of the in d iv id u a l re m a in s  the 
same in  the fu tu re  as i t  was in  the p a s t, then  
such and such can be e x p ec te d . S tatem ents  o f th is  
xind  w i l l  be re fe r r e d  to as fo re c a s ts .
In  conc luding  these com m ents on p re d ic t io n ,  
atte n tio n  w i l l  be b r ie f l y  tu rn ed  to ih e  phenomenon 
r e fe r r e d  to  as re f le x iv e  p re d ic t io n s  or s e l f - f u l f i l l in g  
and s e lf - f r u s t r a t in g  p re d ic t io n s . B uck g’ ves as
an exam ple  the case of "an a g r ic u ltu r a l e c o n o m is t's  
fo re c a s t  o f a fu tu re  p r ic e  f o r  w h eat. Suppose he 
fo re s e e s  an o v e r-s u p p ly , and a subsequent sharp  
drop in w heat p r ic e s . H is  p re d ic t io n  comes to  the 
a tte n tio n  o f the g ro w e rs  who b e lie v e  i t  and decide  
to  sw itch  land to  .'th o r pu rp o se s . So m any of them  
thus sw itch  so mti'.h land  th a t the expected  o v e r ­
supply f a i l s  H  . i t e r i a l i z e .  P e rh a p s  the p r ic e  even 
r is e s  a b i t ,  an y e t  i t  is  f u l ly  p o ss ib le  th a t our 
e c o n o m is t 's  p e d ic t iv n , fa ls i f ie d  by s e lf - f r u s tr a t in g  
f a c to r s , m igh t have tu rn e d  out t ru e  had i t  not been 
d is se m in ated ."'
I t  is  n e c e s s a ry  to  note th a t th is  exam ple docs 
not p ro v id e  a case of p re d ic t io n  i f  th is  w ord  is  
in te rp re te d  in  the same way as above. I t  is ,  of 
c o u rs e , l ik e ly  th a t the w heat g ro w e rs  w i l l  use the 
fo re c a s t  of the ec o n o m ist as a d d it io n a l in fo rm a tio n
L
rin  m aking  t h e ir  dec is io n  re g a rd in g  the amount of 
w heat to  p ro d u ce . B ut i t  is  not p o ss ib le  to p re d ic t  
th a t the fa rm e rs  w i l l  d ec re a s e  th e ir  output (o r l a i l  
to  in c re a s e  i t ) .  The fa rm e rs  m igh t w e ll p lan to  
d ec rea se th e ir  ou tpu t, but w h e th e r they in  fa c t  
dec ide to  do th is  o r not w i l l  depend upon the o ther  
know ledge at th e ir  d is po s a l as w e ll as th e ir  ex p ec ta tio n s  
re g a rd in g  re le v a n t  fu tu re  v a r ia b le s . Thus i f  the 
fa rm e rs  expect a s ig n ific a n t  r is e  in  the demand for 
w h e a t, a r is e  g re a t enough to  t o re  than  take care  
of the fo re c a s t  increas '3  in  s u p p ly , th e y  m igh t decide  
to  in c re a s e  t h e ir  ou tpu t. The co nc lusion  of th is  
d iscuB sio-. is  th at although the ac tio n s  o f the econom ist  
(h is  fo re c a s t)  may in flu e n c e  the d e c is io n s  of the  
fa rm e rs  i t  is  not p o ss ib le  to s ta te  the p re c is e  n atu re  
of th is  in f lu e n c e . I t  th e re fo re  does not m ake sense 
to  ta lk  o f s e l f - f u l f i l l in g  or s e l f - f r u s tr a t in g  p r e d ic t io n s .
F u r th e rm o re , th is  d is cu ss io n  is  o f re lev an c e  
to  the concept of the ’' in i t i a l  s itu a tio n "  as used by 
P o p p er. A cc o rd in g  to  P o p p er s c ie n t if ic  ex p la na tio n  
co n s is ts  in  deducing the im p a ct o f u n iv e rs a l law s on 
an " in i t ia l  s itu a tio n "  and in  te s tin g  tha " p re d ic t io n s "  
thus m ade . H o w e v e r, as the above d is cu ss io n  has 
shown, i t  is  not p o ss ib le  to  s p e c ify  the " in i t ia l  
s itu a tio n "  s o le ly  in  o b je c tiv e  te rm s . S u b je ctiv e  
fa c to rs  such as the ex p ec ta tio n s  o f the fa rm e rs  in  
the g iv en  s itu a tio n  a re  a c r u c ia l p a r t  of the ’ in i t ia l  
s i tu a t io n ."  B u t s iu e e , as we have se en , ex p ec ta tio n s  
may change in  s. c o m p le te ly  unexpected  way at a la te r
rpo in t in  t im e , and since th is  change m ay have 
noth ing  to  do w ith  e x te rn a l fa c to rs  ex p res se d  in  
th e  u n iv e rs a l la w , i t  w i l l  not be p o ss ib le  to s p e c ify  
any fu tu re  " in i t ia l  s i tu a t io n .” T h is  obvious ly  
c o n s titu te s  a s e r io u s  l im ita t io n  to the s c ie n tif ic  
method p roposed b y P o p p er.
rC H AP TER
M E T H O D O L O G IC A L  IN D IV ID U A L IS M  AND  
________ M E T A P H Y S IC A L  H O L IS M __________
1 . I n tro d u c tio n
In  C h ap ter 6 the b as ic  p o stu la te s  of su b je c tiv is m  
w e re  co n s id ere d  and i t  w as concluded th a t we can proceed  
as i f  human action  is  v o lu n ta ry  „ th at is ,  th a t human 
ac tio n  is  guided by the p lans o f the a c to rs . In  the  
p rev io u s ch ap te r some consequences of th is  po stu la te  
f o r the ac tin g  in d iv idual w ere  d iscu ssed . The im p o rtan ce  
of u n c e rta in ty  and knowledge fo r  human ac tio n  was 
th e re  an a lysed . We turn  now to exam ine the so c ia l 
consequences of in d iv id u a l human ac tio n . T h is  
exam in a tio n  w i l l  be u n d ertaken  in  the l ig h t  of the 
s o -c a lle d  m eth o d o lo g ica l in d iv id u a lis m  ve rs u s  m e ta ­
p h ys ica l h o lis m  deb a te . '
2 . D e f in it io n s  of M eth o d o lo g ic a l In d iv id u a lis m  and 
M etap h ysi c a l H o lism _______________________________
The p r in c ip le  of m ethodo lo  . c s l in d iv id u a lis m  
has p la ye d  an im p o rta n t p a r t  in  the w r i t in g s  of the  
s u b je c t iv is ts  th a t w e re  exam ined  in  C h ap ters  3 - 5 .
Thus M is e s , fo r  e x a m p le , has h e ld  th at " I f  we 
s c ru t in iz e  the m eani ng o f the v a r io u s  a c tio n s  p e rfo rm e d  
by in d iv id u a ls  we m ust n e c e s s a r ily  le a rn  e v e ry th in g  
about .the a c tio n s  of c o l le c t iv e  w h o le s . F o r a s o c ia l
rc o l le c t iv e  has no ex is te n c e  and r e a l i ty  v u ts id e  of 
th e -in cU v id ua l m e m b e rs ' a c tio n s . The l i f e  o f a 
c o l le c t iv e  is  liv e d  in  the ac tions of the in d iv id u a ls  
c o n s titu tin g  it s  body. T h ere  ts no s o c ia l . 'le c t iv e  
co n c e iv ab le  w hich is  not o p e ra tiv e  i r  the ac tio n s of 
some in d iv id u a ls . " (1 )
W atk in s  has d e fin e d  m e th o d o lo g ica l in d iv id u a lis m  
and d is tin g u is h e d  i t  fro m  m e ta p h y s ic a l h o lis m  In  the 
fo llo w in g  way: The p r in c ip le  of m e th o d o lo g ica l
in d iv id u a lis m  "s ta te s  th a t s o c ia l p ro ce ss es and 
e v en ts  should be ex p la in ed  by being deduced fro m  
(a ) p r in c ip le s  g o ve rn in g  the beh a v io u r o f p a r t ic ip a t in g  
in d iv id u a ls  and (b) d e s c rip tio n s  o! th e ir  s itu a tio n s .
The c o n tra r y  p r in c ip le  o f m e th o d o lo g ica l h o lis m  s ta te  
th a t the b eh a v io u r o f in d iv id u a ls  should be ex p la in ed  
by being  deduced fro n t <a) m a cro s co p ic  la w s  .fhich  
a re  sui gen e r is  and w hich  a p f y  to  the s o c ia l system  
as a w h o le , and (b ) d e s c rip tio n s  o f the p o s itio n s  
(o r Junctions) of the in d iv id u a ls  w ith in  the w h o le . " ^  
S im ila r ly  in  an o th er co n tex t W atk in s  has said  
th a t " In  the . x p la n a tio n  of a un ique c o n s te lla tio n  of 
ev en ts  the in d iv id u a lis t ic  m ethod is  to re c o n s tru c t  
the h is to r ic a l s i tu a tio n , or connected sequence of 
s i tu a tio n s , in  a way w hich re v e a ls  how . . .  in d iv id u a ls ,  
w ith  th o ir  .b e lie fs  and d is p o s itio n s  (w h ich  m ay in c lu d e  
p e c u lia r  p e rs o n a l d is p o s it io n s  as w e ll  as ty p ic a l  
human d is p o s it io n s ) , g e n e ra te d , in  th is  p a r t ic u la r  
s itu a tio n , the jo in t  p ro d u ct to  be e x p la in e d . I  
em phasize  d is p o s it io n s , w hich  a re  open and la w - l ik e  , 
as opposed V  c cu-.is io n s , w h ich  are  o cc u rre n c e s  , to r
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th is  r»asoi2: A p e rs o o 's  se t o f d is p o s itio n s  ought,
under v a ry in g  c o n d it io n s , to  £ iv e  r is e  to  a p p ro p r ia te ly  
v a ry in g  d e c is io n s . The subsequent o cc u rren c e  of an
■ a p p ro p ria te  dooision  w i l t  both c o n f irm , and be 
t jX p ! ■ K''ii by the ex is te n c e  o f the d i s p o s i t i o n s . ^
: ; , V /a tk ins '- d e f in it io n  ra is e s  unnecessary  
p v.'-t.-.t are  the " p r in c ip le s  g overn ing  the
p • .ja r o.' a a rc ic ip a tin g  In d iv id u a ls ’1 and the 
- e . U o n ? "  th a t W atk in s  ta lk s  vJ and how do they  
ccine to  be? t i  w<.sld be n e c e s s a ry  to a n -w e r these  
< .v '*)-iex  questiocu  ^ o fo re  em b:irk in g  upon an ex p la n a tio n  
iZ \ g iyen  s o c ia l yi'enomenon." F o r th is  reason  i t  is  
pb fg e sted  th a 1; m ti'j vr.'-jlogicr.l in d iv id u a lis m  be defined  
in  v. s l ig h tly  iif fe rfc iU  way: the p r in c ip le  of m ethodo­
lo g ic a l in d iv id u a lis m  s ta te s  th a t s o c ia l p ro ce ss es  and 
ly e n ts  s b c u lj he e x p lt i’.aed by being deduced fro m  ths 
^ jau s th a t g:w ^: tiurapA a c tio n . I t  is  in  h is  p lan  th a t  
the  in d iv id u a l Iv in a s  in fo  c o n s is te nc y  h is  v a r io u s  
in tended  ac tio n s  an:l t a x - e cognizance of the means 
at h is  d is po s a l sntl of o b stac le s  th a t face h im .
Th is  Te£i>r7n'.ilat;!d d e f in U m 'i thus overcom es the 
p ro l? l,'( ie  ra is e d  by th e  f l ; e t  p a r t  o f W a tk in s ' 
d e iiiU .tion  and a t the same t.ime tak es  in to  account 
the second p a r t  o f h is  d e U iv H io n ; a d e s c rip tio n  of 
the 3i;uatlon o f in d iv id u a te  is im p lie d  in  a know ledge 
of t , e p la ns  of th ese  in d iv iV 'ta ? s .
3 . M e th o d o lo g ic a l In d iv id i n |i" m  and the H is to ry  
o f  Econom ic T h ought  ____ _
.We have seen in  C h a p ttr  ? vhc iinpori9 .nce of
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rm e th o d o lo g ica l in d iv id u a lis m  in  the h is to ry  of 
econom ic th ought. The im p a c t o f th is  new approach  
to  the ex p la n a tio n  o f econom ic phenomena v f l i  be 
b r ie f l y  re c a lle d  h e re .
The essence of the s u b je c t iv is t  re v o lu tio n  in  
econom ic th e o ry  was the r e a liz a t io n  th a t va lue does 
n o t, as the B ic a rd ia n s  w ould  have had i t ,  re s id e  in 
the good i t s e l f .  The la b o u r th e o ry  of va lue w hich  
m e asured  the va lu e  of goods in  te rm s  of the num ber 
of la b o u r hours em bodied in  the good was thus 
re p la c e d  by a s u b je c t iv is t  e x p la n a tio n  o t v a lu e .
V a lu e  m ust be ex p la in e d  in  te rm s  of the p re fe re n c e s  
of in d iv id u a ls . An e x p la n a tio n  o f the p r ic e s  and 
q u a n tit ie s  e x is tin g  in  the econom y at a p a r t ic u la r  
t im e  m ust in v o lv e  the deduction  o f these phenomena 
iro m  th e  d e c is io n s  of in d iv id u a ls .
The p r in c ip le  o f m e th o d o lo g ica l in d iv id u a lis m  
obta ined  a f i r m  fo o tin g  in  econom ic th e o ry  in  the 
1870s (a lth o u g h , as is  now ev .tnow ledged, th e re  w e re  
o th e rs  b e fo re  th is  date who in s is te d  on the im p o rtan c e  
of the p r in c ip le )  w ith  the w r i t in g s  ot C a r l M e n g e r, 
W a lra s  and je v o n s . H o w e v e r, th is  la s t  s ta te m en t needs 
some q u a li f ic a t io n . M ethodologies* in d iv id u a lis m  
has been d efined  in  te im s  of the p lans of in d iv id u a ls .
I f  s o c ia l phenom ena a re  to be ex p la in e d  by being  
deduced fro m  the p la ns  of in d iv id u a ls  thee i t  is  
n e c e s s a ry  to  show th a t these p la ns  a re  not d e term in ed  
by an y th ing  e ls e . I f ,  f o r  e x a m p le , the p lans of 
in d iv id u a ls  cou ld  be looked  at as a response to  a 




s tim u lu s -re s p o n s e  re la t io n s h ip  could be fo rm u la te d  
in  the fo rm  oi a la w , "then s o c ia l phenom ena could  
be e x p la in ed  in  the fo rm  of the l?.ws govern ing  
in d iv id u a l re s p o n s e s . As we hsvo argued in  
C h ap ter 6 ,  th is  conception  is  in a d e q u a te .*4 ^
H o w e v e r, the e x p la ’ tio n  of econom ic phenomena 
in  te rm s  of the aat i' -ns  w  in d iv id u a ls  w hich c h a ra c te r iz e d  
the m a rg in a l re v o lu t io n , was o fte , e x p l ic i t ly  couched
In  d e te r m in is t ic  te rm s . Thus M en g er a t  tim e s  re g a rd e d  ;
the needs of the in d iv id u a l as d e te rm in e d . A lthough he 
b eg a n , w ith  the in d iv id u a l,  the v o lu n ta r is t ic  p o stu la te  j
i s ,  in  p la c e s , a b s en t, and je v o n s , as has been b'k -w d , j
was e x tre m e ly  in flu en c ed  by B ontham 's u t i l i t a r ia n is m .
S im ila r ly ,  in  la te r  t im e s , the m a x im iz a tio n  po stu la te  
has been put fo rw a rd  as a d e te rm in a n t o f econom ic 
b e h a v io u r. H o w e v e r, a s a t is fa c to ry  account oZ :
econom ic phenom ena such ex p la na tio n s  cannot be ]
a d m itte d . I t  is  n ec e s s a ry  to p ro ce ed  as i f  the i
in d iv id u a l is  f re e  in  fo rm u la tin g  h is  p la n s . ;
The p r in c ip le  of m ethodo log ica l in d iv id u a lis m  
had ano ther im p o rta n t im p a ct on econom ic th e o ry  w ith  
the in tro d u c tio n  in to  econom ics o f u n c e rta in ty . The 
p lann ing  in d iv id u a l i t  c e r ta in  th a t the consequences 
o f b is  ac tio n s  cannot be known to  h im  w ith  c e r ta in ty . ;
4.  C r i t ic is m  of the P r in c ip le s  of ]
M eth o d o lo g ic a l Ind iv id u a lis m  [
W atk in s  has c la im e d  th at th e re  a re  two cases  
w h e re  a m e th o d o lo g ic a l-  in d iv id u a l is t  ex p la na tio n
il
rdoes not w o rk . "The f i r s t  is  a p ro b a b il ity  s itu a tio n  
w here a c c id e n ta l and u n p re d ic ta b le  i r r e g u la r i t i e s  
in  human b eh a v io u r have a f a i r l y  re g u la r  and p re d ic ta b le  
o v e ra l l  r e s u lt .  Suppose I  su c c e s s iv e ly  p laee 1 ,0 0 0  
in d iv id u a ls  fa c in g  n o rrh  in  the c e n tre  o f a s y m m e tr ic a l 
room  w ith  two e x its  , c-.e ea s t, the o the r w e st. I f  
about 500 le a v e  by one e x it  and about 500 by the o th e r,
I  would not t r y  to e x p la in  th is  in  te rm s  of t in y  
u n d etec ta b le  w e s t- in c lin in g  and e a s t - in c l in in g  
d iffe re n c e s  in  the in d iv id u a ls , fo r  the same reason  
th at Popper w ould not t r y  to  e x p la in  the fao t th at 
about 500 b a l ls  w i l l  to pp le  to  the w e st and about 
500 to the e s s t , i f  1,000 b a lls  a re  dropped fro m  
im m e d ia te ly  above a n o rth -s o u th  b la d e , in te rm s  of 
t in y  undetec tab le  w e s t- in c lin in g  and e a s t - in c l in in g  
d iffe re n c e s  in  the b a l ls .  F o r in  both cases such an 
'e x p la n a ^ io n 1 w ould m e re ly  r a is e  the fu r th e r  p rob lem :  
why should th ese  w e s t - in c lin in g  and e a s t - in c l in in g  
d iffe re n c e s  be d is tr ib u t e d ,  a p p ro x im a te ly  e q u a lly  
among the in d iv id u a ls  and among the b a l ls ? "
A lthough  i t  is  not fe a s ib le  to  ru le  out the  
p o s s ib i l i t y  of the e x is te n c e  of some phenomena  
w here "a c c id e n ta l and u n p re d ic ta b le  i r r e g u la r i t i e s  
in  human b eh a v io u r have a f a i r l y  re g u la r  and 
p re d ic ta b le  o v e ra l l  r e s u l t , "  i t  is  n ec e s s a ry  to  take  
ce re  in  dec id in g  w hich  phenom ena f a l l  in to  th is  c a te g o ry . 
C lo s e r  s c ru tin y  shows , f o r  e x a m p le , th a t the exam ple  
g iv e  n by W atk in s  can indeed be ex p la in e d  in  
in d iv id u a lis t  t e r m s .  The p r e d ic t a b i l i ty  o f the 
o v e ra l l  b e h a v io u r of the in d iv id u a ls  concerned
as co n tras ted  w ith  the u n p re d ic ta b ility  of the b eh a v io u r  
of e ach in d iv id u a l (we cannot p re d ic t  in  advance w hetner  
an In d iv id u a l w il l  go out o f the ea s t o r w e st e x i t )  should  
not le ad  to the co n c lu s io n  thut the phenomenon cannot 
be ex p la in e d  in  in d iv id u a lis t ic  te rm s . By exam in ing  
the phenomenon in  te rm s  of the p lans o f the in d iv id u a ls  
an ac cep tab le  ex p la n a tio n  Is  a c h ie ve d . I f  the a im  ot 
each of the in d iv id u a ls  in  the h a l l  is  to  ge t home as 
q u ic k ly  as p o s s ib le , thm, i f  th e re  are  a v is ib ly  g re a te r  
num ber o f people w a it in g  at one e x it  and the in d iv id u a l 
b e l ie v e s  that the ra te  o f outflow  through both e x its  
to  be e q u a l, then he w i l l  move to the le s s  crow ded  
e x it .  In  th is  case we have a r e a l- w o r ld  exam ple of 
a tendency to w ard s  e q u il ib r iu m  w hich  can be ad equate ly  
ex p la in e d  in in d iv id u a l is t ic  te rm s .
"T h e  second kind  of s o c ia l phenomenon to which  
m e th o d o lo g ica l in d iv id u a lis m  is  in a p p lic a b le  is  w here  
some k in d  of p h y s ic a l connection  betw een p e o p le ’ s 
nerv o u s system s s h o r t - c ir c u it s  t h e ir  in te ll ig e n t  
c o n tro l and causes a u to m atic  . . . b o d ily  re sp o n se s . " ^  
As ex a m p le s , W atk in s  ta k e s  the te m p o ra ry  subm ergence  
of in d iv id u a lity  "beneath  a c o l le c tiv e  p h y s ic a l r ao port  
at j iv e -s e s s io n s  and r e v iv a l is t  m e etings and among 
p an ic k in g  c ro w d s ."  ^  H e re  to o , i t  is  suggested , 
ca re  m ust-be tak en  in  dec id in g  w h e th e r In te ll ig e n t  
c o n tro l has been s h o r t  c irc u ite d  and " a u to m a tic ” 
responses o c c u rre d . Some w o rk has been done in  
the f ie ld  o f s o c ia l psychology fo r  e x a m p le , in  e x p la in in g  
c e r ta in  types of mob b eh a v io u r in  te rm s  of the 





a n c n ym ity  o f the in d iv id u a l in  a crow d . Thus in  
mdiiy cases i t  m ig h t prove u n n ec es sa ry  to re s o r t  
to  ex p la na tio n s  such as those g iven  by W a t l in f .  
N e v e r th e le s s , fo r  p re s e n t purposes i t  ! s im p o rta n t  
to  dec ide how s ig n ific a n t  these ex cep tions a rc .
I f  they a re  not too s ig n ific a n t  (and th is  has been 
suggested h e re )  then  an in d iv id u a lis t  ex p lanation  
of s o c ia l phenom ena is  not im p a ire d .
M e th o d o lo g ic a l in d iv id u a lis m  has a lso  been 
c r i t i c iz e d  on the grounds th a t in d iv id u a ls  often  
t h ink in  h o lis t  te rm s ; i t  is  th e re fo re  n e c e s s a ry , 
i t  is  h e ld , fo r  the o b s e rv e r to  fo rm u la te  h is  
ex p la n a tio n  in  h o lis t  te rm s . I t  m ust be accepted  
th a t in d iv id u a ls  o ften  th in k  in  h o lis t  te rm s  and it  
is  th e re fo re  conven ien t to in c o rp o ra te  h o lis t  
te rm in o lo g y  in to  some d is cu ss io n s  re g a rd in g  
in d iv id u a ls . In s titu t io n s  f u l f i l  the fu nc tio n  of 
o rie n tin g  the ac tions of in d iv id u a ls , and the 
in d iv id u a l cannot but th in k  o f these in s titu t io n s  
as s o c ia l w h o le s . N e v e rth e le s s  th is  does not a l te r  
th e  p o s it io n  th a t s o c ia l phenom ena m ust be e x p la in ed  
by being deduced fro m  ho p lans o f in d iv id u a ls ,  
in c lu d in g  the h o lis t ic  concepts th at fo rm  a v a r t  
of these p la n s . Thus fo r  e x a m p le , p r ic e s  and 
q u a n t it ie s 'a re  to be ex p la in e d  by the p re fe re n c e s  
(p lan s ) o f in d iv id u a ls  in  sp ite  o f the fac t th a t such 
h o lis t ic  concepts as "bank ing  in s titu t io n "  m ight have 
fo rm ed  a p a r t  o f some of these p la n s . S im ila r ly ,  in  
econom ic th e o ry  i t  m ight be u se fu l to e x p la in  the
L J
re x is to n c e  of w holes ( in f la t io n )  in  te rm s  of o ther  
w holes ( fu l l  em plo ym e n t) w ith o u t e x p lic it  le le re n o e  
to in d iv id u a ls . T h is  Joes ao i a l te r  the fa c t th a t  
these w holes a re  d e fin a b le  and e x p la in a b le  w ith  
re fe re n c e  to  ac tin g  in d iv id u a ls .
M e th o d o lo g ic a l in d iv id u a lis m  has a lso  been 
c r i t ic iz e d  on the grounds th a t i t  does not take  
c u ltu ra l co n d itio n in g  in to  account. Th u s , fo r  
e x a m p le , G e lla e r  has argued th a t "the re a l o d d ity  
of the re d u c tio n is t  case is  th a t i t  seem s to p rec lu d e  
a p r io r i  the p o s s ib il i ty  of human dispositions being  
the dependent v a r ia b le  in an H is to r ic a l ex p la na tio n  -  
when in fa c t they often  o r alw ays a re  . . . "  ^
I t  is  im p o rta n t to em phasize  th a t the s o c ia l 
fa c to rs  w hich  in flu e n c e  the ac tions o f the in d iv id u ::.  
a re  by no means o ve rlo o ke d  in  the d e fin it io n  of 
m e th o d o lo g ica l in d iv id u a lis m  g iven  above. As 
A lfre d  Schutz has put i t ,  at any p o in t in  t im e  the 
a c to r  fin d s  h im s e lf  in  a b io g ra p h ic a l ly  d e term in ed  
s itu a tio n . I t  is  acknow ledged th a t much of the  
in d iv id u a l's  know ledge has been s o c ia lly  and 
h is to r ic a l ly  d e r iv e d  as te s t i f ie d ,  fo r  ex a m p le , by 
the language th a t he speaks and the fo rm a l and 
in fo rm a l ed ucation  th a t he has re c e iv e d . H o w ev er, 
although the in flu en c e  of c u ltu ra l co n d itio n in g  is  
to oo g n ls ed  i t  is  n o t p o s s ib le  to  go as f a r  as D u rkh e im  
who in s is ts  on the ex is te n c e  of " s o c ia l fa c ts "  w hich  
e x e r t  a c o e rc iv e  in flu e n c e  on in d iv id u a l human a c t i o n . ^  
I t  is  co nc luded , th e re fo re , th a t man ac ts  in  an
r r
en v iro n m e n t w h ic h  in f lu e n c e s , but does not 
d e te r m in e , h is  a c tio n s . The p r in c ip le  o f m ethodo­
lo g ic a l in d iv id u a lis m  does not re q u ire  an answer 
as to why an in d iv id u a l acted  as he d id , at is ,  
i t  does n o t re q u ire  an e x p la na tio n  o f the m otives  
of human ac tio n ; i t  exam ines the p lans that guided  
the in d iv id u a l's  ac tio n s and the subsequent con­
sequences of these ac tions.
A f in a l c r i t ic is m  of m e th o d o lo g ica l in d iv id u a lis i  
w i l l  be b r ie f l y  ex am in ed . I t  has been held  th at since  
in d iv id u a l p lans o ften  m is c a r r y , an e x p la na tio n  of 
s o c ia l phenom ena based on the p la ns  o f In d iv id u a ls  
is  in a de q u ate . I t  is  not d i f f ic u l t  to d e tec t the 
inadequacy of th is  argu m e n t. The p r in c ip le  of 
m e th o d o lo g ica l in d iv id u a lis m  does not in  any way 
depend upon the subsequent success of in d iv id u a l  
p la n s . In  fa c t ,  i t  has been s tre s s e d  th at s o c ia l 
phenom ena m ust be seen as the consequences, 
both in tended  and u n in te nded , o f human action."
Thus in the d iscuss ion  of the o r ig in s  o f money it  
was shown how th is  In s titu t io n  developed as a re s u lt  
0 / fiacn ‘n d fv id u a l try in g  to do as w e ll in  the m a rk e t 
as he ca n , w h ile  the end re s u lt ,  the in s titu t io n  of 
m oney as a means of p a y m e n t, w a j not p lanned by 
any of the in d iv id u a ls .
H av ing  c o n s id ere d  s e v e ra l c r i t ic is m s  of the 
p r in c ip le  o f m e th o d o lo g ica l in d iv id u a lis m , and 
h aving seen th a t the la t t e r  has em erg e d  unscathed, 





fa v o u r of i t s  a l te r n a t iv e , m e ta p hy s ica l h o lis m .
S. M e th o d o lo g ic a l In d iv id u a lis m  and 
S o c ia l E x p la n a tion _
i t  has been uoneluded above th a t s o c ia l phenomena 
a r e  to  be e x p la in ed  by a p ro ce ss  of deduction fro m  
th e  p lans o f in d iv id u a ls  . The e x p la na tio n  is  expressed  
in  the fo rm  of a ded u c tiv e  m odel: p lans a re  is o la te d
and e x p re s s e d  in  the fo rm  of a r e a l i s t ic  m odel which  
shows how in  the d e s c rib e d  s itu a tio n  the p lans of 
in d iv id u i Is  g e n e ra te  some s o c ia l s itu a tio n .
Since the c o n s tru c tio n  of such m odels , as w e ll  
as o the r p o in ts  o f re la te d  s ig n ific a n c e  , are  d is c u s s e d  
in  d e ta il in  C h ap ter 10 , i t  is  not in tended  to e la b o ra te  
on th is  in  d e ta i l  h e ro . N e v e r th e le s s , th e re  are  
some th in gs  w hich should not go unsaid h e re . F irs t ,  
the p lans o f in d iv id u a ls  are  not in  a l l  cases o b s e rv a b le , 
a lth o u g h  they are  o b s e rv a b le  in some o a s e s , fo r  
exam ple  in  the case of b lu e -p r in ts  . H o w e v e r, i t  does 
not m a tte r  w h e th e r a plan  Is  o b se rva b le  o r not s in c e  
fro m  the ac tio n s and c re a tio n s  o f in d iv id u a ls
we are  ab le to un d ers ta n d  the p u rp o se s  th a t gu ided  
th ese  a c tio n s . We can u n d ers tand  the m eaning th at 
people attac h  to  t h e ir  ac tions s ince we ours e lve s  a re  . 
ac tin g  human b e ing s . Second ly , the co n c lu s ion s  th a t  
a re  a r r iv e d  at v ia  the deductive  p ro ce ss can be te s te d  
ag a in s t the f a c ts .  T h i r d ly , a lthough th is  m ethod can 




i t  oannot be used fo r  the p u rp o se  of p re d ic t in g  what 
w i l l  occur in  the fu tu re . T h is  po in t is  expanded  
upon in  C h ap ter 10 . H o w e v e r, i t  can be sa id  th at 
l£  p la ns  a re  in c o n s is te n t the p lane of some tr i l l  
have to  be re v is e d . T h is  has been c a lle d  "n eg a tive  
p re d ic t io n " . N oth ing  though can be sa id  about the  
s p e c ific  n a tu re  o f th e  re v is e d  p la n , s in c e , as has 
been shown, i t  is  not p o ss ib le  to d e te rm in e  a p r io r i  
the p lan  th a t the in d iv id u a l w i l l  choose in  the lig h t  
o f h is  new e x p e rie n c e  and know ledge.
In  the nex t C h ap ter some im p lic a tio n s  of 
s u b je c tiv is m  fo r  the concept of e q u il ib r iu m  in  





C IIA P.TE S._9
t
SOME FU R TH E B  CONSEQ UENCES OP SU B iEC TIVrStci i 
E Q O IL IB R IU M  IN  EC O N O M IC  T H E ORY____________
1 . Sub je c tiv is m  aud E q u i l i b r i um
In th is  se ctio n  the notion  of e q u il ib r iu m  w i l l  
be c r i t i . — i i y  an a lysed  in  the lig h t  o f o ur p rev io u s  
d iscuss;) n on s u b je c tiv is m .
W hat is  m eant by e q u il ib r iu m ?  The te rm  was 
f i r s t  in tro d uc ed  in to  ec onom ics fro m  the f ie ld  of 
' m e ch an ics . L ik e  a l l  a n a lo g ie s  th is  one is  a lso  
im p e r fe c t  and m any w r i te r s  have p o in ted  to  the 
l im ita t io n s  of the co m p a ris o n . ^  P o r the purposes  
of th is  t h e s is , th e r e fo r e ,  e q u il ib r iu m  w i l l  be looked at  
in  te rm s  of th e  way i t  is  em ployed in  econom ic th e o ry .
We m ay begin w ith  the d e f in it io n  of e q u il ib r iu m  
given  by M ac h lu p . ^  E q u il ib r iu m  is  d e fin e d  as a 
" c o n s te lla tio n  of s e le c te d  in te r r e la te d  v a r ia b le s  
so ad jus ted  to one an o th e r th a t no in h e re n t tendency  
to  change p re v a i ls  in the m odel w h ich  they c o n s titu te . " 
I t  is  p a r t ic u la r ly  im p o rta n t to  note th a t the in t e r -  
r e la t e d  v a r ia b le s  a re  s e le c te d . I f  a w id e r ra ng e  of 
v a r ia b le s .w e re  to  be s e le c te d  then the e q u il ib r iu m  
sta te  re le v a n t  to  the 'b m a i le r ” m odel w ould no lo n g er  
ap p ly . E q u il ib r iu m  is  thus a r e la t iv e  concept 
depending upon the p a r t ic u la r  v a r ia b le s  th a t the 
a n a ly s t has chosen to  in c lu d e .
rSchn m peter has d e fin e d  e q u il ib r iu m  in  the 
fo llo w in g  w ay: " i f  the re la t io n s  w hich a re  d e riv e d  
fro m  our su rv ey  o f the 'm e an in g ' o f a phenomenon 
a re  &uch as to  d e te rm in e  a set o f va lues oi '•he 
v a r ia b le s  th at w i l l  d is p la y  no tendency to  v a ry  
u nder the so le in flu e n c e  of the fa c ts  in c lu d ed  in  
th e s e  re la t io n s  p e r  s e , we s p eak o f e q u il ib r iu m :  
we s a y  th a t  th e s e  re la t io n s  d e fin e  .e q u ilib riu m  
c o n d itio n s  or an e q u il ib r iu m  p o s it io n  of the system  
and th a t t h ere  e x is ts  a set c f  v a lu e s  of the 
v a r ia b le s  th a t s a t is  f ie s  e q u il ib r iu m  c o n d i t io n s . " ^  
T h e re  are  two im p o rta n t and in te r re la te d  
q u e s tio n s  th at are  r a is e d  in  ex am in in g  e q u il ib r iu m  
in  a p a r t ic u la r  ca se . F i r s t ,  th e re  is  the q u es tion  
of the e x is tence o i e q u i l ib r iu m . G iven the s tru c tu re  
of the m odel chosen by the a n a ly s t ,  a re  th e re  a set 
of e c o n o m ic a lly  m e an in g fu l v a lu e s  of the re le v a n t  
v a r ia b le s  th a t w i l l  p e rm it  the n e c e s s a ry  co n d itio n s  
as p o in te d  out in  the above d e f in it io n s  to  be re a liz e d ?  
S e cond ly , th e re  is  the q u e s tio n  o f the s t a b i l i ty  of 
the e q u il ib r iu m . I f  the s y s te m  f o r  any re a s o n  becom es  
one of d is e q u il ib r iu m , w i l l  th e re  be a tendency to  
re tu rn  to th e  e q u il ib r iu m  p o s it io n ?  The two "e s tio n s  
are  con n e cted , b ecause i f  the s y s te m  is  in c • o riu m  
in  the f i r s t  p la c e , i t  is  n e c e s s a ry  to  a s k  how th is  
s ta te  o f a f f a ir s  came to  be o r ,  to  put i t  ano ther w ay, 
xvhat are  the im p lie d  re q u ire m e n ts  th a t a re  n e c e s s a ry  
fo r  the econom ic phenomenon to  be in  e q u il ib r iu m ?
T h i s la t t e r  q u es tion  w i l l  now be ex am in ed .
rI t  is  ac c e s s a ry  to d is tin g u is h  betw een the 
e q u il ib r iu m  of the ac tin g  in d iv id u a l and what w i l l  
bo o a ile d  an ia te r - in d iv id u a l  e q u il ib r iu m . The 
concept o f the e q u il ib r iu m  of the in d iv id u a l in c lu d es  
e q u il ib r iu m  w iie re  th< in d iv id u a ls  act in  eo n c crt or  
w h e re  th e y  o p e ra te  in  a group d ire c te d  by one of 
the In d iv id u a ls . A ty p ic a l exam ple is  a household  
o r the b o ard  of d ire c to rs  o f a f i r m .  In  th is  ease, i t  
can be sa id  th a t a tendency to w ard s e q u il ib r iu m  
e x is ts  in  th a t the " in d iv id u a l"  w i l l  a ttem p t to b rin g  
h is  v a r io u s  a c tio n s  In to  co n s iste nc y w ith  one an o th er. 
Once th is  has been ac h ie v e d , th e re  w i l l  be na fu r th e r  
tendency to  change.
But oven at th is  s im p le  le v e l th e re  bre probJoms  
th a t m ust be fa c e d . I t  has a lre a d y  been shown th a t  
human ac tio n  Is  g e a re d  to the fu tu re  and tak es  p lace  
in  t im e . The ac tio n s  of the " in d iv id u a l"  W ill be 
based on the stock of knowledge th a t he possesses  
at th a t p a r t ic u la r  p o in t of t im e . B ut knowledge 
changes o ve r t im e  as the " in d iv id u a l"  gains new 
e x p e r ie n c e s . T h e re fo re  m y a c tio n s  u n d ertak en  
y e s te rd a y  m ay n o t be co n s is te n t w ith  m y ac tio n s  
u n d ertak en  today i f  my know ledge has changed in  
s ig n ific a n t  re s p e c ts  In the in t e r im .  Thus even 
w ith  the " in d iv id u a l"  m ind th e re  m ay not be 
e q u il ib r iu m  o v e r a p a rte d  of t im e . We can sa y , 
h o w e v e r , th a t the a c tio n s  w hich  have re s u lte d  fro m  
the same p lan  m ust be co n s is te n t w ith  one an o th e r, 
th a t is ,  m ust stand in  e q u il ib r iu m  re la t io n s h ip  to
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rone an o th er. The logSo o f the human m ind w i l l  
not p e rm it  the d if fe re n t  e lem e n ts  of the plan  to 
be in c o n s is te n t since success depends on con­
s is te n c y .
In  th is  re g a rd  what P ro fe s s o r  Lachm aon has 
s a id  in  connection  w ith  the approach of the h is to r ia n  
is  re le v a n t:  "H e [ t h e  h is to r ia n }  m ust aak how
f a r  the v a r ie ty  of purposes pursued  by the in d iv id u a l  
whose ac tio n s  he stu d ie s (as  by any o the r in d iv id u a l)
' f i t te d  to g e th e r '.  He has to  a s c e r ta in  'T h e  P la n ',  
the co h e ren t design behind U e  o b s e rv a b le  ac tion  
in  w hich  the v a r io u s  purposes as w e ll as the means 
em ployed a re  bound to g e th e r . He thus has to  conduct 
coherence te s ts  on two le v e ls . In  each ease he has 
to  a s c e rta in :
(1 ) w h e th e r the purposes he a s c r ib e s  to  the In d iv id u a l ac tin g  
a re  in  fa c t co n s is te n t w ith  one ano ther and f i t
in to  the fra m e w o rk  o f a g e n e ra l p la n , the 
ex ecu tion  of w hich  w ould  account fo r  tho 
known f a c ts ,
(2 ) w h e th e r the design  and ex ecu tion  of such a plan  
a re  in  fa c t co n s is te n t w ith  w h a te v e r b Ibo is 
known about the in te n t io n s , c ircum ai.an<;es; e tc . 
of the in d iv id u a l whose ac tio n  is  the su b je ct 
u n der study.
T h is  ta s k  of the h is to r ia n  is  e x tre m e ly  d i f f ic u lt  
b ec a u s e , as has been seen , the s p e c .fic  p lans o f the 
in d iv id u a l w i l l  change o ve r t im e  as the in d iv id u a l’ s 
knowledge changes . N e v e r th e le s s , the h is to r ia n
r; p roceeds on the (v a lid )  assum ption  th a t at each po in t
j  in  t im e  the in d iv id u a l is  In  e q u il ib r iu m , th a t i s . h is
1 ac tio n s  stand in  a co n s is te n t re la t io n s h ip  to one
j j  an o th er since they a re  gu ided by the same p la n .
I t  ie  n ec e s s a ry  to n o te , in  p as s ing , th a t  
1 co n s is te nc y  m ust be d efined  s u b je c t iv e ly , th a t is ,
| i t  must be d efined  w ith  re fe re n c e  to  the p o in t of
j v iew  of the a c to r  h im s e lf . A c tio n s  w h ic h , to  the
! o m n is c ie n t o b s e rv e r , a re  seen to  be " o b je c t iv e ly "
] in c o n s is te n t m ay have seem ed at th a t t im e  to  be
p e r fe c t ly  co n s is te n t to the a c to r . I t  is  concluded  
th e n , th a t fro m  th is  su b je c tiv e  p o in t o f view  the 
e le m e n ts  ot the in d iv id u a l's  p lans and tho ac tions  
th a t fo llo w  fro m  th e m , m ust be c o n s is te n t. In  th is
■ sense , th e r e fo r e , e q u il ib r iu m  of the in d iv id u a l’ s -
I a c tio n s  m akes sense and , indeed, is  flo e s s e n tia l
' p a r t  o f the lo g ic  o f human a c tio n .
W h a t, g iven  the d e fin it io n s  of e q u il ib r iu m  noted  
ab ove, can be sa id  about e q u il ib r iu m  in v o lv in g  s e v e ra l 
in d iv id u a ls  ac tin g  in d ep e n d en tly  o f one an o th er?
T h is  question  w i l l  be pursued  in  tw o d ire c tio n s :  
an the one hand , what a re  the re q u ire m e n ts  fo r  
the e x is te n c e  o f ao in t e r - in d iv id u a l  e q u il ib r iu m  
so th a t the n e c e s s a ry  c o n d itio n s  a re  f u l f i l le d ?  
S e cond ly , w hat re as on  do we have fo r  assum ing  
' th a t th e re  w i l l  e x is t  a t endency tow ards e q u il ib r iu m ?
j  The above d e fin it io n s  g iv en  by Schum peter and
i M achlup  show th a t in  e q u il ib r iu m  t h er e  must  be no
tendency fo r  the re le v a n t  v a r ia b le s  in c lu d ed  in  the
I
L
rm odel to change, ^  The v a r ia b le s  which the 
econom ist d ea ls  w ith  ( p r ic e , q u a n tity , output 
and so on) a re  the consequences of human ac tio n . ^
I f  th e re  is  to be no tendency fo r  the re le v a n t  
v a r ia b le s  to  change u nder the g iven  co n d itio n s , 
then the p la ns  of the d if fe re n t  in d iv id u a ls  must 
be co n s is te n t w ith  one an o th er and must be con­
s is te n t w ith  the o th e r " e x te rn a l c o n d it io n s " . I f  
the p lans o f in d iv id u a ls  a re  not c o n s is te n t, i f  they  
do not 'd o v e ta il '  th e n , o ve r t im e ,  th e  p lans of some 
w i l l  be f ru s tra te d  and w i l l  thus have to be re v is e d .  
The re v is io n  o f p la ns  and hence of ac tions w i l l  moan 
th a t th e re  w i l l  be a tendency to change in  the re le v a n t  
v a r ia b le s  o f the m odel. E q u il ib r iu m  w i l l  not be 
m a in ta in e d  o ve r t im e .
In o rd e r to  i l l u s t r a t e ,  w ith  a p ra c t ic a l ex a m p le , 
the econom ic s ig n ific a n c e  of the in c o n s is te n c y  of 
p la n s , the savings and in v e s tm e n t p ro b lem  w i l l  be 
m e ntio n e d. I f  the am ount th a t s a v e rs  in ten d  to save 
exceeds the am ount th a t in v es to rs  in tend  to  in v e s t,  
th a t i s ,  i f  t h e ir  p lans a re  in c o n s is te n t, then th e ir  
plans w i l l  be f ru s t ra te d  in  the f a m i l ia r  w ay. As 
the p la ns  of in d iv id u a ls  a re  f ru s t ra te d  so th ey  w i l l  
be re v is e d . Tbo question  re g a rd in g  what can be 
sa id  about th is  re v is io n  w i l l  be exam ined la te r .
In  a d d it io n  to  the re q u ire m e n t  th a t the p lans  
o f in d iv id u a ls  m ust be c o n s is te n t fo r  e q u il ib r iu m  
to e x is t  i t  is  a lso  n e c e s s a ry  th a t the p lans m ust be 
c o n s is te n t w ith  the o the r e x te rn a l c o n d it io n s . For
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ri f  p lans a re  based on fa ls e  suppositions re ga rd in g  
these e x te rn a l co n d itio n s then w ith  the passage of 
t im e  the p la n n e rs  w i l l  be proved  wrong and w i l l  
have to change th e ir  p la n s . A gain th e re  w i l l  be 
a change in  the re le v a n t  v a r ia b le s .
I t  is  concluded th e r e fo r e , th a t the re q u ire m e n t  
fo r  the e x is tence o f in te r - in d iv id u a l e q u i l ib r i u m  a re  
th a t the p lans of the in d iv id u a ls  m ust be co n s iste nt 
w ith  o.ie an o th er and w ith  the o th e r e x te rn a l oonditio i 
H av in g  ex am in ed  the re q u ire m e n ts  fo r  the 
ex i tenc£_ o f e q u il ib r iu m  i t  is  n e c es sa ry  to look at 
the p ro b lem s in h e re n t in  the a tta in m e n t o f e q u i l ib r ia  
I f  th e re  is  to be a tendency to w ard s  e q u il ib r iu m  
o ve r t im e  (the tendency can on ly  m a n ife s t i t s e l f  
o ve r t im e ) then the plan® of in d iv id u a ls  m ust become 
g ra d u a lly  m ore c o n s is te n t w ith  one ano ther and w ith  
the o the r e x te rn a l c irc u m s ta n c e s . How l ik e ly  is  it  
th a t th is  w i l l  in  fa c t occur in  any s itu a tio n ?
A t any po in t in  t im e  i t  is  h ig h ly  u n lik e ly  th at  
the p lans of in d iv id u a ls  w i l l  be c o n s is te n t. I t  is  
n e c es sa ry  to show th a t the m ost u n re a lis t ic  aesum pti 
a re  re q u ire d  to  argue th a t o ve r t im e  p lans w i l l  beeo 
g ra d u a lly  m ore c o n s is te n t.
P la n s  m ay be in c o n s is te n t at any po in t in  tim e  
s in c e , as has been shown, the p la ns  o f the in d iv id u a l  
w i l l  be based ou the Ir.-iow.ledge th a t they have at th e l  
d is ' s a l. I t  has a ls o  been argued th a t d if fe re n t  
people w i l l  a c q u ire  a t t f^ re n t  " b its "  o f knowledge  
fro m  the same s itu a tio n  and i t  has been suggested
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rth a t th is  ir. due to the d if fe re n t  te rm s  01 re le v a n c e  
of d if fe re n t  In d iv id u a ls . M o re o v e r , i f  an event 
occurs w hich  ia  re le v a n t ,  le t  ue assum e, to a l l  the 
ac to rs  the knowledge w i l l  on ly g ra d u a lly  f i l t e r  
through to  the in d iv id u a ls . E x a c tly  how the know­
ledge w i l l  be d is se m in ated  w i l l  depend on the  
e x is tin g  channels of in fo rm a tio n  flow  and upon the  
a b i l i t ie s  o f d if fe re n t  in d iv id u a ls  to a c q u ire  th is  
know ledge. T h is  a b i l i t y  is  not e q u a lly  d is tr ib u te d  
nmonget men and the v e ry  fa c t th a t i t  tak es  t im e  fo r  
if lfo v m a tlo n  to  be uoeveyod w i l l  mean th a t d if fe re n t  
in d iv id u a ls , at each p o in t in  t im e , may w e ll ac t in  
w ays th a t a re  incsonsiBtent. E q u il ib r iu m  v i l l i  th e re fo re  
not e x is t  o ve r t im e .
N e v e r th e le s s , i t  m ay be a rg u e d , g iv en  s u f f ic ie n t  
t im e ,  the knowledge w i l l  becom e common to a l l  men 
and thus t h e ir  ac tions w i l l  becom e co n s is te n t w ith  
one ano ther and w ith  the e x te rn a l c irc u m s ta n c e s .
Th is  ie  the p re c is e  re s u lt  th a t is  a r r iv e d  at by 
the assum ption  of a s ta tio n a ry  s ta te . In  a w o rld  
w here c o n d itio n s  n e v e r change men w i l l  g ra d u a lly  come 
to  know m ore about th e ir  en v iro n m e n t and th is  w i l l  
le a d  to t h e ir  p lane becom ing m ore c o n s is te n t. In  an 
unchanging w o rld  the d iv e rg e n c e  o f p lans w i l l  mean 
th a t some o r a l l  o f the in d iv id u a ls  w i l l  u lt im a te ly  
be proved  in c o r re c t  and , u n lik e  In  co n d itio n s of 
change, men w i l l  le a rn  fro m  th e ir  m is takes confident 
th a t  th is  new know ledge w i l l  be p e r fe c t ly  re le v a n t  
in  the fu tu re .
rA w o rld  o f change on the o th e r hand, is  an 
u n c e rta in  w o rld . In  such a w o rld  th e  ex p ec ta tio n s  
o f d if fe re n t  people w i l l  d i f fe r  and hence m ay be 
in c o n s is te n t. N o r is  i t  p o ss ib le  f o r  the in d iv id u a l 
to  " le a rn  fro m  e x p e rie n c e ” in  the same way th at 
he does in  a changeless w o r ld . K nowledge gained  
in  the p as t m igh t not be re le v a n t in  the w o rld  of 
to m o rro w  as the fa c ts  o f obsolescence and 
m a lin v e s tm e n t, to g ive  ju s t two ex a m p le s , show.
I t  is  not p o ss ib le  to  c la im  th a t ex p ec ta tio n s  w i l l  
converge as people come to  le a rn  m ore about the 
changed s itu a tio n  since i t  has been seen th a t the 
p ro ce ss of "co in ing  to  le a rn  m ore" takes t im e . In  
the m e anw h ile  the s itu a tio n  m ight have changed once 
m o re . In  such a w o r ld , i t  m ust be conc luded , the  
g ra d u a l convergence of e x p e c ta tio n s  w hich  is  necessaty  
f o r  the ex is te n c e  of a tendency to w ard s e q u il ib r iu m  
m ig h t n o t o cc u r.
The above argum ent hinges la r g e ly  on the 
fo llo w in g  assum ption : th a t change p roceeds at a
r a te  w hich  is  ra p id  re la t iv e  to  the speed at which  
in d iv id u a ls  in  the econom y ad jus t to the change.
I f  th is  w e re  not so , i f  the " re  ic t io n  v e lo c it ie s "  w e re  
fa s t enough to  en ab le  the in d iv id u a ls  to ad ju s t to  the 
change, then  p la ns  w o u ld , a t the end of the ad jus tm en t  
p ro c e s s , be co n s is te n t and e q u il ib r iu m  w ould  e x is t .
B ut even  h e re  we run  in to  g re a t d i f f i c u l t ie s .  I f  we 
do not assume p e r fe c t  fo re s ig h t  w ith  the r e s u lt  th a t  
supply does not ad jus t in s ta n ta n e o u s ly  to  dem and,
rthen tra n s a c tio n s  w i l l  take p la ce  at d is e q u ilib r iu m  
p r ic e s  and th is  w i l l  have the e f fe c t  o f changing  
the v e ry  e q u il ib r iu m  to w ard s which th e re  is  a 
supposed ten d en c y . As P ro fe s s o r  Lachtnann has 
put i t :  " . . .  w ith o u t such [ p e r f e c t )  fo re s ig h t
th e  ad jus tm en t of supply to changes in  demand w i l l  
c e r ta in ly  be d e la y e d , and d u rin g  the de lay  th e re  w i l l  
be d is e q u ilib r iu m  in  the m a rk e ts  a ffe c te d . I f  any 
t ra n s a c tio n s  take p la ce  d u rin g  the p e r io d  of d is ­
e q u il ib r iu m  (an d , in  a continuous m a rk e t, how could  
th is  f a i l  to happen?) the c o n d itio n s  o f our moving  
e q u il ib r iu m  w i l l  be changed fo r  the v e ry  same reasons  
fo r  w hich  Edgew orth  and W a lra s  had to  in tro d uc e  
'r e -c o n t r a c t '  to  sa feg u ard  the d e te rm in a te  c h a ra c te r  
of th e ir  f in a l  e q u il ib r iu m  p o s it io n .” ^
In  ex am in in g  the p ro ce ss  to w ard s e q u il ib r iu m  
i t  is  th e re fo re  n ec e s s a ry  to exam ine not o n ly  the 
speed of change of the "d a ta "  and the speed of 
re a c tio n  on the p a r t  o f in d iv id u a ls  to  th is  change, 
but account must a lso  be taken  of the tra n s a c tio n s  
th a t take p la c e  at d is e q u ilib r iu m  p r ic e s . Thus c a p ita l 
w hich  is  ac cu m u lated  at d is e q u ilib r iu m  p ric e s  w i l l  p re s e n t 
p ro b lem s as re g a rd s  the a tta in m e n t o f the new  
e q u il ib r iu m . In  e q u il ib r iu m  the ow ners of c a p ita l 
m ust be p re p a re d  to  exchange each m achine fo r  an 
id e n t ic a l r e p l ic a ,  o th e rw is e  the ow ner is  not in  
e q u il ib r iu m . C a p ita l w hich is  d u ra b le  and w hich  
is  ac cu m u lated  in  c o n d itio n s  of d is e q u ilib r iu m  w il l  
th e re fo re  p re s e n t im p o rta n t o b stac le s  to the a tta in m e n t 
of e q u il ib r iu m .
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rE q u il ib r iu m . S ta tic s  and D ynam ics
A lthough  d if fe r e n t  m eanings have been g iven  
to  the w ord  s ta tic s  at the hands of d if fe re n t  w r i te r s  
and at d if fe re n t  t im e s , ^  i t  is  ne’. e r th e le s s  p oss ib le  
to  d is t i l  the g e n e ra l m eaning o f the w o rd . A  s ta tic  
s itu a tio n  is  one c h a ra c te r iz e d  by the absence of 
change, n  such a s itu a tio n  the re le v a n t v a r ia b le s  
( ta s te s , p o p u la t io n , c a p ita l s to c k , tec hn o lo g y ) re m a in  
constant o v e r t im e , T'te im p o rtan c e  of the passage 
of t im e  in  such a w o rld  is  a c c o rd in g ly  rem oved and 
a l l  the re le v a n t  v a r ia b le s  can be re g a rd e d  as belonging  
to the same p o in t o f t im e . I t  re m a in s  to  exam ine the 
re le v a n c e  of the assum ptions of s ta tic  th e o ry  fo r  the 
concept of e q u il ib r iu m .
B e fo re  do ing so i t  is  h e lp fu l to  d is tin g u is h , as 
H ic k s  d o e s , ^  betw een  what we s h a ll r e fe r  to as 
s ta tic  th e o ry  and the s ta t ic  m ethod re s p e c t iv e ly  .
W h ile  s ta t ic  th e o ry  r e fe r s  to  th e  th e o ry  o f the 
s ta tio n a ry  s ta te , s ta t ic  m ethod is  one o f the ways 
of an a ly s in g  dynam ic co n d itio n s .
"T h e  c r u c ia l assum ption  of s ta ‘ ic  th eo ry  
(w ith ou t w hich i t  cou ld  not have developed  as i t  
has been d ev elop e d ) is  th a t a s ta tic  econom y 
( s t a t ic ,  because ta s te s  and re s o u rc e s  a re  unchanging) 
can be t re a te d  as i f  i t  w e re  in  e q u il ib r iu m  
As we have shown ab ove, e q u il ib r iu m  w i l l  be the 
end re s u lt  o f the c o n d itio n s  p o stu la te d  by the 
s ta tio n a ry  s ta te  . The p lans of d if fe re n t  people
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w i l l ,  under the unchanging c o n d it io n s , ad jus t to  
one an o th er and to the g iven  co n d itio n s so that 
u lt im a te ly  p lans w i l l  be co n s is te n t and e q u il ib r iu m  
w i l l  be e s ta b lis h e d . F ro m  th a t p o in t on, ac tions  
w i l l  bti r e p e t it iv e :  f irm s  and households w i l l  be
pvoducing and consum ing those q u a n tit ie s  which  
th ey  p r e f e r ,  and f ir m s  w i l l  re p la c e  thel r  c a p ita l 
st.iok w ith  ey ac t re p l ic a s  because these a re  best 
su ited  to  the (unchanging) co n d itio n s .
In  such a w o r ld , i t  is  c le a r ,  th e re  is  in  
essence no fu tu re . As Shackle has put i t ,  " In  
th e  e q u il ib r iu m  m odel th e re  is  no fu tu re , fo r  the 
fu tu re  e s s e n tia lly  im p lie s  ig n o ra n c e ,"
The s ta tic  m eth o d , on the o th e r hand , is  one 
of the m ethods a v a ila b le  in  as a n a ly s is  o f dynam ic  
s itu a tio n s . "T h e  cruela .1 c h a r a c te r is t ic  o f wh&t vie are  
c a llin g  the s ta tic  m ethod is  . . . th a t the e q u il ib r iu m  
of tim e  t . . . £ c a n j be taken  to be d e te rm in e d  by 
c u rr e n t p a ra m e te rs  o n ly; o r . . . th a t the e q u il ib r iu m  
of the s in g le  p e r io d  m ay be t re a te d  as self - c o n t a in e d . " 
The dynam ic s itu a tio n  is  then  looked  at as a sequence 
of s in g le  p e rio d s  and the s ta t ic  m ethod is  used to 
exam ine each of the s e lf-c o n ta in e d  p e rio d s .
H av in g  sa id  th is  i t  Is  n e c e s s a ry  to  p ro ce ed  and 
ask w h e th e r the s ta t ic  m ethod is  adequate fo r  the 
a n a ly s is  o f dynam ic s itu a tio n s . The s ta t io n a ry  sta te  
is  in  essence a t im e le s s  s ta te . Since the fu tu re  is  
e x a c tly  the same as the pas t th e  one can be su b s titu ted  
fo r  the o th e r w ith o u t any d if f i c u lt y .  W hat has been
u
rr e fe r r e d  to  h e re  as the s ta tic  m ethod 3s e n t ir e ly  adequate 
fo r  the a n a ly s is  o f such c o n d itio n s . B ut th e  m a tte r  Is  
fu n d a m e n ta lly  d if fe re n t  when the s itu a tio n  to be analysed  
is  a dynam ic one. F o r " the  essence of the dynam ic  
p vo b le m [.is jth a t p re s e n t and fu tu re  a re  no t id e n t ic a l"  ^*1 
and w here th is  is  the case we are  o b liged  to  take in to  
account the p lans of t.iv  re s p e c tiv e  a c to rs . However, the 
s ta tic  m ethod is  in c o m p a tib le  w ith  th e  ex is te n c e  of p lanned
"p ro p e r  dynam ic th e o ry  even at i ts  s in g le -p e r io d  s ta te ,  
m ust take account of the fa c t th at m any a c t iv i t ie s  th a t go 
on 'w ith in  the p e rio d  a re  o r ie n te d  outs ide the p e r io d ; so 
th a t what goes on, oven w ith in  the p e r io d , is  not o n ly  a 
m a tte r  of ta s te s  and re s o u rc e s , but a lso  of p la ns  and 
ex p e c ta t io n s . In  s ta t ic s  th e re  is  no p lann ing ; m ere  
re p e t it io n  of what has been done b e fo re  does not need 
to be p lanned , i t  is  ac c o rd in g ly  p o s s ib le , in  s ta t ic  th e o ry ,  
to  t r e a t  the s in g le -p e r io d  an a c losed  sy s te m , the w ork ing  
of w h ich  can he exam ined  w ith o u t re fe re n c e  to  anyth ing  
th a t goes on o u ts ide i t  ( in  the te m p o ra l s e n se ). B u t th is  
is  no t p o ss ib le  in  d yn a m ic s . Even at the s in g le -p e r io d  
S ta te , the lin k s  w hich  re la te  the s in g le -p e r io d  to  the re s t  
of the dynam ic p ro ce ss  cannot be n e g le c te d .11
In  the l ig h t  o f th is  conc lusion  what can be said  
about e q u il ib r iu m  and the a n a ly s is  of the r e a l  w o rld  
of dynam ic change ? To beg in  w ith  we can show th a t  
e q u il ib r iu m  o ve r a p e r io d  o f t im e  is  not p o s s ib le .
H ic k s  has shown th a t fo r  e q u il ib r iu m  to  e x is t  o v e r a 
p e r io d  o f t im e  i t  is  n e c e s s a ry  to  assum e th a t ex p ec ta tio n s  
w ith in  the p e r io d  a re  h e ld  w ith  c e r ta in ty . I f  th is
ris  not so i t  is  p o s s ib le , in  a changing w o r ld , that 
fro m  the vantage p o in t o f a la te r  po in t o f t im e , 
to  + 1 , e q u il ib r iu m  d id  not e x is t  a t an e a r l i e r  po in t 
in  t im e , t n , even I f  e q u il ib r iu m  did e x is t  (in  an 
ex ante sense) at tn i t s e l f .  The reason  fo r  th is  
is  th a t in  a changing w o rld  i t  is  p o ss ib le  th a t the 
ex p e c ta tio n s  on which the e q u il ib r iu m  a t tn was based  
have been p ro ve d  in c o r re c t  by th e  t im e  tn  + 1 is  
re a c h e d . Thus fo r  e q u il ib r iu m  to  e x is t  o ve r a p erio d  
of t im e ,  e q u il ib r iu m  m ust e x is t  at @%oh p o in t - in - t im e  
d u ring  the p e r io d , and fo r  th is  to  happen, as we have 
se en , ex p e c ta tio n s  m ust be held  w ith  c e r ta in ty . Since 
the r e a l  w o rld  is  a w o rld  o f u n c e rta in  change we can 
conclude th a t in  such a w o rld  e q u il ib r iu m  o ve r a p erio d  
of t im e  is  not p o s s ib le . We a c c o rd in g ly  r e je c t  th at 
th e  concept o f e q u il ib r iu m  over t im e  is  u s e fu l in  u n d e r­
standing  dynam ic s itu a tio n s .
B ut th is  does not c o n s titu te  a d e n ia l o f the 
ex is te n c e  o f e q u il ib r iu m  at a p o in t o f t im e . As H icks  
has put i t :  e q u il ib r iu m  at a p o in t o f t im e  e x is ts
" i f  In d iv id u a ls ' are  re a c h in g  a p re fe r re d  p o s it io n ,  
w ith  re s p e c t to  th e ir  e x p e c ta tio n s , as th ey  a re  at 
th a t p o in t. I t  is  on ly to  such an e q u il ib r iu m  th a t  
th e re  can be a ten d en c y. "
E q u il ib r iu m  and R e a lity
F o r a l l  the re as on s exam ined  above i t  can be 
seen th a t the assum ptions made in  e q u il ib r iu m  a n a ly s is ,  
both in  the f ie ld  of " s ta t ic s "  and "d y n a m ic s " , are
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rh ig h ly  u n r e a l is t ic .  A concept w hich  makes sense 
at the le v e l o f the in d iv id u a l,  arid in d ee d , is  p a rt  
o f the lo g ic  in h e re n t IB human a c tio n , does not 
m ake sense when i t  is  used to  d e s c rib e  in te ra c tio n  
betw een s e v e ra l in d iv id u a ls . 7S i t  thus ju s t if ia b le  to 
continue to  use m odels w hich  a re  based on the assum ption  
of eq u ilib r iu m ?
T h is  q u e s tio n , to  put i t  m ild ly ,  is  an e x tre m e ly  
d if f ic u lt  one to ta c k le . A c tio n s  (In  th is  c a s e , the 
co n s tru c tio n  o f m o dels) can o n ly  be ju s t if ie d  in  te rm s  
of the in te n tio n s  o f the a c to r . T h is  th e re fo re
re q u ire s  an in q u iry  in to  the in te n tio n s  of the m o d e l-  
b u ild e r ,  and in e v ita b ly  ra is e s  the com plex p ro b lem  
of the re la t io n s h ip  betw een a m odel and the r e a l  w o rld .
On the one e x tre m e , i f  the m o d e l-b u ild e r  a im s  at 
co n s tru c tin g  a "p u re  th e o ry " , th a t i e ,  i f  he a im s at  
ex am in in g  the consequences th a t w ou ld  fo llo w  under 
c e r ta in  c o n d it io n s , w h e th e r o r not these co n d itio n s  
e x is t  o r  have e x is te d  in  the r e a l  w o r ld , then d iscuss ion  
re g a rd in g  the ’' ju s t i f ia b le "  use of e q u il ib r iu m  must 
assume a s p e c ia l l ig h t .  O b v io u s ly  no v a lid  c r it ic is m  
can be made of the use of e q u il ib r iu m  in  th is  c o n tex t. 
E q u il ib r iu m  fo llo w s  lo g ic a lly  ( i f  the e x is te n ce  and 
s t a b i l i t y  p ro b lem s have been o ve rcom e) fro m  the 
assum ptions of the m otfe l.
Oa th e  c-ther h a n d , o th e r  ec o n o m is ts  have argued  
th a t even though e q u il ib r iu m  does not e x is t  in  the r e a l  
w - r ld  at each p o in t in  t im e  th e re  n e v e rth e le s s  dec j  
e x is t  a tendency to w ard s  e q u il ib r iu m  v a lu e s . In  th is  
co n n e ctio n  the ana logy of the w aves o f the sea is  o ften  .used.
rT h u s , fo r  e x a m p le , J .B .  C la r k  has sa id  th a t "A  
s ta tic  s o c ie ty  is  an im p o s s ib le  one; fo r  the fo rc e s  
th a t b rin g  m en to g e th e r in  the s o c ia l s ta te  have in  
th em s e lv es  th e  pow er to m ake s o c ie ty  change its  
fo rm  and i t s  mode o f a c t io n . In  r e a l i t y ,  the 
s o c ia l s t ru c tu re  g row s and im p ro v es  d a i ly ,  and w i l l  
do so to the end of t im e  . . . (H ow ever] , the 
d e s c rip tio n  of the p u re ly  s ta t ic  s ta te , in  fa c t ,  dea ls  
w ith  r e a l i t ie s .  I t  is  im a g in a ry  o n ly  by its  om issions; 
f o r  i t  p re s e n ts  an e s s e n tia l p a r t  of the fo rce s  that 
a c t in  the r e a l ,  dynam ic w o r ld . The in flu e n c e s  th at 
b r in g  about the g roup ad jus tm en t th a t we have ju s t 
d e s c rib e d , and a l l  th a t  i t  in v o lv e s  a re  not im a g in a ry ;  
th e y  a re  as r e a l  as anyth ing  on e a rt h . T h ey are  
a lw ays ac tin g  in  the m ids t of the m ost v io le n t  
d is tu rb a n c e s  th a t dynam ic fo rc e s  p ro d u ce . As an 
i l lu s t r a t io n  we have used the se a . A s ta tic  ocean is  
im a g in a ry , fo r  th e re  n e v e r was such a th ing; but 
th e re  has n e v e r been a m om ent in  the h is to ry  o f the 
s to rm ie s t s e a s , when the dom inant fo rc e s  th a t c o n tro lle d  
th em  w e re  those w h ic h , i f  le f t  e n t ir e ly  a lo n e , would  
reduce t h e ir  w a te rs  to  a s ta t ic  c o n d it io n ."  In  a
s im ila r  w a y , C la rk  adds , " the  s ta t ic  s ta te  . . .  is  the 
one to w ard  w h ich  s o c ie ty  is  at e v e ry  in s ta n t ten d in g , 
u n d e / the in f lu e n c e  of c o m p e titio n ."^ ® ^  N o r has th is  
v iew  been put fo rw a rd  o n ly  by the o ld e r  ec o n o m is ts . 
M ilto n  F rie d m a n  has ex p res se d  a s im ila r  po in t of 
v ie w . A t any p o in t in  t im e  th e re  is  a tendency
to w ard s  e q u il ib r iu m  and we can th e re fo re  t r e a t  the 
sy ste m  as i f  i t  w e re  a c tu a lly  in  e q u il ib r iu m . I t  is
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ra d m itte d  th a t the concept o f e q u il ib r iu m  is  a c o n s tru c t  
of the m ind and does no: e x is t  in  the w o rld  but i t  is  
n e v e rth e le s s  held  th a t by assum ing the ex is te n c e  of 
e q u il ib r iu m  adequate re s u lts  are  ac h ie ve d.
O th er w r i te r s ,  h o w e v e r , have re je c te d  the use­
fu ln es s  of the concept of e q u il ib r iu m  and recom m ended  
the in tro d u c tio n  in to  econom ic th eo ry  o f a lte rn a t iv e  
to o ls . T h u s , fo r  e x a m p le . P ro fe s s o r Lachm an has 
argued th a t " In  the W a lra s ia n  system  the no tion  of 
e q u il ib r iu m  is  em ployed as a fo rm a l d ev ice to u n ify  
econom ic ac tio n  on th e  th re e  le v e ls  of In d iv id u a l,  
m a rk e t and sy ste m . T h is  u n if ic a tio n  is  ap p a ren tly  
acco m p lish e d  at m e  s tro k e  on a l l  th re e  le v e ls . Hence 
the fo rm a l e legance and a rc h ite c to n ic  u n ity  w hich have 
so fa s c in a te d  many of o ur c o n te m p o ra r ie s . B u t, as 
we sa w , p o v e rty  o f con ten t is  h ere  the p r ic e  to  be 
p a id  fo r  elegance of fo rm . W h ile  we le a rn  som ething  
u s e fu l about what go ve rn s and u n if ie s  in d iv id u a l a c tio n ,  
we m e re ly  le a rn  a few  h a l f - t r u th s  about the fo rc e s  
o p e ra tin g  in  the sy ste m  as a w h o le ." * 2 2  ^ I t  is  thus 
suggested th a t a th e o ry  of the m a rke t p ro ce ss must 
be evo lved  in  o rd e r to re p la c e  the concept o f e q u il ib r iu m .
W ith  re ga i'L  to  the tw o opposing v iew s  on the u s e fu l­
ness o f the e q u il ib r iu m  asum ption  r e fe r r e d  to  above, 
i t  is  n e c e s s a ry  to r e a l iz e  th a t both v iew s  accept
(a ) th a t e q u il ib r iu m  does not e x is t  in  the r e a l w o rld  
but th a t (b ) th e re  a re  e q u il ib ra t in g  ten d en c ies  in  any 
d is e q u ilib r iu m  s itu a tio n . The d iv e rg e n c e  of op inion  
appears to a r is e  in  assess ing  the s tre n g th  of these
rte n d e n c ie s . Thus C la r k  w ould ho ld  th a t the e q u il ib r iu m  
wage ra te  would g iv e  the a n a ly s t a good id e a  of the 
e x is tin g  wage ra te  s tru c tu re  s ince the la t t e r  w i l l  be 
s tro n g ly  tend ing  to w ard s (and hence w i l l  not d iv erg e  
too s ig n if ic a n t ly  fro m ) the fo rm e r . The opposing view  
would deny th is . To quote P ro fe s s o r  Lachm ann once 
m ore: " . . .  a good d ea l alw ays depends on the speed
of the ad jus tm en ts  fo llo w in g  d is e q u il ib r iu m . W here  
these a re  made r a p id ly ,  e q u il ib r iu m  m ay be reached  
b e fo re  the next unexpected  change o c c u rs . M ost 
e c o nom ists  ag re e  th a t the m a rk e t is  an agent fo r  the 
d iffu s io n  of in fo rm a t io n , but we may w e ll doubt w hether  
th is  can be at a l l  re g a rd e d  as a ra p id  p ro ce ss .
E q u il ib r iu m  th e o ry , in  o rd e r to a f f ir m  the e x is te n ce  
of a s tro n g  tendency to w ard s i t ,  has to  assum e th a t 
c o r r e c t  in fo rm a tio n  about e q u il ib r iu m  p r ic e s  and 
q u a n tit ie s  is  r e a d i ly  d is t i l le d  fro m  m a rk e t happenings  
and a v a ila b le  to  a l l  p a r t ic ip a n ts . O th e rw is e  th e re  can 
be no im m e d ia te  a d ju s tm e n t. W ith  slow ad jus tm ents  
a good d e a l may happen in the m e an tim e  b e fo re  
e q u il ib r iu m  is  re a c h e d . In  r e a l i t y ,  of c o u rs e , in fo rm a tio n  
w i l l  s p ro rd  s lo w ly  because not a l l  p a r t ic ip a n ts  have the 
sans a b i l i t y  to  assess the in fo rm a t iv e  s ig n ific a n c e  of 
the e v en ts  they o b s e rv e ."
A c c o rd in g ly , a lthough th e re  is  a tendency at any 
m om ent in t im e  to w ard s  e q u il ib r iu m , th is  tendency can 
be re g a rd e d  as being  w eak because the p ro ce ss  o f the 
d is tr ib u t io n  o f know ledge is  s lo w . The tendency is  
thus l ik e ly  to  be o v e rta k e n  by new unexpected  ev en ts .
The question  u lt im a te ly  b o ils  down to an e m p ir ic a l
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rquestion  and the answ er to  I t  depends upon two fa c to rs :  
the ra te  o f unexpected  change and the speed of a d ju s t­
m ent to th is  change, the la t t e r  depending upon the 
fa c to rs  th a t d e te rm in e  the d is s e m in a tio n  of know ledge.
I f  i t  is  found th a t the two fa c to rs  m entioned  
o p era te  in  such a way as to negate the usefu lness
o f the e q u il ib r iu m  assum ption  th e n , n ee d les s t i  sa y , 
the consequences a re  o f g re a t  s ig n ific a n c e . P o lic y  
re co m m e n da tio n s  based on th e o r ie s  RseumSag the  
ex is te n c e  o f e q u il ib r iu m  m ust then be v iew ed  With  
c a u tio n . T h is  a p p lie s , o f e v u rs ? , a lso  to the econo­
m e tr ic  m odels  w hich assume e q u il ib r iu m . In  o rd e r  
to  i l lu s t r a t e  th is  po in t a w id e ly  acknow ledged exam ple  
w i l l  be tak en  fro m  the f ie ld  of developm ent econom ics.
As has been shown ^ ^  many econom ists  w r i t in g  
on the c a p ita l needs of th«j d evelop ing  co u n tr ie s  have  
used the assum ption  of a s ta b le  o v e ra l l  c a p ita l-o u tp u t  
r a t io  o f the type used in  the H a rro d -D o m a r grow th  
m o d el. I t  is  thus concluded th a t i f  the p a r t ic u la r  
deve lop ing  co u n try  has a po p u la tio n  grow th  ra te  o{
2% p. a . and i f  i t  w is h es  to  grow at a ra te  equal to  
4% p . a . , th a t is ,  i f  i t  w ishes to  in c re a s e  it s  p e r  
c a p ita  incom e at the ra te  o f 2% p . a . , then i t  must 
save 12% o f it s  n a tio n a l incom e p e r  y e a r , assum ing  
a c a p ita l-o u tp u t  r a t io  o f 3 , The "p ro b le m  of
d e v e lop m e n t” is  thus reduced  to  one of ra is in g  the 
le v e l o f savings to  12% i f  th a t co u n try  w is h es  to in c re a s e  
i t s  p e r  c a p ita  incom e b y2% p .a .
M y in t notes th a t the assum ption  of a s ta b le  o v e ra l l  
c a p ita l-o u tp u t  r a t io ,  wh<ch is  ju s t if ie d  fo r  the m a tu re
r n
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phase of the advanced cc m n trlo s, a lso  assum es constant I
re tu rn s  to scale  fo r  the eoonotr.y as a w hole and th is  ;
assum ption  is  not m et in the develop ing  c o u n trie s  •
which have im p o rta n t a g r ic u ltu ra l s e c to rs . The use
of a constan t c a p ita l-o u tp u t  ra t io  thus has se rious
l im ita t io n s . But th e re  a re  o the r d i f f ic u lt ie s  that
a re  at le a s t as im p o rta n t. The p ro ce ss  w hereby j
output in c re a s e s  in  d evelop ing  co u n tr ie s  is  ve ry
d if fe re n t  to  th at of developed c o u n tr ie s . F o r th is
reason  i t  is  being in c re a s in g ly  r e a liz e d  th a t the
in c re a s e  in  m a te r ia l c a p ita l in  the d evelop ing  co u n tr ie s  1
doos not p ro v id e  the answ er to the developm ent p ro b le m . 
A c c o rd in g ly  in c re a s in g  a tte n tio n  is  being  p a id  to ■
in v e s tm e n t in  "hum an c a p ita l"  ^ ^ a n d  o th e r (non­
econom ic ) v a r ia b le s  such as the chaiging of a tt itu d e s .
The a p p lic a tio n  o f a constan t c a p ita l-o u tp u t  m odel d e r iv e d  ;
fro m  the e q u il ib r iu m  grow th  th e o ry  of the H a rro d -D o m a r  ;
m odel am ounts to  a m e c h a n ic a l tre a tm e n t  of an e x tre m e ly  j
c o m p lic a te d  m a tte r  and does not y ie ld  s a tis fa c to ry  
r e s u lts . I t  a ffo rd s  an o th er exam ple  of p o lic y  re co m m e n da­
tio n s  being  made an the b a s is  o f conclusions draw n fro m  
h ig h ly  u n re a lis t ic  as su m p tio n s . *2 8 *
rC H A P T E R  10 
E C O N O M IC  TH E O R Y  AND THE FU TUR E
1 . In tro d u c tio n
I t  is  in tended  in  th is  C  t e r  to  b r in g  toge the r  
s e v e ra l po in ts  th a t have a lre a d y  been made in  d if fe re n t  
p a r ts  of th is  th e s is  w ith  a v iew  to dec id in g  how u se fu l 
econom ic th e o ry  can be in  thx owing lig h t  on the fu tu re .
In  o rd e r  to  answe.- th is  question  i t  is  n ec es sa ry  to  
s u m m a rize  some v iew s  th at have a lre a d y  been ex p re s s e d ,
2 . The P re d ic t io n  of Human A ction
F u tu re  human ac tio n  cannot be d e te rm in e d  fro m  a 
know ledge o i p as t e v e n ts . I t  is  thus not p o ss ib le  to  say 
w hat a g iv en  in d iv id u a l w i l l  do at a g iven  po in t o f tim e  
in  the fu tu re . ^  I t  is  th is  co nc lusion  th a t is  re fe r r e d  
to  when i t  is  sa id  th a t p r e d ic t io n in  the s o c ia l sc iences  
is  not p o s s ib le .
The u n p re d ic ta b il i ty  o f fu tu re  human ac tion  can be 
co n tra s te d  w ith  one exam ple (not in a l l  re s p e c ts  ty p ic a l)  
fro m  the n a tu ra l sc ie n c e s . In  the f ie ld  o f c e le s t ia l  
m e chan ics ^  p re d ic t io n  is  p o s s ib le . G iven an in i t ia l  
s itu a tio n , th a t i s ,  the p o s it io n s  of the sun and p la ne ts  
at any one tim e  , to g e th e r w ith  a u n iv e rs a l la w , the 
N ew tonian  th e o ry  o f g r a v it y , i t  is  p o s s ib le  to p re d ic t  
t h e ir  p o s itio n  at any o th e r t im e  e i th e r  in  the p as t o r  the 
fu tu re . I t  is  thus p o s s ib le  to  p re d ic t  fu tu re  ec lip s e s
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ro r e x p la in  e o lip a e s  th a t have taken  p la c e . We have 
fa ith  in  these p re d ic t io n s  because they have not been 
re fu te d  In  the p a s t. The system  re fe r r e d  to  here  may 
be looked  at as a c losed system  w here a l l  the re le v a n t  
v a r ia b le s  a. a known and in te ra c t  o n ly  w ith  one an o th er.
We thus p'.'sduse " p e r fe c t  know ledge" whioh ea&bless us 
to s t ip u la te  the fu tu re  s ta te  o f the v a r ia b le s  concerned .
In  the s o c ia l s c ie n c e s , on the o ther hand, th e re  
is  an ir re m o v a b le  e lem e n t o f u n c e rta in ty  th a t re s u lts  
fro m  the im p o s s ib il i ty  o f p re d ic t in g  (fu tu re )  human 
a c tio n . W hat a re  the im p lic a tio n s  o l th is  fo r  econom ic  
th eo ry?
To beg in  w ith , i t  is  n e c e s s a ry  to d is tin g u is h  between  
"p u re "  econom ic th e o ry  and " e m p ir ic a l"  econom ic th e o ry .  
P u re  econom ic th e o ry  does not c la im  to have any e m p ir ic a l  
co n ten t. I t  on ly  a im s at deducing the consequences of 
c e r ta in  assum ptions w h e th e r o r not r e a l  c o n d itio n s  can 
be found w hich corres po n d  to  these as su m p tio tie . E ta p iv iQ a l  
econom ic th e o ry , on the o th e r hand , a im s at an ex p la na tio n  
of ev en ts  th a t have tak en  p la c e . A tte n tio n  in  th is  C hap ter  
w i l l  be focussed  on ly on e m p ir ic a l econom ic th e o ry .
I t  has been shown th a t the h y p o th e tic o -d e d u c tlv e  
method (w hich  some w r i te r s  have c la im e d  is  the m ethod  
of the e m p ir ic a l sc ie n c e s ) is  e n t ir e ly  a p p ro p ria te  to  the 
n a tu ra l seien-ces. F u r th e rm o re , p re d ic t io n  is  p o ss ib le  
in  the n a tu ra l sc ie n ce s w here the " c o n tin u ity  o f en v ironm ent"  
axiom  p la y s  so im p o rta n t a p a r t .  ( I t  is  c o n c e iv a b le ,  
but u n lik e ly , th a t N ew ton 's  apple w ould suddenly move 




sc ie n ce s thus "c o n s is t 
a c e r ta in  fu tu re  even t 
c e r ta in  known (past or 
( i i )  s u ita b le  g e n e ra l ]
I t  has been contended by thi 
"u n ity  o f m ethod" th a t the same t 
f o r  the s o c ia l sc ie n c e s . T h is  co
e r iv in g  a sta te m en t about 
rotn ( i )  s ta te m en ts  d e s c rib in g  
ent) c o n d itio n s  . . .  and
„ (3)
se su pporting  the 
etbod is  ap p ro p ria te  
ten tio n  w i l l  now be
m p ortan t d if fe re n c i 
nd n a tu ra l sc ience  
). r o p r ia te  in  each
co n s id e re d .
T h e re  are  at le a s t  two i 
subj e c t -m a t te r o f the s o c ia l 
in f lu e n c e  the m ethod th at is  a 
Thus as has been noted e lse w h ere  the hypotheses of the 
s o c ia l sc ie n ce s are  o ften  based on the unders tand ing  th a t  
ac tin g  in d iv id u a ls  (o r  o b s e rv e rs )  have o f the ac tions of 
some or a l l  o the r In d iv id u a ls . T h is  u n d ers ta n d in g , i t  
is  ac c e p te d , is  n o t open to  the n a tu r a l s c ie n tis ts .
n e v e r th e le s s , i t  is  a rg u e d , in  sp ite  o f th is  im p o rta n t  
d if fe re n c e  betw een human and n a tu ra l phenom ena, the 
m e thod used by the n a tu ra l and s o c ia l sc ie n ce s is  s t i l l  
th e  sam e. In  o rd e r  to assess th is  argu m e n t i t  is  n ec es sa ry  
to  ta k e  note o f the second d if fe re n c e  betw een s o c ia l and 
n a tu ra l phenom ena. In  the n a tu ra l s c ie n c e s , because of 
th e  re a lis m  of the p o s tu la te  o f the " c o n tin u ity  o f e n v iro n ­
m e n t" , a h yp o th es is  w hich has not been re fu te d  by the 
o bserved  fa c ts  does p ro v id e  know ledge about the fu tu re .
B u t th is  is  not t ru e  in  the case of the s o c ia l sc ie n ce s .
F o r in  th is  case the observed e o c ia . phenom ena, fo r  
e x a m p le , p r ic e s  and q u a n t it ie s , a re  the consequence of 





rth a t human beings w i l l  con tinue to ac t in  the fu tu re  as 
th e y  d id  in  the p a s t. The c o n tin u ity  p o s tu la te  is  la ck in g  
in the s o c ia l sc ie n c e s . Thus although a h ypo thes is  is  
supported  by the o bserved  fa c ts  at a p o in t in  l im e ,  these  
ob se rve d  fa c ts  m igh t change as human ac tio n  changes at 
a la t e r  d a te . A s o c ia l th e o ry  th a t has not been re fu te d  thus 
c a n n o t, lo g ic a l ly ,  p ro v id e  know ledge about the fu tu re .
I t  is  ac c o rd in g ly  n e c e s s a ry , in the s o c ia l sc ie n ce s , 
to s e p a ra te  h is to r ic a l  ex p la n a tio n  (ex p la n a tio n  o f past 
e v e n ts ) fro m  s o c ia l p re d ic t io n  (p re d ic tio n  o f fu tu re  
e v e n ts ) although i t  has been dem o n s tra ted  th a t p re d ic t io n  
and ex p la n a tio n  a re  f o r m a l ly th e  sam e. ^
The h y p o tb e tic o -d e d u o tiv e  m ethod is  e n t ir e ly  adequate  
fo r  the purposes of h is to r ic a l ex p la n a tio n  in  the s o c ia l 
s c ie n c e s . B u t i t  cannot be used to p re d ic t  s o c ia l events  
th a t w i l l  o cc ur o n ly  in  the fu tu re  because fu tu re  " in i t ia l  
co n d itio n s '' c o n s is tin g  of fu tu re  c o n s te lla tio n s  of know ­
le d g e , cannot be p re d ic te d .
3 . E conom ic T h e o ry  and H is t o r ic a l  P henom ena
The u->e of the h y p o th e tic o -d e d u c tiv e  m ethod in  
h is to r ic a l  ex p la n a tio n  w i l l  now be e la b o ra te d  upon.
A n h is to r ic a l  even t is  e x p la in e d  by fin d in g  the 
• in it ia l  c o n d itio n s  and " e x p la n a to ry  hypo theses" fro m  
w hich the ev en t m ay be deduced. I f  e i th e r  the in i t ia l  
s itu a tio n  or the e x p la n a to ry  hypo theses a re  co n s id ere d  
to  be p ro b le m a tic  then the co n c lu sion s of the deductive
rchain  o f re as on ing  can be tes te d  ag a in st the (h is to r ic a l)  
evidence and e i th e r  supported  o r re fu te d . In th is  way 
a pas t even t can be e m p ir ic a lly  ex p la in e d .
I t  should be noted th a t we have re fe r r e d  to 
"ex p la n a to ry  hypo theses" and n o t, as is  n .ore u s u a l, 
u n iv e rs a l la w s . T h f reason  fo r  th is  te rm in o lo g y  is  
th a t , as has been shown, l l  is  not p o ss ib le  in  the s o c ia l 
sc ie n ce s to  is lk  o£ " la w s "  o f human a c tio n . A t a la te r  
p o in t o f t im e  an in d iv id u a l (o r  many in d iv id u a ls )  m ight 
dec ide to  act in  a d if fe re n t  w ay. I t  is  thus m is le ad in g  
to ta lk  o f u n iv e rs a l la w s .
T h is  m ay be i l lu s t r a t e d  w ith  an e x a m p le . Assume 
th a t the h is to r ic a l  even t to  be e x p la in e d  is  the k i l l in g  
of Sm ith  by B ro w n . In  e x p la in in g  th is  ev en t tho fo llo w in g  
ex p la n a to ry  hyp o th es is  m ay be used: When B rown is  under 
the in f lu e n c e  of a lc o h o l and is  an g e red  he becom es v io le n t .  
But a lthough th is  ex p la n a to ry  hyp o th es is  is  adequate in  
e x p la in in g  the k i l l in g  of Sm ith  i t  cannot be concluded  
th a t i f  Brown in  the fu tu re  is  under the in flu e n c e  of 
a lco h o l and i f  a n g e re d , he w i l l  k i l l  someone e ls e . The 
ex p la n a to ry  hyp o th es is  can thus be used fo r  the purposes  
of h is to r ic a l  e x p la n a tio n  bu t not fo r  s o c ia l p r e d i c t i o n . ^  
A lthough  the exam ple g iv en  r e fe r s  to  two in d iv id u a ls ,  
the game p r in c ip le  could  be i l lu s t r a t e d  w ith  re fe re n c e  to  
la rg e  groups of p eo p le . A good exam ple o f the im p o s s ib il i ty  
of p re d ic t in g  the ac tio n s o f la rg e  groups of people is  
found in  the in a b i l i t y  to  p r e d ic t ,  fo r  e x a m p le , v io le n t  
re v o lu tio n s .
Thus the " b a c k w a rd -lo o k in g "  n a tu re  o f the
rb y p o th e tic o -d e d u c tiv e  m ethod In  the s o c ia l me la nces is  
to  be s tre s s e d ,
4 . E c onom ic T h eo ry  and the F u tu re
Can econom ic th e o ry  say anyth ing  about the fu tu re  
end i f  b o , p re c is e ly  what can be sa id?
I f  a lo g ic a lly  co n s is te n t th e o ry  is  looked at as a 
c o n d itio n a l s ta te m e n t, in  a way s im ila r  to the conclusion  
th a t fo llo w  fro m  m a th e m a tic a l a x io m s , then th e o r ie s  can 
say the fo llo w in g  about the fu tu re :  _ff co n d itio n s in  the 
fu tu re  a re  the same as those con ta ined  in  the assum ption  
of the th e o ry , then the conc lusions " p re d ic te d 1’ by the 
th e o ry  w i l l  fo llo w . But o f course , human ac tio n  m ay 
change w ith  the re s u lt  th a t fu tu re  c o n d itio n s  may not 
a p p ro x im a te  the assum ptions of the th e o ry  and the 
’’ p re d ic t io n ’1 w i l l  ac c o rd in g ly  be re fu te d . ^
I f  human ac tio n  does , in  f a c t , change s ig n if ic a n t ly  
o v e r t im e  then such a c o n d itio n a l s ta te m en t w i l l  not be 
u s e fu l in  illu m in a t in g  what m ay be expected  in  the fu tu re  
B u t can anyth ing  be sa id  about the ra te  o f change of 
human ac tio n  o v e r t im e  ? I f  i t  can be shown th a t much 
of the human ac tio n  th a t is  re le v a n t  fo r  an u nders tand ing  
of econom ic phenom ena does in  f a c t , re m a in  f a i r l y  con­
s ta n t o ve r t im e  then  fo re c a s ts  at le a s t  in  the s h o rt-ru n , 
can be shown to  be re a s o n a b ly  a c c u ra te . W he the r such 
re le v a n t  human ac tio n  does re m a in  f a i r l y  constan t over  
t im e  o r not is  an e m p ir ic a l q u es tion . H ow ever we can 
say th a t in  an u n c e rta in  w o rld  w here people make p lans
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based on in c o n s is te n t jx p o e ta tio n s , the p lans of some 
w i l l  be f ru s t ra te d  and w i l l  th e re fo re  be re v is e d . B ut 
in  guch a w o rld  p re d ic t io n  is  im p o s s ib le  since the exac t 
n a tu re  o f the re v is e d  p lans cannot be p re d ic te d .
6 .  The Use of  S ta t is t i c a l  Tec h n i ques in  E conom ies
The use of s ta t is t ic a l  techn iques in  the s o c ia l 
sc ie n ce s cannot enable us to  overcom e the o bstac le  
p ro s e a te d  by th e  u n p re d ic ta b il i ty  of human a c tio n . I t  
is  u n s a tis fa c to ry  to arg  ie  th a t " p ro b a b il i ty  hypo theses" ^  
based on s ta t is t ic a l  f in d in g s  can be used in s te ad  of 
e x p la n a to ry  hypotheses in p re d ic t in g  fu tu re  s o c ia l 
phenom ena. K o r can B ro d b e c k 's  sta te m en t th a t the  
s o c ia l sc ie n ce s "have developed techn iques ["most 
im p o rta n t ly  s t a t is t ic a l  techn iques} to  com pensate fo r  
la p se s  in  c lo s u re  and com p le ten e ss " ^  be ac ce p te d . 
S t a t is t i c s , as m ust be em phasized  (and as we noted  
above has been em phasized  by M is e s ) are  by d e f in it io n  
based on past e v e n ts , the consequences of pas t human  
ac tio n . I t  is  ac c o rd in g ly  not p o ss ib le  to in fe r  fro m  
these ev en ts  w hat w i l l  happen in  the fu tu re .
The o b s e rv a tio n  made by H ick s  w ith  re fe re n c e  to  
e c o n o m e tr ic s  a lso  a p p lie s  in  g e n e ra l to  w hat was re fe r r e d  
to  as e m p ir ic a l econom ic th e o ry . As H ick s  has put i t :
•'the c h a r a c te r is t ic  o f ec o n o m e tric s  . . . th a t  i ts  th e o ry  
Ss ap p lied  th e o ry , n o t pure  th e o ry  -  e x p la in s  why i t  is  
th a t i t  can on ly le ad  up to  'p ro je c t io n s ' or p ro g n o s tic a tio n s :  
fo re o a s ts  of what  w i l l  ha-p e n , i f  the, s ama f o rc e s as h avs 
been o ffe rat i ng con tinue to  a e r ate in  the fu tu re ,, not
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rwhat w i l l  happen i f  a new fo rm  of o rg a n iza tio n  ( ia  the 
w id e s t sense) is  in tro d u c e d . Once p o lic y  is  in tro d uc ed  
as a v a r ia b le  , we have to go beyond e c o n o m e tric s .
T h e re  is  no doubt th a t H ick s  accepts th a t th is  conc lusion  
holds fo r  a l l  a p p lied  th e o ry  o r e m p ir ic a l econom ic  
th e o ry . H o w e v e r, we should add th a t ,  as shown by 
our p r io r  a n a ly s is , the p o lic y  th a t H ick s  m entions  
should be tak en  to r e fe r  to  human ac tio n  in  g e n e ra l.
In  th is  C h ap ter some consequences of the p o stu la te s  
of s u b je c tiv is m  have been exam ined  w ith  a view  to 
d jc id in g  now much lig h t  can be throw n on events to 
be expected  in  the fu tu re  by econom ic th e o ry . S ta r tin g  
fro m  the u n p re d ic ta b il i ty  o f human a c tio n , a fe a tu re  
not im p o rta n t in  the n a tu ra l s c ie n c e s , " the  d o c trin e  
of the unity o f method, th a t is  to sa y , the view  th a t a l l  
th e o re t ic a l o r g e n e ra liz in g  sc ie nce s make use of the  
same m e th o d , w h e th e r th e y  a re  n a tu ra l sc ie n ce s <?r 
s o c ia l s c ie n ce s"  ' 10^was in  p a r t  re je c te d . I t  was seen 
th a t although the h yp o th e tic o -d e d n c tiv e  m ethod can be 
used fo r  the purposes of h is to r ic a l  e x p la na tio n  i t  
cannot be used fo r  the p urposes of s o c ia l p re d ic t io n .  
Thus the c la im  fo r  th e  u n ity  o f m ethod can be accepted  
as re g a rd s  the ex p la n a tio n  o f p as t e v e n ts . But w h ile  
the n a tu ra l sc ie n ce s can p re d ic t  fu tu re  e v e n ts , although  
th is  m ay bo d if f i c u lt  in  some c a s e s , e .g .  the p re d ic t io n  
of an e a rth q u a k e , p re d ic t io n  is  not p o ss ib le  in  the case
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ro f the s o c ia l s c ie n ce s . I t  Is  h e re  th a t an Im p o rta n t  
a s y m m e try  between the n a tu ra l and s o c ia l sc iences
The conc lusions of th is  C hap ter are  i l lu s t r a te d  
W ith re fe re n c e  to an a r t ic le  by H .G . L ip s e y . In
th is  p ape r L ip se y  c la im s  th a t he "as a p r a c t it io n e r  in  
the f ie ld  o f econom ic sc ience se arch es fo r  s ta b le  
p a tte rn s  of human b eh a v io u r in  the econom ic sp h e re.
Such b eh a v io u r p a tte rn s  p ro v id e  the b as is  fo r  m aking  
the te s ta b le  p re d ic t io n s  w ith o u t w hich  th e re  can be no 
s c ie n c e .” The re s t  of the p ape r co n s is ts  o f an
e la b o ra tio n  of the s ta b le  re la t io n s h ip  betw een the 
demand fo r  la b ou r (as m e asured  by the am ount of 
unem ploym ent) and the ra te  o f in c re a s e  in  wages f i r s t  
noted by P ro fe s s o r  P h i l l ip s .  F o r p re s e n t purposes  
I t  is  not n e c e s s a ry  to  ex am in e  the co n c lu sion s a r r iv e d  
at by L ip se y  and com m ent is  th e re fo re  r e s t r ic te d  to 
h is  m e th o d o lo g ica l co n c lu s ion s .
A cc o rd in g  to  L ip s e y , the ec o n o m ist o ften  p o stu la te s  
c e r ta in  s ta b le  b eh a v io u r p a tte rn s  and then deduces what 
t h e ir  consequences w ould  b e . The f in a l stage in v o lve s , 
se arch in g  the d ata  to  see i f  these consequences can be 
o b se rve d . L ip s e y  thus p o s tu la te s  a d ire c t  re la t io n s h ip  
betw een the demand fo r  la b o u r (taken  to be in v e rs e ly  
re la te d  to the le v e l o f unem ploym ent) and the ra te  of 
in c re a s e  in  w ages. Subsequent a ttem p ts  to  te s t  th is  
p o s tu la te  proved s u c ce ss fu l ex ce p t fo r  some m in o r  
d if f i c u lt ie s ,  l ip s e y  th e re fo re  concludes th a t "One is  
l e f t ,  at the end of a l l  th is ,  w ith  a fe e lin g  of the
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p o s s ib il i ty  o f a t r u ly  s c ie n tif ic  study of human b ehaviour  
iu  the econom ic sphere and w ith  an a tt itu d e  o f o p tim ism  
about the lo n g -te rm  developm ent o f such a sc ie n c e . In  
the p a s t, econom ists  both  am ateu r and p ro fe s s io n a l, 
have . . .  taken  too much to  h e a rt  the d i f f ic u lt ie s  of 
p re d ic t in g  in d iv id u a l beh a v io u r acd fo rg o tte n  the 
re m a rk a b le  g roup s ta b i l i ty  in  many f ie ld s  . . . [They 
have a ls o ]  been too e a s i ly  co n v ir  i ,  a p r io r i . that  
e v e ry  h is to r ic a l  sequence is  un ique. When in  fac t we 
ta k e  a look in a sphere most a ffe c te d  by these d e fe a tis t  
argu m e n ts we f in d  evidence of s im p le  beh a v io u r p a t te rn s ,  
re m a rk a b ly  sta b le  o v e r , w hat in  econom ics is  a v e ry  
long p e rio d  of t im e , and, when co m plete  s ta b i l i ty  has 
not been m a in ta in e d , we f in d  what looks l ik e  a re as on a b le  
chance of d evelop ing  and extend ing  our th e o r ie s  to co v e r  
these m ore com plex p a tte rn s  o f b e h a v io u r ."
Just two com m ents w i l l  be made in  connection  w ith  
L ip s e y 's  co n c lu s ion s . In  the f i r s t  p la ce  the d if f ic u lty  
of c o n fro n tin g  the consequences of p o s tu la te s  w ith  the  
ob se rve d  fa c ts  has a lre a d y  been noted above. In  d ea lin g  
w ith  com plex phenom ena i t  is  o ften  d i f f i c u lt  to  come to 
c le a r -c u t  co n c lu sion s such as those a r r iv e d  at by 
L ip s e y . T h u s , fo r  e x a m p le , H ines has argued th at
a lthough L ip s e y  and o th e rs  have e x p l ic i t ly  re je c te d  the 
s ig n if ic a n t  in flu e n c e  of t ra d e  un ions on w a g es , h.is 
(H in e s ')  re s e a rc h  g iv es  ev id e nc e to th e  c o n tra r y ,  
n am e ly  th i " t ra d e  unions do a ffe c t the ra te  o f change 
of wages in d ep e n d en tly  o f the demand fo r  la b o u r . "
S e cond ly , even i f  i t  cou ld  be unam biguously shown
rth a t a s ta b le  re la t io n s h ip  has p re v a i le d  between d if fe re n t  
v a r ia b le s  o ve r t im e , th is  does not mean th a t the observed  
re la t io n s h ip  m ust continue in to  the fu tu re . The " p re d ic t io n 1' 
th a t an in c re a s e  in  the demand fo r  la b o u r as shown by a 
f a l l  in  unem ploym ent w i l l  le a d  to a r is e  in th e  ra te  o f 
in c re a s e  o f money wages m ust th e re fo re  be seen as a 
fo re c a s t based on the assum ption  th a t the fa c to rs  u n d e r­
ly in g  the s ta b le  re la t io n s h ip  re m a in  the same in  the  
fu tu re . The developm ent o f s ig n if ic a n t  changes in  the 
in s t itu t io n a l s tru c tu re  m ig h t, fo r  exam ple  le a d  to a 
d is tu rb a n c e  of the re la t io n s h ip . The same can , of
co u rs e , be sa id  about the e m p ir ic a l s tud ies done on the 
demand fo r  m oney . A  sta b le  demand to r  money (so 
im p o rta n t as re g a rd s  p o lic y  im p lic a tio n s )  th a t has 
p re v a i le d  in  the p rs t  m ight not do so in  the fu tu re . 
F r ie d m a n 's  o b s e rv a tio n  th a t money m ay be re g a rd e d  as 
a " lu x u ry  good" since the am ount dem anded in c re a s e s  
a t a ra te  som ewhat fa s te r  than the in c re a s e  in  incom e  
m ight not ho ld  tru e  in  the fu tu re . E m p ir ic a l s tu d ie s
a r e , by d e f in it io n , based on the p as t w h e rea s  in  the 
fu tu r e ,  human ac tio n  m igh t change.
H o w e v e r, the u se fu lne ss  of such e m p ir ic a l w ork  
m ust cot be u n d e re s tim a te d . A g re a t  d ea l is  ach ieved  
fro m  u n d e rs ta n d in g , fo r  e x a m p le , the p re c is e  in flu en c e  
th a t tra d e  un ions have had on the money wage r a te ,  and 
• even  though th is  does not e l im in a te  a l l  the u n c e rta in ty  
re g a rd in g  w hat is  to  be ex pected  in  the fu tu re , i t  does 
a llo w  a fe e lin g  o f g re a te r  co n fidence in  th a t the fu tu re  
can be fac ed  w ith  a f i r m  u n d ers ta n d in g  of th e  p a s t.
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for this would turn economic activity into a series of reflexes responsive 
to quasi-tiological tropiszns." Kirzne/, I. op. cit. p. 130.
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(31.) According to Kirznor, the contribution of Max Weber to "the 
evolution of praxeological ideas . . .  scarcely approaches that of Croce." 
Kirzner, op. cit. p. 57. However, for a view of the role of Weber's 
concept of verstehen in praxeological analysis, see Lachmann, L.M.
The Legacy of Max Weber. London: HetnetaaiiB, 1970.
(32) See International Economic Papers. No. 3, London, 1953.
(33) in ..Das Wesen und der Hauptiiihalt der tiieorotlsclien NationaUlkonomie," 
le-ipEig, 1908.
(34) Kirzner, I.M . op. cit. pp. 60, 70.
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value of all goods, found the mathematical method used by Walras and 
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op. cit. p. 98.
(36) Weber, Max. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, 
translated A .M . Henderson and Talcott Parsons. London: William Hodge 
& Co., 1947.
(37) & Chapter 10, the point of view is discussed which claims that, 
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(36) Machlup, F. "The Inferiority Complex of the Social Sciences," 
ia Semsholz, Mary H. (Ed.\ On Freedom and Free Enterprise Essays 
In Honour of Ludwig von Misea Princcton, New Jersey: van Nostrand,
(39) Edgeworth, F .Y . Mathematical Physics. London: C.K. Paul & Co., 
1881 ^London: The London School of Economics and Political Science 
Reprints., 1932) , p. 15.
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<40) Myidal, G. op. ctt. p. 92.
(41) Weber, Max. Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Wissenschaftslebre. 
TUbingen, 1922, p. 373. Quoted in Misea, L. Human Action: A Treatise 
on Eeocomlca. London: William Hodge, 1949, p. 126.
(42) Misea, L. ibid. p. 124.
(43) The methodology espoused by Misea is examined in detail in 
Chapter 4.
(44) Laehmann, L.M , "Professor Shaclde on the Economic Significance 
of Time." Metroeconomica Vol. X I, September, 19S9, pp. 72, 73.
(45) Siackle, G.L.S. The Nature of Economic Thought. Selected 
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(46) See Chapter?.
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(2) Hayek, F.A . "Carl Monger" in David L. Shills (Ed.) International 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. New York Macmillan, 1968, p. 125.
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(4) ibid, p. 811.
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Illinois: The Free Press, 1950, translated and edited by James Din@v&ll 
and Bert F. Fozelitz.
(6) See Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science. Footnote S3, p. 212.
(7) Hayek, F .A . The Counter-Revolution of Science, p. 38.
(8) Suiztoyi-Ucger, Theo. "The Historical School11 in International 
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(18) See Hayek, The Counter-Bevojutlon of Science, footnote 33, p. 212
(19) See the discussion of methodological individualism below 
Chapter 3.
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(21) ibid. p. 146.
(22) See Menger, C. "On the Origin of Money," The Scoocmic Journal,
8, June, 1892, pp. 239-255.
(23) Menger, C. Problems of Economics and Sociology. Book 3,
Chapter 1, pp. 131-134.
(24) ibid. p. 145.
(25) ibid. p. 159.
(26) ibid. p. 83.
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(35) ibid. p. 158.
(36) ibid. p. 63.
(37) See for example Hicks, J.R. "Monetary theory and history -  an 
attempt at perspective." in Critical Essay on Monetary Theory.
London: Oxford Ibiversity Press, 1967, p. 158. "Metallic money te 
an expensive way of performing a stirnie function; why waste resources 
in digging up gold from the ground when pieces of paper (or mere book 
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(38) Schneider, L. in introduction Menger's Problems of Economics 
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(2) Mises, L. The Ultimate Foundation o'. Economic Science:
An Essay on Method. Princeton, Mew Jersey. D. van Nostmnd, 1962,
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(5) Mises, L. Human Action, p. 81 (emphasis added).
(6) See the oiotation from Human Ar“  **> p. 32.
(7) Mises, L, Human Action., p. 79. (emphasis added).
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(8) Papsndreou, A.G. "Economics and the Social Sciences",
Economic Journal. Vol. 60, 1950, p. 716.
(9) ibid. p. 717.
(10) Mises, L. The Ultimate foundations, p. 120
(11) Mises, L. ibid. pp. 99-70.
(12) Mises, L. The Ultimate Foundations, p. 45.
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(15) Mises, L. The Ultimate Foundations.
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and for this reason the conclusions might be inadequate in explaining 
those events.
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consequences (intended and unintended) of human action. See Chapter 8.
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(22) Mises, L. Human Action.p. 16.
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This also provides an answer to Popandreou's contention that praxeology 
is "empirically irrelevant."
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(3) Hayek, F. A. Studies to Philosophy. Politics And Economics, p. viii.
(4) Streissler, E. led.) Roads to Freedom: Essays in Honour o£ Friedrich 
A. von Hayek. London: Routledge andKegan Paul, 19R9.
(5) Degrees of Explanation, p. 5.
(6) ibid. pp. 3-4.
C?) ibid. p. 10.
(8)  ibid. p. 10.
(9) Hayek, J .A . "Economics and Knowledge". Economica. 193’ , pp. 33-54.
(10) ibid. p. 40.
(11) Hayek, F.A . The Theory Of Complex Phenomena, p. 34.
(12) Aid. p. 36.
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(13) Thus for example, Hayek says that a theory whioh does not tell 
us ptedael? what to expect but which will tell us "only what kinds of 
events we are to expect within a certain range . . .  w ill still make the 
world around us a mot e familiar world in which we can move with 
greater coaQdanee that we shall not be disappointed because we can
at least exclude certain eventualities." Degrees of Explanation, p. 18
(14) The 'rules of the road' may be taken to Illustrate the certainty- 
creating importance of institutions, in this case intentionally 
created legal institutions. The task of driving to town would become 
incredibly complicated if  the driver were not reasonably sure that the 
approaching car will remain on the opposite side of the road.
(15) Misea, L. Tb: Ultimate Foundations, pp. 69-70,
(16) Mises, L. Human KCtiop. p. 79.
<17) H&yek's views on this point in particular have changed as the 
following quotation shows: "All that the theory of the social sciences 
attempts is to provide a technique of reasoning which assists us in 
connecting individual facts, but which, like logic or mathematics, is not 
about the facts. It can, therefore, . . .  never be verified ot falsified 
by reference to facts. All that we can and must verify is the presence 
of our assumptions in the particular case . . . .  In this connection a 
genuine 'question of fact' arises — though one it w ill often not be possible 
to a w er with the same certainty as is the case In the netural sciences. 
But the theory itself, the mental scheme for v.e interpretation, can 
never be 'verified' but only tested for its consistency. It  may be 
Irrelevant because the conditions to which It refers never occur; or 
It  may prove inadequate because It does not take account ot a sufficient 
number of conditions. But it  can no more be disproved by facts than 
can logic r mathematics.” "The Facts of the Social Sciences" In 
Individualism and Economic Order. London: RoutJedge & Kegan Paul, 
1949, p. 93.
It  is thus evident from tills quotation that Hayek was, at this stage 
close to the position of Mises. His later views show signs of change in 
this regard. His later views as expressed in Degrees of Explanation 
and Ifoe Theory of Complex Phenomena show that it  is not possible 
to refute specific predictions because social theories cannot make such 
predictions. Nevertheless, it  is possible to test the prediction of general  
patterns, as the following quotation shows; "Any model defines a certain
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it  represents. We may not be able directly to confirm that the causal 
mechanism determining the phenomenon in question is the same as that 
of the model. But we know that, i f  the mechanism is the same, the 
observed structures must be capable of showing some kinds of action 
and unable to show others; and if, and so long as. the observed phenomena 
keep within the range of possibilities indicated as possible. that is so long 
as our oxpootations derived from the mode! are not contradicted, there is 
good reason to regard the model as exhibiting the principle at work in the 
more complex phenomena." Degrees of Explanation, p. 15. (emphasis added.) 
And; "We are however, Interested not only in individual events, and it  is 
also not only predictions of individual events which can bs empirically 
tested. We are equally interested in the recurrence of abstract patterns 
as such: and the prediction that a pattern of a certain kind will appear 
in defined circumstances is a falsifiable (and therefore empirical) statement." 
The Theory of Complex Phenomena, p ."28. It is thus evident that Hayek 
started from a position close to tint of Mises but subsequently moved to 
a new position closer to Karl Popper.
(18) Miscs. L. Theory and History, p. 159.
(19) ibid. p. 69.
(20) Hayek, F .A . The Theory of Complex Phenomena, p. 37.
(21) In fact many of Hayek's writings are aimed at redirecting a 
tvend the consequences of which he deems to be undesiraole.
(22) See Buck, R. C. "Beflexivs Predictions" in Brodbeck, M. (Ed.) 
Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan,
1968, pp. 436-447.
(23) Hayek, F.A. The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the 
Abuse of Reason. London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1965, p. 50.
(24) Hayek, F .A . "The Facts of tiie Social Sciences,' Id  
Individualism and Economic Order, pp. 67-68.
(25) Popper, K.R. The Poverty nf Illstoricism. London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1966, p. 138.
(26) Hayek, F.A. The Counter-Revolution of Science, p. 77.
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Kegan Paul, 1961, pp. 473-486.
(28) Quoted in Nagel, op. cit.
(29) ibid.
(30) Hayek, P.A. Economics and Knowledge, p. 52. (footnote.)
(31) Nagel, E. Op. cit.
(32) ibid.
(33) Of course, reference will have to be made to the relevant facts
in order to support or refute this "subjectivist1’ hypothesis. In this way 
an adequate subjectivist explanation of the phenomenon may be found.
(34) Hayek, P. A. The Theory of Complex Phenomena, p. 39.
(35) ibid. p. 39.
(36) ibid. p. 40.
(37) ibid. p. 40.
(38) ibid. p. 42.
CHAPTER 6.
(1) Mises, J-i. The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science.
(2) ibid. p. 18.
(3) Knight, P. H. M,Wha ‘fl Truth1 in Economics?" Reprinted in 
On the History and Method -d Economics. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 196C.
(4) Melden, A .I. "Willing1' in White, A.R . (Ed.) The Philosophy of 
Action. London-, Oxford University Press, 1368.
(5) See Taylor, C. The Explanation of Behaviour. London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1964.
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(6)  Miees, L.. The Ultimate Foundations of Economic Seieace. p. 58 
See ate£>,for example, Miaes' Theory and History, p. 89.
(?) See Chs e r  V.
(8) Hayek does admit., however. L.at not all physical phenomena are 
capable of being predicted. Thus it is not possible to predict the waves 
that will result in my coffee cup from a plane Dying overhead.
(9) Shackle, G.L.S. Time in Economics. Amsterdam: North-Hollaud 
Publishing Company, 1967, p. 22.
CHAPTER 7.
(1) See Schutz, A. "The Well-isiormed Citizen: An Essay on the 
Social Distribution of Knowledge" in Collected Papers n Studies in 
Social Theory. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 196-1.
(2) The point bei: g suggested here is similar to the argument put forward 
to show that "pure" induction is not possible and that, on the contrary, thj 
problem comes first. See, for example Karl Poppor The Poverty
of Historiclsm. p. 121. "Science, we may say, is confronted with 
problems, at any moment of its development. B cannot start with 
observations, or with the "collection oi data" as some students of 
method believe. Before we can collect data, our interest in data of a 
certain kind must be aroused: the problem always comes first. The 
problem in its turn may be suggested by practical needs, or by scientific 
or pre-scientific beliefs which, for some reason or other, appear to be 
in need of revision." (italics in the original.)
(3) Schutz, A. "Choosing Among Projects of Action" in Collected Papers 1: 
The Problem of Social Reality. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962, p. 69.
(4) Thus Hayek has said: "Ihave long felt that the concept of equilibrium 
itself and the methods which we employ in pure analysis have a clear meaning 
only wht-n confined to the analysis of the action of a single person and that 
we are really passing into a different sphere and silently introducing a new 
element of altogether different character when we apply it to the explanation 
of the interactions of a number of different individuals." Economics and 
Knowledge " in  individualism and Economic Order, p. 35.
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(5) It becomes vet-y clear in this context that we are not referring to 
all individuals but only to certain individuals. We thus exclude from our 
discussion for example, the young child and the person suffering under 
illusions. This is an assumption which is implied when the actions of 
the "individual" are examined.
(6)  Professor Lachmann has shown that the transmission of knowledge 
does constitute an equilibrating force. Nevertheless the spread of 
knowledge is a slow process and is therefore "likely to be hamperc j  
by the divergence of expectations and overtaken by unexpected events." 
Lachmann, L.M . Ludwig Von Mtses and the Market Process. (A paper 
not published at the time of typing this thesis.)
(7) Schufz, A. 'The Well Informed Citizen: An Essay on the Sociel 
Distribution of Knowledge." p. 131.
(8) I  bay "in most cases” because some consequences are anticipated with 
certainty. I  ant certain that if  a place a beaker of water under a 
sufficiently hot flame at sea level, ibac water will boil a hundred degrees 
Centigrade or two hundred and twelve degrees Fahrenheit.
(9) This includes actfons, the aim of which is to influence n y own state 
of well-being, for example, in the case of the applying a cosmetic or the 
taking of medicine.
(10) For example, I  might!"know" thet unpleasant consequences will follow 
if  I  insert my finger into an electrically charged socket without being able 
to exp'ain why this happens.
(11) Smith, Adam, An Inquiry into the Mature and Causes p.~ the Wealth
of Nations. London: J.M . Dent, 1914, {Everyman Edition) Chapter 2, p. 12.
(12) Knight, F.H. The Economic Organization. Mew York: August.- 3 
M. Kelly, 1951, p. 31.
(13) See for example Hayek, F. A. The Counter Revolution of Science.
(14) Shackle, G. L.S. Time in Economics, pp. 103-104.
(15) ibid. p. 105.
(16) See Buck, R.C. "Reflexive Predictions" in "Headings in Uie 
Philosophy of the Social Sciences." Brodbeck, M . (Ed.) op. cit .jp. 436-447. 
See also Merton, U.K. "The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive 
Social Action." American Sociological Review, 1936, vol. I  pp. 894-904.
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(5) Watkins, J.W.N. "Methodological Individualism and Social 
Tendencies." p. 273.
(6)  Watkins, J.W ." op. eit. p. 273.
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Reprinted in Readings in the Philosophy of the Social -lienees,
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(9) In The Rules of Sociological Method Durkheita has defined social facts 
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exercising on the individual an external constraint; or again, every way
of acting which is general throughout a given society, while at the same 
time existing in its own right independent of its individual manifestations." 
(emphasis added.)
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<10) Similarly Adam Smith, in bis famous statement has noted ttiat 
in the market each individual "intends only hi s own gain and be is 
in this . . .  led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no 
part of hie intention."
(11) A tool is thus understood in terms of the plans which its use is 
intended to help fulfil.
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(1) See for example, Kaight, F .H . "Sti .ics and Dynamics: Some queries 
Regarding the Mechanical Analogy in Economics," in Knight, F. H.
On the History and Method of Economies. Chicago: University of 
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(3) Machlup, F. "Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: Misplaced 
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Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hsll, 1963, p. 54,
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(7 ) Laehmann, L.M . "Ludwig Von Misee and the Market Prrcess."
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(12) Shackle, O. L.S "Equilibrium" in Shackle, G. L. S. A Scheme
of Economic Theory. London: Cambridge University Press, 1965, p. 23. i
(13) Hicks, <J.R. Capital and Growth, p. 32. >
(14) ibid. p. 32.
(15) ibid. p. 32.
(16) ibid. p. 25.
(17) ibid. p. 24.
(18) Thus in our legal system the actions of an individual are just''led
if Ms intentions were acceptable even though the consequences of his :
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(19) Clark, 3. B. The Distribution of Wealth. New York: Macmillan, i
1900, pp. 400-403. j
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(21) Friedman, M . Essays in Positive Economics, Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1953.
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(25) Myint, H. The Economics of the Developing Countries. London: 
Hutchinson, 1965, pp. 80 if.
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(27) "Concern with education, hmr.an capital, or the quality of labour 
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This experience has strongly suggested that the early post-war emphasis 
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on the creation oi a labour force both equipped with the necessary 
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philosophy conducive to the acceptance and promotion of economic and 
technical change." Johnson, H.G. "Toward a Generalized Capital 
Accumulation Approach to Economic Development1' in Economics of 
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attached to this ratio, and the real reason seems to that it offers 
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(2) This example is taken from Brodbeck, M . "Explanation, Prediction, 
and 'Imperfect' Knowledge" in Brodbeck, M. (Ed.) Peadings in the 
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This conclusion is also suggested by Watkins. See Wav J.W.N, 
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(7) See Hempel, C. op, cit. p. 465.
(8)  Brodbeck, M. op. cit, p. 375.
(0) Hicks, J.R . Capital and Growth. Lcmdon: Oxford Ujiversity Presp 
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(11) Lipsey, R.G. "Can There bo a Valid Theory of Wages?", in 
The Labour Market McCormick, B.J. and Smith E .D. (Eds.) 
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L
r(17) The instihitional environment might change in such a way as to 
prevent a rise in the rate of increase i r  money wages and this change 
itself cannot be predicted.
(18) For example, money might not be regarded as a luxury good in a 
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